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This thesis is concerned with the qualification of forms of life in approaches of 
biopolitics and vitalism, two main perspectives that map discussions around the 
politics of life in contemporary political theorising. The literature on biopolitics 
highlights how modes of life are given meaning as effect of regimes of power that 
construct the value ascribed to forms of living. The idea of a norm of life captures the 
functioning of biopolitical apparatuses that operate through logics of inclusion and 
exclusion of forms of life, by rearticulating the ancient Greek distinction between zoe 
and bios. Opposite to biopolitics, vitalism looks at life in its materiality and attempts 
to re-ground the value ascribed to forms of living in an ontological dimension that 
starts from the assumption of a power intrinsic to life as the principle to inform also 
the laws of the social and political domain. Even though formulating an apparently 
opposite account to biopolitics, the thesis argues that perspectives of vitalism entail an 
idea of life that reproduces qualifications and exclusions in drawing out their political 
projects. By so doing, they are unable to reframe the terms of the debate of the politics 
of life in a way that fundamentally challenges the premises of biopolitics. 
After providing a schematic of this debate, the thesis elaborates an alternative 
perspective that, following the trajectory of the engagement with life that runs through 
the works of Michel Foucault, Georges Canguilhem and contemporary Spinozist 
perspectives, argues that a more comprehensive account of the ways in which power 
and life relate to each other cannot be captured by either a discursive or a materialist 
account only and needs to be seen as dependent on the contingent situations in which 
the engagement and encounter with modes of life are defined. By critically deploying 
William Connolly’s notion of ontopolitics, the argument maintains that this approach, 
which fosters a practical ethics of life, remains open and receptive to modes of life and 
their interaction with multiple levels of power. To this aim, the analysis formulates an 
ethical approach that conceives of modes of existence not as object of a discursive 
power over life only nor as a purely vital-materialist power of life, but treats modes of 
life in their singularity. 
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Mapping the Debate on the Politics of Life  
 
 
“Today politics knows no value (and consequently no nonvalue) other 
than life”  




“Forming concepts is a way of living and not a way of killing life, it is a 
way to live in relative mobility and not a way to immobilise life; it is to 
show, among those billions of living beings that inform their environment 
and inform themselves on the basis of it, an innovation that can be judged 
as one likes, tiny or substantial: a very special type of information”  
(Foucault, 2003: 14-15) 
 
 
The question around politics and life 
 At the roots of this thesis, there is a preoccupation with current understandings 
of a politics of life. As the above quote by the Italian theorist Giorgio Agamben 
suggests, an engagement with “life” has become a defining element for politics. Key 
issues that populate the political debate, both in academic discussions and in public 
discourse, seem to show this trend: from contemporary asylum and refugee policies, 
to medical research and its bioethical implications, from agriculture policies and 
animal studies to debates inspired by posthumanist and neo-materialist sensitivities 
asking what kinds of life should enter into the political domain. Even though being 
very diverse and spanning a vast array of areas and disciplinary subjects, all these 
issues seem to be driven by the underlying question of what counts as life and what 
the value attributed to life is. The question of the engagement with modes of life 
applies both to practices and gestures in everyday interactions and to policy decisions 
at governmental level. In all these cases, a more or less established idea of what is 
understood by “life” seems to be challenged and put into question by new encounters 
and understandings, which refashion the problematic of what qualifies as life in a new 
way.   
 8 
This concern has not been ignored by academic debates. In particular, two main 
approaches have engaged in discussions around the politics of life: biopolitics and 
vitalism. On the one hand, biopolitics looks at life as politically at stake and takes the 
biological dimension of life of subjects and individuals as the key interest of political 
control. Notably starting with the work of Michel Foucault (1978), biopolitics stands 
today as an episteme (Vatter, 2009)1 that has acquired a preeminent status in political 
and cross-disciplinary theorising, spanning both empirical and theoretical approaches 
across social sciences, economics, anthropology and legal studies, passing through 
arts, medicine and biology (Lemke, 2011; Wilmer and Zukauskaite, 2015).  
On the other hand, vitalism puts forth an affective-phenomenological 
understanding of life derived from the philosophy of affectivity, process and self-
organisation inspired by the thoughts of Baruch Spinoza, Henri Bergson and, more 
recently, Gilles Deleuze. Vitalism emphasises ideas of becoming over being, of action 
over structure, of flow and flux over fixity and stasis (Fraser et al, 2005; Lash, 2006). 
Even though originally applied to the biological sciences, in social studies this 
approach tends to be used to define rationalities, explanations and ethical 
understandings that conceive of the material and/or human world through a non-
reductionist perspective (Blencowe, 2011: 204). Referring to Michel Foucault’s quote 
reported above, vitalism conceives of life as fundamentally escaping any stable 
knowledge, and highlights the self-regulating and self-assessing capacities that pertain 
to all modes of living. Together, biopolitics and vitalism provide two main 
perspectives in which the question around the politics of life can be captured and 
mapped out today (Thacker, 2010). 
This thesis is interested in the understandings of life within these perspectives. It 
establishes that biopolitics entails an idea of life subjected to processes of 
normalisation and classification effected by mechanisms of power. This implies the 
disqualification and exclusion of certain modes of existence from the political domain. 
The enquiry then asks whether vitalism, with its allegedly more comprehensive 
account of life, can provide an answer to the exclusions and normalisation seen 
operating in biopolitics. After giving a negative answer to this second question, the 
                                                 
1 As Vatter (2009) notices, the status of biopolitics within current academic debates and in political and social 
theorising more specifically can be best captured by another term used by Foucault in his Archaeology of the Human 
Sciences (Foucault, 2002): more than a clearly identifiable approach, biopolitics may be defined as an “episteme”, 
an “order of things” which does not function as a paradigm but stands as an incessant source of paradigms (Foucault, 
2002). The variety and diversity of avenues of research that biopolitics has generated across many disciplinary 
fields is also what makes it difficult, if not impossible, to pin the term down to a clearly identifiable definition.  
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research sets out to formulate an alternative account of the politics of life, which strives 
for a more situated and context-dependent engagement with modes of being and 
encounter of life at the level of everyday practices. 
 
Biopolitics and vitalism: a contested relationship 
If the approaches just introduced provide important frameworks in contemporary 
political theorising, their understanding and mutual relationship appear more contested 
and blurred. The existent literature on the subject tends to treat the two as neatly 
separate approaches and sees them as incapable of establishing a reciprocal dialogue. 
In his book After Life (2010), Eugene Thacker identifies vitalism and biopolitics as 
two “major modes in the politico-philosophical engagement with ‘life’ today” (2010, 
xiii–xiv)2 and emphasises the conceptual difference and historical distinction that has 
been highlighted above. In a similar fashion, Zukauskaite and Wilmer, in their work 
Resisting Biopolitics: Philosophical, Political and Performative Strategies (2013), 
define them as three sub-strands within the current biopolitical debate: a forensic 
strand, concerned with questions of sovereignty, theology and the law, which they 
identify primarily with Agamben (himself building on the previous work of Foucault 
and Carl Schmitt); the stand of political economy, represented particularly by Michael 
Hardt and Antonio Negri, and the strand of vitalism, once again derived from the line 
of Spinoza-Deleuze and concerned with the power of “life itself”. Although with very 
different premises and outcomes, they all build on Foucault’s suggestion that at a 
certain point in time, “it was life more than the law that became the issue of political 
struggles” (Foucault, 1998:145). In the latter strand, life particularly comes to be 
regarded as a vital, more-than-human material force (Marks, 1998), which emerges 
across living beings and that has further inspired current strands of new materialist and 
posthumanist literature (Coole and Frost, 2010; Braidotti, 2013). 
Finally, Thomas Lemke (2005, 2015) equally suggests a classification of the 
works that have taken on and updated the Foucauldian notion of biopolitics and 
                                                 
2 Thacker adds a third perspective to this outline, identified with the politico-theological account of life that ushers 
in particular from the work of Heidegger and Derrida, and takes a starting point of transcendence. The reasons why 
this project focuses particularly on the two approaches mentioned above will become fully clear in the rest of the 
introduction, when I further unpack the problematic that is at the very root of this thesis, that is, the engagement 
with the situated and contingent engagement with modes of living and the potential exclusions ensuing from current 
accounts of the politics of life. In this regard, biopolitics and vitalism appear the two most productive approaches 
that help formulate, and only partially address, the question posed. This is the reason for selecting them as the 
starting point of the analysis. It should also be noticed that my analysis distances itself from the objectives and the 
skeptical conclusions that Thacker advances around the very engagement with the idea of life as philosophical 
concern (Thacker, 2010: x). 
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developed it in further directions. The different lines of reception that he lists are the 
following: first, the literature that draws from Gilles Deleuze’s and Donna Haraway's 
works, which challenges the idea of disciplinary control and values the material 
corporeal dimension of the body as site of politically significant action (as represented 
today in further perspectives of affectivity or material-embodied feminism, Haraway, 
1988; McLaren, 2012). A second perspective takes a genealogical stance by showing 
the origin of biopolitics both in the West (Agamben’s work on ancient Greece, 1998) 
and beyond the Western hemisphere in post-colonial contexts, as made evident by the 
work of Achille Mbembe (2001). Finally, a third area of enquiry again focuses on the 
mode of the political intertwined with capitalist logics through the work of Hardt and 
Negri (2000, 2005) and, to an extent, Roberto Esposito (2007, 2013). Lemke also adds 
another development that looks at the matter of life as relevant for both science and 
technology studies and for feminist and gender theories: this coincides with the 
corporeal and technological dimension of existence as object of appropriation by 
power; the empirically-driven works of Nikolas Rose and Paul Rabinow (2003, 2006) 
exemplify this last position.  
In addition, a similar contrast between the two perspectives can be found within 
the literature that shapes these debates themselves. For instance, Braidotti (2013) reads 
and criticises the work on biopolitics derived from Foucault’s legacy. She openly 
declares the intention of challenging  
the idea of the biopolitical on both conceptual and political grounds. The current 
conditions of advanced capitalism push the logic of the biopolitical beyond 
anthropocentrism and pay renewed attention to the necropolitical dimensions of 
the politics of ‘Life’ (Braidotti, 2015: 71).  
In particular, her polemical object is the “forensic” biopolitics exemplified by 
Agamben (1998, 2005), who produces a tanathopolitics by focusing on a conception 
of life (as “bare” life) captured in the inhuman status of extreme vulnerability, 
bordering and exception. In her view, this approach ontologicises the relation between 
politics and violence in taking mortality and finitude as the transhistorical horizon of 
discussions on “life”. She concludes that, if it is true that Agamben (and other authors 
in the biopolitical strand) raises a concern about life, this is accomplished only in a 
negative definition, where life is portrayed as fundamentally diminished and inhumane 
under the effect of power (Braidotti, 2013). Braidotti, thus, criticises the attention 
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given to the element of death, which ends up reifying an immanent conception of life 
and deprives it of its intrinsic vital force. 
A final case that demonstrates the confused and blurred theorisation of the 
relationship existing between these two bodies of literature, finally, applies to the 
existing collections around biopolitics. Some of the main existent anthologies on 
biopolitics (Campbell and Sitze, 2013, Prozorov and Rentea, 2016; Radomska, 2016) 
often gather together texts and authors that belong to all the approaches listed above. 
However, the rationale behind this move remains silenced or almost entirely 
undertheorised. From this preliminary survey, it appears clear that variations within 
vitalist and biopolitical perspectives are often easily interpreted as contrasting and 
opposite positions.  
If this division appears established and commonly accepted, however, much less 
work has been done in problematising this understanding (Szerszynski, 2005). This 
project sets out to contribute to this gap and, first, provides a schematic that maps out 
the debate in a novel way. More specifically, by using the concept of ontopolitical 
interpretation drawn from William Connolly (1992), which I will further explain in the 
section on methodology below, the thesis highlights that the two perspectives function 
as sets of presumptions that ground specific modes of qualifying life and forms of 
engagement with modes of living. The two perspectives can be situated along an axis 
that illustrates how power interacts with modes of living by varying from forms of 
complete control (what can be defined as a power over life) to forms where it is instead 
the force of life that defines the possibilities for political action (a pure power of life).  
By following the assumptions around ontopolitics and by critically applying the 
concept as a method of analysis, the thesis examines the implications of the two 
perspectives and the forms of action and engagement with life that they enable to 
formulate. In this regard, the thesis advances the claim that vitalism is not able to 
provide an alternative to the normalisation and qualification of modes of life 
highlighted by biopolitics. Part I provides a schematic of the debate around the politics 
of life, before moving on and attempting to elaborate a different trajectory in the 
following parts of the thesis. It suggests that a more fruitful account of the politics of 
life should be understood as an attempt to consider the situatedness and the specificity 
of modes of engagement with life. This approach is more receptive towards the 
emergence of forms of life that escape established categories and reflects the 
immediate and contingent way in which relations with life are constantly negotiated.  
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The origin of the question: defining biopolitics 
The analysis starts from the perspective of biopolitics as the first approach that 
systematically captures the question of the relationship between politics and life. It is 
thus necessary to provide a definition of this approach and explain why it is relevant 
for the enquiry set out by the project.  
Tracing the origin of the biopolitical debate is a challenging task. Campbell and 
Sitze capture the difficulty of defining biopolitics by noticing that “competing 
versions, not only of the origins of biopolitics, but also of the question of its principal 
subject and object, will continue to spark debates, transatlantic and transpacific 
exchanges, and struggles for conceptual dominance” before they can find a 
fundamental agreement (Campbell and Sitze, 2013). Following from this, they 
conclude that the task for today’s scholarship on biopolitics is not so much seeking to 
impose a dominant or overarching definition, but rather to “dramatize biopolitics as 
the expression of a kind of predicament involving the intersection, or perhaps 
reciprocal incorporation, of life and politics, the two concepts that together spell 
biopolitics” (Campbell and Sitze, 2013).  
While appreciating the richness of debates associated with this term, it can be 
uncontestably recognised that the work of Michel Foucault provides a crucial turning 
point in raising the question of the political control of life. In this regard, I agree with 
Lemke’s suggestion (2011) that, even though attempts to explain the relationship 
between politics and life were already present before then, it is only with Foucault that 
this perspective is invested with a new theoretical significance. Lemke effectively 
discusses how the debate was shaped before the intervention of Foucault. He identifies 
two particular strands: a “politicist” position, for which the very function of politics 
and the political consists of steering life processes of the population; and a “naturalist” 
position, which reads political processes in analogy with biological notions (for 
instance, in an organicist conception of the state). As Lemke most effectively 
demonstrates, both approaches ended up reifying one of the polarities considered 
(either politics or biological life) and subsuming the explanation of one domain to the 
functioning of the other in purely causal and deterministic terms (Lemke, 2012: 9-32). 
On the backdrop of these more rigid accounts, it could be argued that Foucault 
is the first author that offers an analysis of biopolitics which does not consist simply 
of the mere reification of the two terms constituting the basis for the concept: life and 
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politics. Rather, in his own definition and study, the two terms are redefined and shown 
to be mutually constitutive. More specifically, the contribution that Foucault 
undeniably gives to the debate of biopolitics is to invert the very question from which 
biopolitics ushers: not so much enquiring into the ways in which characteristics and 
definitional elements of the one term (either life or politics) can be causally related to 
the other - that is, either subsuming politics to the functioning of biological laws or 
conceiving biological characteristics of the population as defining the kind of politics 
that can derive. Rather, for the first time, Foucault demonstrates how the relationship 
between the two is itself contestable and open, and is constantly redefined and 
reconstructed as effect of political action (Lemke, 2011, 4; 33-52).  
My concern here is not so much going back to the discussion and clarification of 
early approaches, which have already been so effectively explained by Lemke. Rather, 
the aim of the thesis is to build on these conclusions and further problematise the way 
in which multiple perspectives around life and politics can be assessed and interpreted 
after Foucault’s legacy. Following from this, the aim of the thesis is to offer an 
alternative account of the qualification of modes of life beyond the normalisation 
operated by biopolitical logics, which is the object of analysis in Chapter 1, and that is 
seen reproduced in vitalism (Chapter 2). The study takes as guiding definition of 
biopolitics those positions which demonstrate the contingent character of the boundary 
between natural and political life - which the definition of life as zoe-bios in Aristotle 
(1995) arguably brought to light (Agamben, 1998). 
Contrary to approaches that reify the two terms and treat them as separate 
domains, the analysis here agrees with arguments that such boundary is continuously 
constructed. In this regard, it locates the origin of the biopolitical debate understood in 
these terms with the work of Foucault. Foucault is the first who demonstrates how the 
domain of natural life is appropriated by power by means of the establishment of 
systems of power-knowledge (Foucault, 1972, 1978), which aim precisely at gaining 
control over the natural dimension of life with the end of managing, directing, 
manipulating it. Foucault links the rise of these political mechanisms with the advent 
of political modernity. First, therefore, Foucault establishes a new definition of 
biopolitics as the processes whereby life has become the object-target of specific 
techniques and technologies of power. In particular, in Foucault himself, biopolitics is 
defined as a mode of power based on the attempt to take control of life in general “with 
the body as one pole and the population as the other” (Foucault, 2003: 253), referring 
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to the two regimes of disciplinary and biopolitical power that he elaborates on in the 
intermediate phase of his work. 
However, as the thesis will demonstrate, Foucault’s account does not stop at the 
analysis of how life becomes the object of mechanisms of political control. Rather, 
Foucault’s specific formulation of biopolitics already presupposes an understanding 
of life also as active and productive, and capable of interacting with power dynamics 
in a more fluid and complex way. I will substantiate this claim in Part II of the thesis 
and use it to open up an alternative trajectory to the mapping of the debate on the 
politics of life established in Chapters 1 and 2. This alternative route looks at a way to 
account for the practical engagement and encounter with modes of living beyond the 
qualifications established by either biopolitics or vitalism. It invites to consider the 
specificity and situatedness of the engagement with life at the level of everyday 
relationships. The argument put forth here maintains that a politics of life so 
understood presupposes an ethical approach to life that can accommodate such 
situatedness. As an alternative to the ideas of life fully identified with either a power 
over or a power of, the thesis suggests a treatment of life as singularity and maintains 
that an appreciation of the latter can be conveyed by means of an ethics that enables 
diverse and not pre-determined forms of political relationships.  
 
The engagement with life: concepts, issues, problems 
The survey of biopolitical and vitalist perspectives conducted above requires 
looking at some key problematics that the debate around the politics of life raises, both 
in terms of the key concepts and ideas discussed and of the way in which they are 
treated and understood in the thesis with regard to existent approaches on the subject-
matter. These provide the key dimensions that will be explored and investigated in the 
development of the enquiry. 
 
The idea of life and the understanding of biopolitics 
It is first necessary to clarify what is meant by life in the thesis and particularly in 
relation to politics. In the previous sections, I indicated how my analysis positions – 
and, simultaneously, distinguishes itself from – the large body of critical literature that 
currently engages with approaches of biopolitics and vitalism. The thesis looks at the 
qualification of life within these debates and starts from biopolitics to set out the 
 15 
problem of the normalisation of forms of life, which often results in potentially 
exclusionary terms in the politics derived. An effective formulation to frame the 
understanding of life in the literature on biopolitics can be captured by Roberto 
Esposito’s definition of the “enigma of biopolitics”. In his work Bios: Biopolitics and 
Philosophy (2007), and crucially in the first chapter titled “The Enigma of 
Biopolitics”, the author clearly defines biopolitics by noticing that “notwithstanding 
the theorisation of the reciprocal implication […] politics and life remain indefinite in 
profile and qualification” (Esposito, 2006: 43). It is worth reporting at length a core 
passage that explicates what is meant here by life: 
If we want to remain with the Greek (and particularly with the Aristotelian) 
lexicon, biopolitics refers, if anything, to the dimension of zoe, which is to say to 
life in its simple biological capacity [tenuta], more than it does to bios, 
understood as “qualified life”, or “form of life”, or at least to the line of 
conjunction along which bios is exposed to zoe, naturalising bios as well. But 
precisely with regard to this terminological exchange, the idea of biopolitics 
appears to be situated in a zone of double indiscernibility, first because it is 
inhabited by a term that does not belong to it and indeed risks distorting it. And 
then because it is fixed by a concept, precisely that of zoe, which is stripped from 
every formal connotation. Zoe itself can only be defined problematically: what, 
assuming it is even conceivable, is an absolutely natural life? […] Politics 
penetrates directly in life and life becomes other from itself. Thus, if natural life 
doesn’t exist, that isn’t at the same time technological as well; if the relation 
between bios and zoe needs by now (or has always needed) to include in it a third 
correlated term, techne – then how do we hypothesize an exclusive relation 
between politics and life? (Esposito, 2013: 351). 
 The very “enigma” of biopolitics is identified in the complex articulation of the 
relationship between politics and life, one that, as the author states, by definition 
cannot find any correct and final answer3. A clarification needs to be added in regard 
to the dichotomy of bios-zoe, which Esposito’s excerpt uses. I will provide a full 
discussion of the terms, their contested genealogy and the way in which they help set 
out the starting selection of the literature on biopolitics in Chapter 1. On the one hand, 
                                                 
3 As evident from the quote, Esposito identifies a third term that pertains to the problem of defining the relationship 
between politics and life, that of techne. Although supporting this reading, the analysis conducted in this thesis will 
leave this third term in the background. This is primarily due to the scope of the discussion: the incorporation of 
this third term would open up new avenues of enquiry which a single project could hardly be able to address (in 
particular, it would require a closer focus on the work of other contemporary authors that develop specifically this 
line of enquiry, see for instance Deleuze, 1992b; the aforementioned work by Haraway, 1988; to certain extent, 
Braidotti, 2013). The focus is here put on the relationship between politics and life specifically, reflecting the 
question of how to rethink life beyond the normalising processes entailed by biopolitics and as the common object 
of concern that links biopolitics and vitalism. In this regard, the relationship between bios-zoe provides the 
preliminary framework for the discussion which will be expanded in Chapter 1. 
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bios stands for the qualification of the organised form of life that pertains to a political 
community. Its origin alludes to the idea of politics as a specific domain aimed at 
attending the question of “how to live” (Aristotle, 1995). On the other hand, zoe points 
at the natural, unappropriated biological dimension that falls outside the political 
domain4. However, according to Esposito, zoe also stands as something that cannot be 
defined but “problematically”, indicating the complex and undecidable way in which 
its relationship with politics can be articulated.  
In regard to the latter point, it has been argued (Piasentier, 2018) that the 
ambiguity and complex relationship highlighted by Esposito rely on a deeper 
unresolved analytical problem that emerges already in Foucault. Addressing this point 
is useful to further clarify my engagement with the original theorisation of Foucault in 
Chapter 3. Piasentier argues that this ambiguity lies on the fact that a distinction 
between a natural and a politically-defined life is not clearly and fully established in 
Foucault’s original theory of biopolitics itself (Foucault, 1979, 1982). Hence, he 
concludes that Foucault himself simultaneously implied two approaches in his 
answering the problem of the relation between politics and life, deriving from two 
different theories of the human being: a discursive (where life is conceived as object 
of political control) and a vitalist, referring to the intrinsic capacities present in 
biological life (Piasentier, 2018: 22). This observation is important for the analysis 
conducted here since, in my enquiry towards an alternative approach to the 
qualification of life in Part II, I support a similar argument and maintain that, in fact, 
a vital and material element is presupposed in Foucault’s theory of possibilities of 
resistance to power structures. 
Moreover, the latter point around the ambiguous and ambivalent meaning that 
the discussion of life has in Foucault is supported by another argument. Both Lemke 
(2010) and Fassin (2010) have claimed that the concept of “life” itself remains 
fundamentally under-theorised in Foucault, who, in his lectures on biopolitics, very 
soon shifts from the attention on life to that of the population, thus paving the way to 
his theories around governmentality, with which his theory of biopolitics is often 
conflated. This further distinction helps me justify my engagement with the theory of 
biopolitics and the trajectory of enquiry I select. I intimate that, perhaps contrary to 
the direction in which the work of Foucault has been often taken on by studies focusing 
                                                 
4 As it will be discussed further on, different authors have different perspectives as to how, and at what point in 
time, zoe starts problematising the logics and domain of politics.  
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on questions of governmentality, maintaining an analytical distinction between 
governmentality and biopolitics is important and productive, in order to unlock 
problematics that concern each of the two terms of analysis. In particular, I argue that 
the concern for the qualification of life can be more fully addressed by looking 
specifically at the biopolitical dimension of Foucault’s theorising. This justifies the 
reason why I engage with this specific part of Foucault’s work and I leave aside instead 
the many developments ushered from academic debates on governmentality (Burchell, 
1991; Lemke, 2001, 2010). 
In relation to this, I share Fassin’s invitation to deepen the enquiry into the 
“politics of life” initiated by Foucault and investigate the concept of life, that, even 
though undertheorised, sits at the core of the question and problematic of biopolitics. 
I agree with Fassin (2009) that shifting the focus from governmentality to the analysis 
of life as such is important particularly for two main reasons. First, it demonstrates that 
biopolitics, as a form of a politics of life, is concerned not only with the question of 
governmentality and technologies, but also of meaning and values that are attached to 
life and produced by its management and qualification. Secondly, what is at stake in a 
deeper enquiry into the idea of life is an understanding of the degree of legitimacy 
attached to forms of life and the way in which they are included and accounted for 
both in everyday engagements and in the political realm. Both these dimensions will 
be central to the following analysis. 
Finally, there is a last point that I want to touch on to further support the relevance 
and the purpose of the analysis conducted by the thesis. Fassin advances a similar point 
in another piece (2010), where he argues that there are in fact two different ways to 
understand life within the account of politics started by Foucault: an idea of life as 
matter, which values life as existence and looks primarily at its biological and 
scientific consideration, and a life as meaning, which is instead attached a moral aim 
and that refers to the social-political dimension of life (in a trajectory that can be seen 
influenced particularly by Hannah Arendt). My research aims to make an intervention 
on this aspect, too: it argues that the two dimensions of life do not need to be disjoined, 
since, as it shall be seen, the material and biological status of existence often plays a 
role in determining the exclusions, inequalities and injustices of which life is object at 
the social and political level. The concept of singularity, that I will introduce in the 
second part of the thesis in order to build an alternative account to the politics of life, 
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aims at taking into consideration these only apparently separate dimensions which are 
highlighted in academic discussions around life as an object of interest for politics.   
 
Politics, ethics and norms 
The introductory debate to the problematic of the thesis is framed as an 
engagement with current perspectives on the politics of life, starting from the 
biopolitical idea that life becomes the primary concern for politics. This formulation, 
thus, requires a clarification as to what is understood by politics here and what is the 
relationship of the politics of life with other perspectives of political theorising. As 
Lemke (2011) very clearly notices, it could be argued that the very definition of 
biopolitics as a mode of governing which is concerned with the organisation and the 
control of life may sound trivial or obvious, and it might be argued that any politics 
deals with life by definition. In this regard, the very juxtaposition of the two terms 
“life” and “politics” may appear an oxymoron (Lemke, 2011: 2).  
However, as will become clear in the development of the analysis, the 
perspectives of the politics of life analysed could also be read as inverting the ordinary 
logics of politics. In this regard, biopolitics in particular is contrasted with a “classical” 
definition (as Lemke, 2011 defines it) whereby the task of politics is identified with 
creating a space for “common action and decision-making and is exactly what 
transcends the necessities of bodily experience and biological facts and opens up the 
realms of freedom and human interaction” (Lemke, 2011: 2). Politics, in this second 
reading, stands therefore as a separate and artificial domain for the construction of 
collective meaning, from which the functioning and fulfilments of material and 
biological needs should be kept at bay and abstracted into formal structures of 
institutions and laws. This is for instance the idea of politics famously advocated by 
Arendt, which I will discuss more thoroughly in Chapter 1. 
On similar lines, Vatter (2006) notices that Foucault’s work, for the first time, 
groundbreakingly demonstrates that biopolitics marks the shift of the operation of 
politics to a power imposed over life achieved through the control of processes of life 
itself. Whereas the mere preservation of biological life was seen as a condition for 
enabling political existence (as a structured and well-defined way of life as bios), the 
idea of “mere living” or life itself becomes now the very end of politics. By taking this 
approach, a qualitative difference is thus established between biopolitics and 
understandings of politics as a separate and artificial sphere of human interaction.  
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The latter point, thus, helps clarify what is meant by politics in the analysis, and 
particularly in the perspective of an ethics of life that I elaborate in Part II of the thesis. 
I will return to this clarification in Chapter 5, when discussing the idea of a 
dispositional ethics to which the approach formulated by the thesis is compared. It is 
here maintained that, precisely because biopolitics already displaces politics from the 
formal and separate sphere of institutions and juridical arrangements to the level of 
practices and norms of living that constitute and discursively define the life and 
experience of subjects, then politics, and also any response to (bio)politics, need to be 
performed in the “everyday and at the level of gestures, practices and bodies” 
(Beausoleil, 2017: 314).  
This is also the reason why, as I will argue in Part II, the answer to the qualification 
of life in biopolitics needs to be investigated (and practiced) at the level of ethics. If, 
as Foucault demonstrates, the sphere of governing and practices is already shifted from 
the formal domain of codified laws to the processes taking place at the level of  
interactions and relations of power that constitute the fabric of society, then any 
response or challenge to the biopolitical structuring of life also need to take place at 
this same level of the everyday interactions and micro-political renegotiation of modes 
of living and existing, which is then able to influence and affect also the domain of 
formal and institutional politics. I will expand all these discussions in Chapter 5 when 
completing the final step of the argument and try to demonstrate how the ethics of life 
as singularity here elaborated can be made politically productive.    
The question of ethics and ethical attitude as the dimension to alter the effects of 
power will thus be central to the analysis. I first introduce considerations around ethics 
when examining the productive idea of life that is implied in Foucault’s notions of 
critique and resistance. In Foucault, the function of ethics that produces resistance is 
understood as co-extensive to biopolitics and, in my reading, is associated to the vital 
element of life that opposes and actively responds to biopolitical mechanisms.  
The understanding of subjectivity and ethics is further connected to possibilities of 
action. To quote Thoma on this point: biopolitics defines “the borderland in which the 
distinction between life and action is introduced and dramatized in the first place” 
(Thoma in Lemke, 2011: 31). The question around possibilities of action that counter 
biopolitical strategies of regulation of life is another dimension to which the account 
provided by the thesis aims at giving a contribution. It is argued that, in order to reveal 
the complex modes of engagement with life, also with the aim of altering the 
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normalisation effected by power, the encounter with life needs to be problematised 
and decided at the level of actions and conducts. As seen with Esposito, the account 
of biopolitics cannot rely on an absolute and abstract idea of life, but needs to be played 
at the level of generating and enabling new forms of action. In the approaches of 
biopolitics discussed in Chapter 1, the space for subjective action is still subordinated 
to the mechanisms exercised by power. Nevertheless, with Foucault, possibilities for 
action start also to be associated with the capacity of the self to critically respond and 
position oneself with regard to power dynamics. Ethics will be there identified with 
the expression of a dimension of freedom that remains open for the self to challenge 
power relations (Foucault, 1978, 1983). The analysis of the idea of political dispositif 
that Foucault uses to characterise the working of power will be crucial to capture this 
dimension of the analysis (Deleuze, 1992c; Legg, 2011).  
Moreover, the focus on ethics is further expanded in the following part of the 
discussion when looking at the ethics inspired by Spinoza’s naturalist-material system 
as read through contemporary literature (Deleuze, 1988b; 1992a; Sharp, 2011; 
Spinoza, 1985). There, ethics appears entirely detached from systems of defined rules 
and principles and is read as part of the very experience of life. Therefore, the affective 
experience at the level of the material-corporeal dimension can generate new modes 
of thinking and thus forms of action that can have an impact on the surrounding 
environment and system of relations. At this point, ethics plays a crucial role, since it 
becomes the condition not only to respond to and resist forms of power, but also to 
transform the surrounding environment of ideas and conducts.  
In relation to the latter point, another problem will be identified with the role of 
norms. Norms are read as the multiple devices through which biopolitical logics 
ascribe a qualification on life. More specifically, norms play the role of defining the 
boundary between the normal, the standard, the naturalised idea of modes of being 
and, conversely, what can be seen as the abnormal, the improper or deviant form of 
existence. The functioning of norms and rules effects mechanisms of inclusion and 
exclusion produced by biopolitics in its qualification of modes of life and structuring 
the regime of the living. If the idea of the shift from the juridical law to the norm is 
taken again from Foucault, and it will be more thoroughly discussed in Chapter 3, it is 
argued that the authors discussed in Chapter 1 all provide an articulation of biopolitical 
processes of normalisation. In the introduction of the problem of the thesis, I define 
norms as any biopolitical apparatus that establishes a qualification of types of life and 
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organises them around a certain normative idea of what legitimate life is. As the 
analysis progresses, I demonstrate how, first, the idea of normalisation of life starts to 
be challenged by Foucault and his idea of resistance. Then, by moving on to 
contemporary Spinozian understandings via Canguilhem, who introduces the idea of 
the capacity of life to generate its own norms, I will try to demonstrate how the 
affective disposition produced by systems of relations can have an impact on the 
surrounding environment of ideas and structures, with the possibility of modifying 
existent systems of thinking and modes of engagement with life. In the final stage, I 
will ask whether the approach of an ethics of life here developed can be integrated and 
have an effect also for formal and macro-scale political dynamics. As a parallel, even 
though minor, implication of the argument, I will also briefly touch on what the role 
of critique to power is and what its significance is in regard to the possibilities of action 
outlined. 
Finally, an aspect on which I will focus attention is the ontological starting point 
of immanence that the two approaches of biopolitics and vitalism seem to share. In 
both accounts, life is produced as effect of an immanent causality (Macherey, 1992; 
Juniper and Jose, 2008), whereby processes of control by power and the ensuing 
formation of subjects are not seen as separate or standing on different planes (as it 
would occur under assumptions of transcendence), but are simultaneously present and 
continuously produce one another. This argument is thus relevant because it focuses 
on a purely immanent dimension of life, and discusses the value attributed to it at the 
level of experiences and practices. This is another element that allows me to put 




 The section above has outlined some of the main topics and problematics that 
the discussion of the politics of life dealt with by the thesis analyses. It is now possible 
to present how these themes will be structured in the project and the rationale of the 
chapter outline.   
 Chapter 1 discusses how the qualification of life in approaches of biopolitics is 
interpreted and developed by some key authors within this perspective. The analysis 
demonstrates that the literature selected shows that, under biopolitical logic, life is 
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subject to processes of normalisation that assess and qualify types of life, and organise 
them in specific categories. This differentiation will be formulated by a rehabilitation 
of the dichotomy bios and zoe. These expressions are borrowed from the classical 
terminology used to define “life” in the ancient Greek language and referring 
respectively to the politically organised form of existence (bios), which is counter 
posed to the natural and biological dimension of living (zoe). The thinkers discussed 
at this preliminary stage are authors who, even though implicitly, build their analysis 
of biopolitics upon the starting divide of bios-zoe. The thinkers considered in the first 
chapter are: Hannah Arendt, by looking at the emergence of the sphere of the social as 
the domain of the “governing of life”; Giorgio Agamben and his focus on the 
relationship between sovereignty and bare life; Roberto Esposito through the logics of 
the immunitas-communitas generating the modern category of personhood, and the 
joined work of Nikolas Rose and Paul Rabinow, who are instead preoccupied with the 
treatment of the life of individuals and the population under the effect of medical 
practices. The literature discussed in the chapter highlights how biopolitics functions 
through operations of classification of forms of life between normal and legitimate and 
those that are instead deprived of any value and consideration. By so doing, biopolitics 
thus operates continuous processes of inclusions and exclusions which structure the 
regime of the living. Even though appreciating the critical outlook of these 
perspectives, the analysis intimates that their idea of life does not allow them to 
recognise or explain phenomena of life that might escape the control and appropriation 
by power, that means, of a consideration of life outside biopolitical discursive logics.   
Chapter 2 shifts the focus on the other perspective that takes issue with the 
politics of life in contemporary debates: positions of vitalism. These are here taken as 
the opposite end in understandings of the politics of life, by focusing on the element 
of the productive and lively life as zoe. By postulating a generative and expansive force 
of life, these perspectives seem to potentially rethink the qualification and value of life 
beyond the constraints and normalising operations of biopolitics. I first try to outline 
the main constitutive elements pertaining to the idea of life maintained by vitalist 
approaches. Even though with differentiations among theories and sub-fields, life is 
there described as endowed of enabling, productive and lively capacities. This pertains 
to a living force that furthers itself by flowing into an interconnected whole across all 
planetary scales and registers of existence and variously defined as “zoe”, life-force or 
“biophilosophy” (Thaker, 2015; Zukauskaite, 2015; Bradotti, 2013, 2015; Bennett, 
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2010). I discuss this point on the backdrop of a “vitalist turn” in the social sciences in 
the last decades, which tends to questions modern ad discursive modes of knowledge-
formation and experience. I then analyse some examples of this approach by selecting 
the following: the theory of Gaia and the living planet; the new-materialist idea of 
thing-power and lively matter; and the call for an eco-sophy of zoe-cented 
egalitarianism formulated particularly by Braidotti. While appreciating their attempt 
to take a more egalitarian and flat ontology of life, I argue that in their political 
projects, the discourses analysed are not able to overcome the classifications of life 
found in biopolitics, even though reformulating this in an inverted order (that means, 
starting from the celebration of natural forms of life). By critically deploying an 
approach of ontopolitics, I argue that the ontological assumptions underpinning their 
claims reproduce a normative idea of life that impacts on the political projects that 
they advocate. Together, Chapter 1 and 2 propose a schematic in which the debate of 
approaches revolving around the question of the politics of life can be read in 
contemporary theory. 
Then, Part II of the analysis turns to the elaboration of an alternative perspective 
to the one found in those analysed in the previous enquiry. It is aimed at investigating 
modes of qualification and engagement with life that escape the exclusions and 
reductions operated by processes of normalisation; this is the question that leads the 
enquiry. In Chapter 3, I explore this route by returning to the theory of Michel Foucault 
(1978, 1998). A comprehensive reading of the author’s work, in fact, demonstrates 
that Foucault entailed a more complex and nuanced idea of life. If he is the first to 
theorise the working of norms and processes of normalisation in modern politics (as 
shift from a paradigm centred around the sovereign and the law), he also provides an 
opening beyond such an outcome. The structures that Foucault envisions for the 
shaping of subjectivity in biopolitical regimes seem already to accommodate an 
element of a vital life, which is not excluded or entirely suppressed by biopolitical 
mechanisms of power. This is identified with the enactment of practices of resistance 
enabled by an ethics understood as “care for the self”. In order to prove this point, I 
concentrate on the concept of the dispositif as the notion that chiefly identifies the 
structure according to which multiple dynamics of power are present in the process of 
subject-formation and articulate the possible field of experience, thus defining the 
norm of possible modes of life. Ultimately, the subject develops an art “not to be 
governed quite so much” (Foucault, 1996: 384) by means of practices of resistance 
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and critique. For Foucault, this attitude carves the space for subjective freedom within 
the structures of biopolitical normalisation. Foucault’s theory, thus, has the merit of 
starting to blur the distinction between a power over and a power of life and 
demonstrates how the two are (and need to be) already intertwined in the working of 
biopolitical practices. A vital element that expresses this force of life affirming itself 
beyond power constraints will be further characterised as a capacity of norm-formation 
by linking Foucault’s work to that of Georges Canguilhem. The latter helps introduce 
the idea of a striving for life that generates its norms and escapes power.  
Chapter 4, thus, attempts to further build on the point reached and asks how it is 
possible to expand the generative force of life found in Foucault not only in a way that 
resists power dynamics, but also such as it is able to produce transformation and 
modification of the surrounding environment. In this aim, the analysis looks at the 
materialist-naturalism of Spinoza’s thought through the way it has been taken on by 
contemporary theorising. It intimates that contemporary readings of Spinoza’s 
materialist conception of thought, particularly through the interpretation offered by 
Deleuze, indicate a way to challenge and, potentially, change, existent systems of 
relations, in which also the experience and practices of biopolitics take place. The 
distinctive element of this understanding is read through the connection between the 
bodily-affective experience and the dimension of thought. Experience generates 
modification of ways of thinking in the self and subjects that are translated into action. 
In this way, it expands the attempt initiated by Foucault through his ideas of resistance 
and critique. More specifically, the ethics inspired by Spinoza and highlighted in some 
of contemporary Spinozism (as in authors like Hasana Sharp) does not oppose existent 
systems of power relations, but rather is able to modify the surrounding environment 
of ideas, since ideas themselves, generated by the continuity with affective experience, 
can have a material force to be turned into action. If Foucault’s work attempted to 
introduce a positive critique by practices of resistance played at the level of the body, 
then, the integration and passage to a Spinozian ethics expands the biopolitical 
experience to forms of actions able to modify their surrounding environment of 
relations and systems of thinking. There, the argument suggests an expansion of 
Foucault’s concept of dispositifs with the idea of an ecology (or an ecosystem) of 
thought. In the latter, ideas hold a material force that is able to modify the surrounding 
system of relations, by engaging in a process of transformation that can ultimately 
carve new spaces for alternative forms and modes of life to emerge. Ultimately, the 
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analysis explores how conceiving of dispositifs as a materialist ecosystem of thought 
can generate practices of counter-conduct within a “milieu” of norms and their 
functioning - and eventually open up the possibility for their modification. Here, ethics 
comes to play a crucial role, as a constant practice or mode of living able to modify 
existent norms and challenge existent ways of thinking. In this regard, I suggest the 
idea of an “ethics of singularity” as a form of ethics able to support the attempt to 
challenge and renegotiate existent systems of norms and biopolitical accounts of life 
by means of practices of counter-conducts. The idea of singularity offers a different 
ground for a politics of life able to incorporate an account of life that is not reduced 
either to the object of a power exercised over it nor to a pure affirmation of a force of 
life. Rather, it appears able to renegotiate the value ascribed to life and modes of living 
in the contingent and situated mode of engagement in which the encounter with forms 
of life takes place. This is seen to challenge the systems of normalisation and 
qualifications of life discussed in Part I. In order to exemplify how the ethics of 
singularity here outlined can work in practice, I will provide a brief example by 
applying the analysis to discussions around refugees. 
 Finally, Chapter 5 tries to address some points that still seem to remain open 
from the previous elaboration and anticipate the criticisms that could be advanced 
against the understanding of ethics outlined. These can be primarily identified with the 
overlooking of questions of power and domination, which were in fact central in the 
debate set out through biopolitical theories at the beginning of the thesis, and with the 
relevance and impact this has for formal and macro-structures of processes and 
phenomena at the political and institutional level. First, I will connect my analysis to 
discussions around a dispositional ethics (with which the approach I formulate share 
some commonalities) present in contemporary political theorising. This short 
discussion will help me clarify further the meaning of politics presupposed by the 
analysis and the impact that the ethics so formulated can have. I will finally turn to the 
work by William Connolly, which appears useful to address the problematics listed 
above: first, reengaging with the question of power by looking at a perspective of 
micro-politics; secondly, showing how ideas, actions and practices at the level of 
everyday relationships can have an impact also at the formal, macro-scale level of 
political practice.  
Ultimately, the thesis maintains that the ethical perspective here elaborated can 
provide a non-reductionist account of modes of engagement and qualification of life 
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grounded on the appreciation of the contingent and situated character in which life is 
encountered. By so doing, it can provide a more comprehensive account – and thus, a 
practice - of a politics of life that the literature explored in Part I of the thesis is not 
able to address.  
 
Ethics and norms between Foucault and Spinoza 
I have outlined in the introductory section that the project is framed primarily as 
a contribution to the debates around the politics of life and takes biopolitics and 
vitalisms as points of departure. However, the selection of the literature and thinkers 
performed by the research contributes to a further area of scholarship, that is, the 
critical literature that deals with Foucault and Spinozist perspectives jointly. A quick 
survey of the existent scholarship on the subject can be offered. 
First, it might be interesting to notice that, in his wide and most diverse body of 
work, Foucault himself engages and makes explicit reference to Spinoza only in two 
cases: first, with a very short mention in the History of Madness (2013) and in a more 
obscure reference during a televised debate with Noam Chomsky in 1971 around the 
idea of human nature (eventually collected in Chomsky and Foucault, 2011). The latter 
makes a rather vague allusion to the virtual political weight of Spinoza’s ideas – 
possibly with reference to the notion of the multitude and a constituent power 
generated by the mobilisation of affects. Among the two, however, it is possibly the 
former that has more relevance for my analysis. The passage alludes to the function of 
reason in relation to action, which, crucially, is deemed to take place in the space of 
ethics (Foucault, 2006). Although this reference, too, remains rather short and under-
explained by Foucault, it seems to allude to the fundamental Spinozian thesis of the 
connection of mind and nature, and of ideas and their surrounding environment, which 
does not leave any solution of continuity between ideas and action – and therefore, 
which makes any action already a matter of ethics. I will return and further expand on 
these theorisations only at a later stage of the analysis in Chapter 4. However, I 
maintain that this demonstrates that there is scope for a possible connection around the 
themes of action, ideas and ethics, on which the two perspectives seem to share 
significant commonality. 
Beyond Foucault’s direct mention, the first reference that comes to mind when 
thinking of the relation between biopolitics and Spinoza’s vitalism cannot but be 
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identified with the series of works by Hardt and Negri (2000, 2005, 2011, 2017) and 
Deleuze (1988a, 1990, 1992a, 1994, 2001) and Deleuze and Guattari (1984, 2004, 
2014). The former, in particular, recuperate the Spinozian concept of the “multitude” 
(Spinoza, 2004) to theorise the emergence of a new political subject staging plural 
forms of resistance against the global capitalist order in the form of the empire. On the 
other hand, Deleuze builds instead on the idea of desire to theorise rhizomatic and self-
organising forms of action constantly renewing forms of de/territorialisation against 
the territorialising force of the state. Jointly, they celebrate the emancipatory 
invocation of the essence of life as force for staging action aimed at liberation from 
power. While recognising the value of these perspectives, my analysis runs a different 
direction of enquiry in posing the question of the norm and life. In doing so, I agree 
with Osborne (2016) that the originality and interest of vitalist perspectives (especially 
as interlocutors to biopolitics) can be focused on the question of the normativity of life 
and the living organism rather than on the recent invocations of a generalised, 
processual variety of vitalism largely deployed in the social sciences and humanities. 
Part of the originality of the enquiry, thus relies in selecting a trajectory into ideas of 
vitalism that runs through the work of Foucault and Georges Canguilhem (1973) to 
current Spinozism rather than on the idea of process, creativity and unbounded 
liveliness of the vitalisms5. This line is deemed more relevant for the question asked 
by the thesis. Nevertheless, I will still draw from Deleuze and further approaches in 
today’s Spinozism (Sharp, 2011) as mediation to my reading of Spinoza and to the 
concepts introduced, in order to highlight the key themes that can be retraced in the 
contemporary turn to Spinoza.  
A further branch of literature that broadly engages with the two thinkers (even 
though mainly indirectly or more loosely) is represented by those authors that, 
similarly to Deleuze, were deeply influenced by Spinoza’s system of thinking and 
inevitably reflected Spinozian ideas in their own discussions with Foucault in the 
broader context of French and continental philosophy of the second half of the 20th 
century – and often recognising themselves in the wave of Marxian or post-Marxian 
thinkers. Authors like Althusser (2006; also in Montag, 1995), Balibar (1998) or Negri 
(1991, 2013) could be included in this second trajectory.  
                                                 
5 For a further criticism of the approaches to vitalism focusing on creativity, vitality and self-organising processes 
applicable to both the biological and the social sphere see also Noys (2010, 2011); Prozorov (2007).  
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Moving towards more recent works, contributions to this debate remain rather 
scarce. Among these most recent works, Juniper and Jose (2008) have produced an 
article that clearly and lucidly traces a comparison between the immanent systems 
developed by the two authors, their convergence on the idea of an immanent causality 
and the way in which this impacts on processes of subject formation - in fact, a process 
that both of them envision as necessarily decentering the subject. I will use part of this 
contribution in the analysis.  
A second piece has been written more recently by Dawney (2013). The title of 
the article “The Interruption: Investigating Subjectivation and Affect” once again puts 
the emphasis on the revaluation of the affective experience and the role of the body in 
attending processes of subjectivation. In particular, the author is interested in the social 
dimension of affects and the way in which the mobilisation of affective and bodily 
experience intersects with political processes of manipulations of affects. Once again, 
this will be an important point of comparison for the analysis that follows; however, I 
will also take a separate angle from Dawney by looking at the way in which ethics 
enables an engagement with life.  
A separate piece which also focuses on the affective dimension, applied 
specifically to spirituality and practices of the self, is Davidson (2015). It interestingly 
discusses how, in defining technologies of cultivation of the self, a relevant precursor 
of Foucault’s interest on the subject should be identified with Spinoza and his attention 
to ethics and spiritual experience, more than with Descartes. The article thus deals 
specifically with the topic of the formation of ethical subjectivity. Once again, even 
though interesting and ultimately in line with the argument I suggest in this regard, the 
analysis remains very different and partly outside the focus of my study6.  
Above all these possible references, a particular mention needs to be reserved to 
Pierre Macherey and to the few articles and essays that he has written by explicitly 
connecting the two authors (and collected primarily in his In a Materialist Way (1998), 
see particularly the essay “Towards a Natural History of Norms”). Significantly for 
my analysis, Macherey traces a point of comparison and continuity between the two 
authors precisely in regard to the idea of the norm and immanence, and the effects this 
entails for processes of subject-formation and social theory more broadly. I will not go 
                                                 
6 First, it focuses on the individual and practices of the self, while my investigation has an ethical and philosophical 
angle. Secondly, it does not engage with questions of life and politics, which is instead the area from where my 
research starts. I thus draw from the piece only insofar as some of the claims made intersect with the objectives of 
my analysis. 
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on too deep commenting on Macherey’s work here, since his work has indeed been 
key for the development of some of the thoughts underpinning the project, and it will 
be thus incorporated along the analysis.  
 
Methodology: ontopolitics and projectional interpretation 
 A final remark can be added with regard to the methodology used to conduct 
the research. This is inherent primarily to the question posed by the thesis, which is 
framed through approaches of the politics of life and, primarily, biopolitics. In this 
regard, it appears necessary to justify my reading of this debate. As mentioned, current 
approaches of biopolitics span a vast range of perspectives and fields, which can hardly 
be constrained into any final classification. One of the reasons behind the wide variety 
of discussions gathered under this label is that biopolitics has increasingly grown as a 
framework that is applied both to theoretical and empirical discussions and often at the 
edges of well-defined disciplinary boundaries7. The current project understands this 
difficulty and by no means aims at reducing the discussion to a single line of reading 
that claims any final answer. In this regard, I agree with what Lemke points out when 
he highlights that no contributions to the field can claim to be neutral and no research 
on the subject can be entirely value-free. To quote him:  
Each answer to the question of what processes and structures, what rationalities 
and technologies, what epochs and historical eras could be called “biopolitical” 
is always and inevitably the result of a selective perspective. In this respect, each 
definition of biopolitics must sharpen its analytical and critical profile against 
the blind spots and weak points of competing suggestions (Lemke, 2011: 2-3). 
My intervention aims at providing an alternative reading to the treatment of the 
qualification of life diagnosed by the literature on biopolitics here selected, starting 
from the rehabilitation of the zoe-bios dichotomy. The analysis does not claim any 
ultimate and definitive justification; rather, it builds on the “blind spots and weak 
points” identified in the existent scholarship and provides a contribution aiming to 
address these gaps, and thus move the discussion further. 
Moreover, such contribution can be supported by another perspective that 
appeared particularly helpful in defining the method to approach the literature here 
                                                 
7 In this regard, the definition and study provided here, concerned with the philosophical dimension of biopolitical 
approaches, clearly differs from perspectives emphasising the empirical or historical application of the term. See 
for instance Marks (2006, 2008). 
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selected and identifying and addressing possible gaps. This has been found in William 
Connolly’s formulation of the idea of “ontopolitics”, and the practice of projectional 
interpretation associated with it. Projectional interpretation inspired by an ontopolitical 
analysis consists in bringing to the surface the ontological presumptions that inform 
interpretations of actuality (in the case of the thesis, current understandings of the 
politics of life) and demonstrates how these presumptions affect the politics derived, 
and the exclusions and limitations ensuing from it. Projectional interpretation as a 
method, therefore, goes beyond attempts to simply deconstruct the claims of the 
positions engaged (by unveiling the idea of rationality that they presuppose) or to 
conduct a genealogical enquiry tracing their historical origin. It rather compares 
existing perspectives on the basis of their underpinning ontological understandings and 
shows how these affect their respective accounts of politics. By so doing, it 
demonstrates the contestable character of perspectives that are often not sufficiently 
questioned, and thus opens up space for new alternatives to be advanced.  
It is possible to discuss these notions and how they can be applied to the 
specific case of my analysis in more detail. Connolly first coins the term of ontopolitics 
in the essay “The Irony of Interpretation” (1992), in order to analyse the “ontopolitical 
matrix of late-modern discourse”, in reference to the debate of the Anglo-American 
political theory of the early 1990s. With this, he organises the main perspectives 
existent in the debate in political theory of that period along two axes: a horizontal axis 
defined by the variable of the relationship between society and nature (varying from 
the pole of mastery to that of attunement and harmony) and a vertical one capturing 
the level of application, from the primacy of the individual to the collective dimension 
of the community or the state. By so doing, he maps out the perspectives that shaped 
the existent debate in political theory at the time, and provides the criteria to structure 
and organise the debate and compare the different positions gathered in it. My analysis 
is not concerned with the specific content and context engaged by Connolly in the 
1990s. Yet, I suggest that undertaking an ontopolitical interpretation may provide a 
fruitful method for organising and structuring the debate of the politics of life from 
which my research departs, and for creating the space for new interventions starting 
from the gaps and limits found in it. These steps – that is, critically assessing existent 
perspectives of the politics of life and opening up an alternative interpretation – will 
be explored in Part I and Part II of the thesis respectively.  
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First, the concept of ontopolitics helps demonstrates that every political 
interpretation and every political statement implies a specific ontology, even when the 
latter is not visible and tends to be concealed behind the operations of the most 
ordinary conflicts, problems and issues that face contemporary life. Connolly goes on 
specifying that any type of political interpretation is already onto-political since 
it contains fundamental presumptions that establish the possibilities within 
which its assessment of actuality is presented, delimits its distribution of 
explanatory elements, generates parameters within which its ethics is 
elaborated, and centers (or decenters) its assessment of responsibility 
(Connolly, 1992: 119). 
In what follows, I apply the method of ontopolitical analysis so described to 
survey and structure the debate on the politics of life outlined in Part I: more than a 
full matrix, I suggest that the perspectives of biopolitics and vitalism can be read as 
the opposite ends of the axis that maps out the contemporary debate on the politics of 
life. This helps organise existent perspectives as varying from those suggesting a 
power over life (biopolitics), where life is conceived as an object controlled and 
mastered by power, and those advocating a power of life (vitalism) where life is seen 
as continuously generative and self-organising and thus escaping any control.  
Applying an ontopolitical analysis as a method, therefore, first, allows me to 
compare and critically assess these competing positions and simultaneously show and 
identify affinities between their competing claims. As Connolly puts it, ontopolitics 
enables a “delineation and critique of affinities and complementarities among [these] 
competitors” (Connolly, 1992: 133). Also for my analysis, an ontopolitical method 
helps comparing and contrasting the perspectives of biopolitics and vitalism, by 
looking simultaneously at the level of the politics that they advocate and at how this is 
informed by the ontological assumptions from which their theories start. In this regard, 
I follow Connolly in arguing that the comprehension and analysis of any political 
position cannot but go hand in hand with the unveiling of the ontological and 
epistemological assumptions that support political claims in the first place. In this 
light, using the idea of ontopolitics as a method means first of all unpacking, 
recuperating and deconstructing the ontological assumptions underpinning the 
approaches of biopolitics and vitalism discussed, in order to better justify their 
normative stand about the meaning and function of politics and, crucially, about what 
entities partake in such politics. In better terms, ontopolitics helps define the problems 
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and possibilities of being that become seen, detected and analysed by a certain 
perspective and thus helps compare the positions analysed on this ground. 
This approach appears particularly significant for my question around the 
qualification of life. The ontopolitical method helps me demonstrate that the two 
perspectives of biopolitics and vitalism are only apparently opposite in offering 
accounts of the politics of life. Starting from strong ontological positions, they both 
result in theorising a politics that remains still partial and limited as to the types and 
modes of engagement with life that they are able to conceive and conceptualise. Their 
mutual opposition (which, as seen in a previous section, is also corroborated by the 
secondary literature on the subject) structures the existent debate on the politics of life 
in a manner that still remains highly polarised: refusing the strong premises of one 
position implies immediately being drawn “like a magnet” (Rosenow & Coleman, 
2016: 265) to the opposite pole of the axis. However, despite their declared 
differences, biopolitics and vitalism remain similar in seeing life as endowed of a 
certain purpose or directionality (either as object of a power over, or as capable of a 
generative power of life itself). A first problem that ontopolitics as method of analysis 
helps identify is thus how these alternatives tend to define themselves mutually. In 
other words, they polarise the understanding of the politics of life in a binary structure 
that is yet ultimately unable to reframe and reformulate the terms of the debate, and 
does not leave space for alternative understandings.  
This structuring highlights thus a shortcoming of which the current debate 
remains prey. By starting from defined strong ontological conceptions of life and 
living beings, biopolitics and vitalisms are not able to grasp the practical engagement 
and encounters of modes of living and being that escape their premises. Thus, precisely 
at the limits of these approaches that an analysis along the lines of ontopolitics helps 
identify, it is possible to justify why ask the question of life in the first place. I argue 
that the relevance of this question, that drives the thesis, is found precisely in the 
“holes” that these theories leave open: they are unable to account for the material and 
contingent engagement with life and modes of living in everyday interactions. If these 
theories provide a most useful compass and tool to formulate and diagnose some key 
problems around questions of life and politics, yet, they are incapable of grasping the 
way in which in each relation and encounter, we constantly deal with modes of living, 
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assessing their values and determining how they count, in a way that comes before and 
escapes the premises that these approaches set out8.  
Moreover, and in connection to the last point, there is a further element of 
Connolly’s approach that appears helpful to explain how I methodologically conduct 
the analysis in Part II and III of the thesis. The author further indicates genealogy of 
the origin of such positions and linguistic deconstruction of their claims as the possible 
methods to apply during the analysis. However, he also shows that neither of these 
may be considered sufficient, since they are still incapable of imagining an alternative 
beyond the space mapped by the matrix of existent positions (Connolly, 1992: 143). 
In order to overcome this impasse, he identifies an alternative trajectory in the method 
of “projectional interpretation” of options: this entails bringing to light explicitly 
ontological interpretations as possible competing understandings, thus opening up the 
matrix but also acknowledging the contestable character with which these alternatives 
must be considered. It is worth quoting at length the passage where this further notion 
is introduced. In Connolly, projectional interpretation  
proceeds by projecting ontological presumptions explicitly into detailed 
interpretations of actuality, acknowledging that its implicit projections surely 
exceed its explicit formulation of them and that its explicit formulation – 
constructed as relative to other identifiable positions – always exceeds its current 
capacity to demonstrate its truth. It challenges closure in the matrix, first, by 
affirming the contestable character of its own projections, second, by offering 
readings of particular features of contemporary life that compete with detailed 
accounts offered by others, and, third, by moving back and forth between these two 
levels as it introduces alternative interpretations onto the established field of the 
discourse (Connolly, 1992: 145). 
 The application of an ontolopolitical method based on projectional 
interpretation, thus, allows me to justify and explain also how I conduct the further 
development of the thesis. The unveiling of ontological underpinnings and their 
implications for political understandings help leave possible competing interpretations 
contestable, and thus add to and pluralise the terms of the established discourse. This 
is what I set up in Part II and III of the thesis, where, after having established the limits 
of the current debate around the politics of life, I suggest a possible alternative to make 
sense of modes of engagement with forms of being and living which remain excluded 
                                                 
8 For further engagements and current deployment of the concept of ontopolitics, especially in relation to 
possibilities of academic discussion and critique see Chandler (2018); Rosenow & Coleman (2016); Campbell 
(2005); for an application and analysis of the implication of ontopolitics in debates in IR, see Dillon (1998). 
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from the positions analysed. Also the further trajectory outlined does not claim any 
final or superior validity, but rather aims at introducing alternative interpretations in 
the field of the debate, and invites further attempts in this direction. This is the 
contribution that the project pursues. 
Ontopolitics, therefore, seems to provide a useful method to structure the 
enquiry in light of the question around the politics of life investigated by the project: 
it first helps map out and structure the literature of the existing debate, highlighting 
differences and affinities between the positions analysed but also the limits of the 
current terms of the discourse. Secondly, it situates and justifies my own intervention 
into the debate, which does not claim on itself any definitive answer, but attempts to 
open up further avenues of research around the question of politics and life in 
contemporary political theorising.  
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Part I | The Norm of (Bio)Political Life: A Schematic 
 
 
Chapter 1  
Biopolitics and the Power over Life 
 
Introduction 
The first chapter engages with the qualification of life in biopolitics. As outlined 
in the Introduction, biopolitics refers to perspectives that are concerned with the 
articulation of the relationship between power and life (Campbell and Sitze, 2013). As 
I pointed out, this grounding definition has been developed in many directions and has 
generated multiple and diverse strands of enquiry (economic, Hardt and Negri, 2000, 
2005; forensic, Agamben, 2005; necropolitical, Mbembe, 2001; technological, 
Haraway, 1988, Deleuze, 1992b). All these perspectives offer a diagnosis of the 
biopolitical management of life, by which power establishes knowledge on forms of 
living, with the aim of regularising and controlling them. Thinkers within the 
biopolitical debate have highlighted how life and modes of being become object of a 
power exercised over them and of which life is defined as a passive object.  
In this very broad range of readings, I followed Lemke’s suggestion (2011) to 
return to the original analysis of Foucault. Lemke maintains that the ground-breaking 
contribution offered by Foucault is to demonstrate that natural and political domains 
of life do not exist objectively as already-defined, absolute spheres. Rather, the 
boundary between natural and political existence is constructed as effect of practices 
and discourses that power imposes on forms of living. This appeared evident also in 
the definition that Roberto Esposito (2013) has given of the “enigma” of biopolitics, 
pointing to the contingency and undecidability of the threshold between natural and 
political life. 
Chapter 1 explores the implications of the discursive treatment of life highlighted 
by biopolitics. It aims to show that the fabrication of the boundary between natural and 
political existence produces a certain norm of life that classifies forms of existence 
between politically qualified life and forms that are deprived of political significance. 
By norm, I mean any biopolitical apparatus that establishes a qualification of types of 
life and organises them around a certain idea of what legitimate life is. Ensuing from 
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this, biopolitics operates through mechanisms of inclusion of certain forms of life and 
exclusion of those that are diminished or unworthy of political consideration. In order 
to develop this argument, the analysis returns to the distinction between natural and 
politically qualified life expressed in the bios-zoe dichotomy, which in the biopolitical 
literature still informs the classification of life as effect of regimes of power. The 
chapter focuses on contemporary theorists who have rehabilitated this distinction and 
have used it to develop a diagnosis of how biopolitical regimes operate through the 
qualification and construction of the value attributed to life, and the ensuing dynamics 
of inclusion/exclusion that derive from this classification. Far from being drawn from 
an idea of stable essence or identity of life and the living, the theories analysed 
demonstrate how the boundary between political and natural life results from the 
political action exercised along the continuum traced between bios and zoe. The 
dichotomy bios-zoe, therefore, can provide a fruitful analytical category to capture the 
working of biopolitics, by reducing life to an object which is defined by the control 
exercised over it, often with annihilating and potentially exclusionary effects.  
I further substantiate the idea of a norm of life by specifying how mechanisms 
of biopolitical domination operate. They consist of processes of classification between 
forms of life that are considered legitimate, and thus inscribed in the political order, as 
opposed to other deemed “improper” or deviant, which remain outside of the capture 
and regularisation by regimes of knowledge-power. Biopolitical regimes produce not 
only a differentiation of forms of life, but also an attribution of value: modes of living 
are distributed along a continuum that separates the normal from the abnormal, the 
appropriate and regularised from what is excluded from the sphere of political life. 
The discursive character of power in the biopolitical qualification of life is one of the 
forms in which the politics of life can be currently understood.   
The chapter is structured as follows: first, it unpacks the distinction between zoe 
and bios, its genealogy and argues for its analytical significance. Then, the following 
section looks at the works of Hannah Arendt, who provides a first example of a reading 
of the relationship between zoe and bios in her analysis of the emergence of the social 
and, even more, in intervening in the discussion of her contemporary experience of the 
post-WWII refugee crisis. Even though the inclusion of Arendt in this body of 
literature could be questioned9, I argue that her treatment of the division between 
                                                 
9 I acknowledge that the very inclusion of Arendt in this classification may be objected. However, the specific part 
of her work that I focus on and the way in which the analysis is structured and presented (that is, looking specifically 
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natural and political life, and particularly the way in which she applies it to the 
historical experience of refugees contemporary to her, justifies the inclusion of the 
author in this group. Then, the study proceeds with analysing the work of thinkers that 
look at the same problematic: Giorgio Agamben; the joined work of Nikolas Rose and 
Paul Rabinow, and Roberto Esposito. Expanding on a reading suggested by 
Zukaskaskite (2015)
10
, I show how the authors above expose and together define a first 
paradigm within the life-politics schematic outlined in Part I of the thesis. Specifically, 
they demonstrate how biopolitical domination produces a qualification and 
normalisation of modes of life into sharp and mutually exclusionary categories: those 
of citizen and non-citizen (through the work of Arendt); of human and non-human (in 
Agamben); of healthy and pathological life (in Rose and Rabinow), of person and non-
person (in the case of Esposito). Further distinctions may indeed be possible when 
taking a broader perspective on the biopolitical literature, especially when 
incorporating more contemporary developments and openings. This further expansion 
might include the following: living and non-living; animate and inanimate; organic 
and inorganic; healthy and disabled life; human and savage. 
In sum, the chapter argues that the perspectives analysed offer a lucid and useful 
approach to diagnose how power operates over life through processes of 
normalisation, by producing a series of distinctions between those that are considered 
“appropriate" and “improper” modes of living. At the same time, however, this 
understanding also underplays phenomena intrinsic to life that might exceed and 
escape biopolitical classification and normalisation, and thus reduces also the 
possibility to challenge this division. 
 
                                                 
at her distinction between the political and the social sphere, or the sphere of labour, which reproduces the starting 
distinction between zoe and bios considered here) justifies the inclusion of Arendt in this literature. Moreover, there 
is extensive scholarship that provides a reading of Arendt as a biopolitical thinker (Lechte, 2007; Oksala, 2010; 
Vatter, 2006). Some of the claims made by this literature are taken into account to support the argument.  
10 Even though sharing some of the categories used by Zukaskaite, my analysis remains fundamentally different 
from hers. Zukaskaite is concerned with the idea of the subject and how the latter is produced in biopolitical 
discourses. I argue that approaching the discussion from the angle of life as the correlative to the exercise of 
biopolitical power provides a more useful framing to read biopolitics as a form of a politics of life and put it in 
dialogue with the approaches of vitalism discussed in Chapter 2. Jointly, this analysis offers a more comprehensive 
treatment of current perspectives on the politics of life; this is deemed relevant in order to account for the 
engagement with modes of life beyond the normalisation of biopolitics and its potentially exclusionary outcomes, 
which is the question posed by the research.  
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The conceptual foundations of biopolitics: Aristotle on the zoe-bios distinction 
 In his works on biology, ethics and politics, Aristotle sets out the foundations 
for talking about the idea of life in the theoretical edifice of Western thought. He refers 
to different kinds of life by deploying the terminology of bios and zoe. Zoe denotes 
those functions of a living being that correspond to bodily and corporeal processes 
(breathing, bodily heat…); on the contrary, bios tends to be conceived as a “way of 
life”, and points to the insertion of being within a socio-political community and the 
thriving that comes from it. In political studies, the dichotomy has been popularised 
by the mediation offered by Giorgio Agamben, who starts the first work of his Homo 
Sacer series (1998) by deploying the terms and bringing them to new attention (1998, 
2005). Agamben reinstates the distinction pointed out above between the natural 
functions and the political qualification of living beings and makes it the defining 
element of the very function of politics.  
The etymological accuracy of the distinction has been object of increasing 
contestation (Finlayson, 2010; Hirono, 2016). These critics have advanced the claim 
that Agamben’s study itself relies on the intervention made on the same topic by 
Arendt (2013) and Foucault (1972), and that this linguistic differentiation was in fact 
not present in the original Aristotle’s texts. According to this criticism, Aristotle 
himself makes use of the word bios almost interchangeably between the two contexts: 
in a biological sense, when he studies biological phenomena of animals, and in the 
political sense, when referring to political and ethical qualities of mankind (for 
example, being courageous, honest…). Moreover, a clear distinction of bios from zoe 
seems not to be supported by the reading of original Greek works either (Hirono, 2016; 
Dubreuil et al., 2006). The same criticism has been also made clear by other authors, 
who tend to disregard this interpretation and argue for a much more blurred and less 
defined terminological use of the words in the classical world (Finlaynson, 2010; 
Swiffen, 2012).  
 Nevertheless, if the historical reliability of Agamben’s analysis might be 
questioned, engaging with the discussion shows that the question around the encounter 
of politics and types of life can be traced back to a very early point in time. Derrida 
(2010), in a critical engagement with Agamben, seems to share this point. Derrida also 
rejects the idea that a clear zoe-bios distinction was in fact present in Aristotle’s ancient 
texts. The point where this becomes the most evident is the very definition of man as 
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a “political animal”, captured by the Greek expression of politikon zoon. With this 
definition, Aristotle seems already to challenge a clear divide between natural and 
politically organised modes of being and to imply an idea of zoe which is already 
political (Aristotle, 1995). His definition suggests that human zoon is political “by 
nature”: being political is a natural attribute of human life and its specific difference 
from other animals. As Derrida comments on Aristotle: “Man is that living being who 
is taken by politics: he is a politically living being, and essentially so” (Derrida, 2010: 
348). The definition of the human as politikon zoon, therefore, would seem to 
challenge the zoe-bios distinction on which Agamben founds his whole biopolitical 
edifice. Nevertheless, Derrida does not use this critique to refute Agamben’s theory 
tout court and reverses it in order to argue that an obvious reference to biopolitics was 
already present in Aristotle (Derrida, 2010: 348). In this premises, therefore, 
biopolitics as the orchestration of zoe-bios could be deemed to initiate at very early 
stages of Western thought. The debate on zoe-bios can thus be used to define the 
beginning - if not empirical, at least, intellectual - of the very history of biopolitics. 
Therefore, if it is true, as Campbell and Sitze argue (2013), that it is in fact impossible 
to identify a clear and singular moment to mark the beginning of the theory of 
biopolitics, for the sake of the discussion that this thesis sets out, I take the reference 
to the qualification of life as zoe-bios as the starting analytical ground to select and 
classify the biopolitical literature considered at the preliminary stage of the analysis.  
The specific angle that the chapter takes is to look at biopolitics as an operation 
of qualification of forms of life. By arguing along key thinkers that have uncovered 
the mode of functioning of biopolitical regimes, the chapter shows how the latter 
operate by structuring the regime of life (human life, and, more broadly also all life 
forms more generally) around categories that define the value and meaning assigned 
to living beings by the operation of political power. This corresponds to a process of 
normalisation that distinguishes between normal and abnormal or improper forms of 
living. This operation of power also decides about the inclusion of life into the political 
order. As the chapter demonstrates, as a consequence of this normalising operation, 
life becomes crystalised in a series of distinctions between legitimate and valued life 
as opposed to modes of existence which are excluded from the political domain. The 
chapter contends that a biopolitical mode of governing as emerging from the literature 
here selected is grounded on the distinction between types of life and the qualification 
and attribution of meaning and value that derives from it. In this regard, biopolitics is 
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built on an ontology of life which is assigned the status of mere object of biopolitical 
control. Such an account neutralises those phenomena intrinsic to life that might 
exceed and escape the boundaries of the determinations imposed by biopolitical 
domination, thus reducing also its potentials to escape the effects of power. 
 
Hannah Arendt and the bio-politicisation of the public sphere 
 The beginning of biopolitics as an explicit area of research tends to be 
identified with the work of Michel Foucault (1978, 2002). Significantly, Foucault 
introduces the notion of biopolitics precisely by referring to the Aristotelian definition 
discussed above. To quote from the author: “for millennia, man remained what it was 
for Aristotle: a living being with the additional capacity for political existence; modern 
man is an animal whose politics places his existence as a living being in question” 
(Foucault, 1978: 143). Foucault undeniably problematises the division outlined above, 
and, for the first time, he systematically deals with how the separation becomes 
challenged in the fabric of modern politics11.  
Despite this recognised starting point, it can be suggested that, before Foucault, 
the German thinker Hannah Arendt makes a move in a distinctive biopolitical 
direction, although with entirely different aims and premises. I suggest this reading by 
looking at Arendt’s argument around the distinction between a political and a 
private/personal dimension of life (drawn from the ideas of zoe and bios), which she 
uses in the formulation of the rise of the social (Arendt, 2013). It is precisely the 
disruption of this divide, which she defines in highly critical terms, that marks the 
enlargement of the domain of the political to the governing of private life, or “life 
itself”. I analyse this aspect of her thought to justify why, as I maintain, the author’s 
work can be used to introduce the discussion of the approaches of biopolitics dealt 
with in the following12. I also suggest that, yet, if an engagement with the problematics 
                                                 
11 A full discussion of Foucault’s theory in this regard will be provided in Chapter 3. The reason for engaging with 
Foucault at a later stage of the analysis, as I will be arguing later in the thesis, is that Foucault’s position in his 
treatment of the idea of “life” and the latter’s interaction with politics is much more complex and nuanced and 
already contains elements that help overcome the definition and repressive outcomes of biopolitics outlined at this 
stage. I will thus look at Foucault in what follows, in order to pave the way to the opening towards ethics and a 
Spinozist system of ideas in the second part of the thesis. 
12 Several authors have supported a reading of Arendt’s thought from a perspective of biopolitics (Collin, 1999; 
Durst, 2004; Vatter, 2006; Villa, 1996). They have specifically engaged with her discussion of “natality” as a 
category that looks at the relation between life and territorial sovereignty. I partly take an alternative trajectory and 
argue that a significant biopolitical framing can be traced already in Arendt’s definition of the political as opposed 
to the social realm. I will nevertheless return to the question of sovereignty and its effects on the inclusion of modes 
of life in the next section when exemplifying the argument of the author through her discussion on refugees.  
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of biopolitics is present in this part of her work, it is in her treatment of the situation 
of the refugees that she witnessed and experienced in the aftermath of the second 
World War that the effects of biopolitical mechanisms on qualification and 
inclusion/exclusion of modes of life above described become even more apparent and 
explicit in her oeuvre. I start with the former aspect to contend that an engagement 
with the life-politics problematic - and with the relationship between politically 
organised life and the sphere of mere living - was in fact at the core of the author’s 
philosophical enquiry. 
 In the first chapters of The Human Condition (2013), Arendt sets the basis of 
her political theory by looking at the space of politics within the dimensions of human 
life. Echoing the Aristotelian position discussed above, she establishes a neat 
distinction between the political public sphere (as the domain of life and freedom) and 
the private domain of the economy of the household, the oikos of personal affairs – of 
which she is ultimately highly critical (Arendt, 2013:106). The latter is identified with 
the dimension of labour pertaining to the fulfilment of biological and material needs 
of the natural dimension of human life. By compelling individuals to work incessantly 
to fulfil their needs, labour is seen a form of constraint and imprisonment.  
Along with the physical dimension of living, yet, individuals partake also to 
the sphere of moral freedom, which stretches beyond the requirements of mere survival 
(Arendt, 2013:12). If labour is a condition of constraints, freedom needs to be realised 
in a separate, artificial domain of public life, which is the political sphere of action, 
words and deeds. With this theorisation, Arendt recovers the distinction between two 
kinds of life: a natural, biological dimension of existence, which equates humans to all 
other living beings in their never-ending struggle for survival (what can be termed as 
zoe), and an organised, defined life attached to their being part of a political 
community, in the world of bios. For her, only in the artificial sphere of politics can 
human beings realise themselves and establish a world of shared meaning and values 
through free action. The domain of politics is deemed a separate sphere of existence, 
additional and transcendent to the physiological and physical dimension of mere 
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 Nevertheless, according to Arendt, a fundamental turn occurs in modern 
society when labour stops being considered as separate from the moral fulfilment in 
the political sphere of action, and becomes the organising principle of life also in the 
public sphere. She identifies this turn with the advent of the factory system and of 
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modern means of production, as the point in time when the division of labour 
transforms communities into societies of labourers (Arendt, 2013: 46). In these 
transformed historical and economic circumstances, the objective of political 
governance and administration coincides no longer with the cultivation of a separate 
human world, but rather with the expression and fulfilment of life itself and its material 
needs (Szerszynsky, 2005: 2). Arendt defines this transformation as the “unnatural rise 
of the natural” (Arendt, 2013: 47): the domain of natural life of material necessities 
irrupts into the separate and artificial human world of politics, dictating the criteria of 
its organisation. The domain of politics is no longer identified with a polis in which 
every individual can fulfil and express their human nature by means of speech and 
action. Rather, the public sphere becomes shaped by the logics of physical and 
practical necessity, and the organisation of life processes turns into the dominant 
rationale of political administration and management.  
I argue that, by conceptualising the historical process of the rise of the social in 
terms of the irruption of the problematic of life itself, or natural life, in the organised 
world of politics, Arendt offers an account liable to an interpretation in biopolitical 
terms. Her theory illustrates the concern with the problem of the relation between 
politics and life as the constitutive element that defines politics. More specifically, 
Arendt endorses the idea that the definition of the political sphere consists in realising 
an artificial space aimed at the expression of human action, freedom and equality, 
carved out against the sphere of mere natural living and survival.  
As I will illustrate in the rest of the chapter, however, contrarily to all the 
alternative perspectives on biopolitics that will be discussed in the following, the 
normative assessment of Arendt appears reversed. Whereas, as will become clear, 
authors in biopolitics tends to ascribe a negative character to the governing logics and 
the laws that define the entering of life within the political sphere (as operating a 
repression and often an annihilation of the free and natural sphere of existence), Arendt 
reverses this judgment and rather considers natural life as an obstacle and limit to the 
political realm of freedom. In this regard, Arendt’s argument can be read as outlining 
a process of “animalisation” (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983) of the domain of human 
living, that is at the core of the operation of biopolitics. However, whereas in the 
authors that follow, this process is seen as the result of the operation of a (bio)political 
power that obtains control on natural life, in Arendt, it is life itself that enters the logics 
of political existence, hindering and limiting the freedom that can be there 
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accomplished. Arendt’s judgment of this process as “unnatural” thus, ensues from her 
celebration of the political sphere as the sole realm that can fulfil the condition of zoon 
politikon inherited from the Aristotelian tradition. To quote the author in a different 
passage drawn from The Origin of Totalitarianism, the entering of the natural life of 
zoe in the logics of governing is assessed as follows:  
the dark background of mere givenness, the background formed by our 
unchangeable and unique nature, breaks into the political scene as the alien which 
in its all too obvious difference reminds us of the limitations of human activity —
 which are identical with the limitations of human equality (Arendt, 1973: 301).  
The natural life of “mere giveness”, identifiable as zoe, is the threshold against 
which political life defines its limit. Thus, in the progressive “biopoliticisation” of the 
public sphere, it is now life processes (and not the creation of an artificial space for 
action and expression) that become the primary stake for political life. For the sake of 
the analysis here, two implications of what was just illustrated can be pointed out. 
First, as seen, Arendt uses the distinction of zoe and bios to articulate a clear division 
between the natural and the political spheres of existence. In this regard, she follows a 
historical perspective which sees the rise of biopolitics (conceived as the emergence 
of natural life as the main objective of governing) as a modern form of politics 
specifically13. In this case, biopolitics consists of the management, by means of 
organisation and normalisation, of the sets of conducts and behaviours that subjects 
exercise in the public sphere. Secondly, this incorporation redefines also subjects’ 
relation to life, by bringing to the foreground the natural and material dimension of 
needs before the artificial one made up of values and meanings collectively 
constructed. The former corresponds to a form of life understood as zoe and driven 
primarily by the fulfilment of material necessities.  
 In Arendt, therefore, a biopolitical regime is conceived as an alteration of the 
relationship envisioned between natural and material life and politics. Her analysis 
highlights how the two become progressively intertwined: the laws of the private 
sphere of the oikos and labour infiltrate the public sphere of collective action. This 
shows the gradual problematisation of politics by life itself, which functions as the 
                                                 
13 In fact, Arendt’s analysis achieves here its closest proximity with the conclusions reached by Foucault on similar 
dynamics, and particularly in situating biopolitics historically. I will expand on Foucault in Chapter 3. In both the 
authors, it is possible to trace an analogy that sees the rise of modern political rationale as the shift from a visible, 
delimited and artifactual space of politics towards the progressive appropriation of all other domains of life; politics 
becomes thus equated to the administration of life processes. For a more accurate comparison between Foucault 
and Arendt on their approach to biopolitics see also Blencowe (2010, 2012); Allen (2002). 
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correlative to political life. For this reason, the work of Arendt, in this assessment of 
the emergence of the natural life in forging and determining the dynamics for 
collective existence, can be read as a precursor of the arguments that would later be 
fully formulated by approaches of biopolitics, even though with a reversed normative 
assessment by the author. 
 
Bios-zoe in the citizen/non-citizen distinction  
 If the analysis of the “rise of the natural” just discussed makes it possible to 
link Arendt’s work to the questions posed by biopolitics as the blurring and irrupting 
of life itself into the sphere of politics and governing, there is yet another aspect of 
Arendt’s thought that lends itself to an analysis from a biopolitical perspective. This 
further development not only highlights the presence of the life-politics problematic 
in Arendt, but also unveils the consequences of the operation of classification of life 
highlighted by biopolitics. By separating a natural from a politically organised mode 
of living, biopolitical mechanisms function though a continuous inclusion of certain 
types of life within the recognised sphere of politics and the exclusion of those that 
remain external to it. In other words, the notions of bios and zoe also signal an 
operation of qualification and attribution of the value assigned to life, by distinguishing 
among politically qualified life and life that remains relegated to the mere sphere of 
natural needs in zoe. This is part of a process of normalisation, whereby biopolitical 
mechanisms regularise, administer and foster types of life and produce a classification, 
often also in totalising and exclusionary terms. 
 This distinction becomes apparent in Arendt’s analysis of the establishment of 
totalitarian regimes, where she seems to exemplify the complex (and potentially 
deadly) working of such binary logics. In this regard, she demonstrates how the 
totalitarian regimes of the 20th century operated precisely by enacting a suppression 
and annihilation of the human element thorough a simultaneous process of de-
humanisation and bestialisation of human beings, aimed at achieving a complete 
control over the biological dimension of life14. The fully human character attenable 
only thorough associative political life is reduced to a status of “naked living”, 
deprived of any human dignity (Arendt, 1973).  
                                                 
14 Vatter (2006) has argued that Arendt’s use of the distinction outlines her “humanist” position, elaborated by the 
author precisely to tackle the problems and analysis of the totalitarian regimes. 
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According to the author, this became apparent in the post-war era, in 
connection to the historical emergence of the debate on human rights. For the author, 
this period significantly brought to light the paradox inherent to biopolitical systems: 
even though possibly reaching the apex of the formal expansion of human rights, never 
as in this circumstance did it appear evident that the non-belonging to a certain nation-
state meant the de facto exclusion from recognition from any political system (of 
rights) altogether. This became clear with the figure of the refugee, which captured the 
condition of those who could not be counted as citizens and therefore be protected in 
the name of any substantive rights, but were simply turned into the (passive) objects 
of humanitarian help, that means, naked life stripped of any qualification or 
recognition (Arendt, 1943).  
 The problematic is addressed by the author in The Origins of Totalitarianism. 
(1973). In the famous chapter titled “The Perplexities in the Rights of Man”, she voices 
the following paradox: the rights of man had been created to protect the rights of those 
who had lost their political status of being part of an ordered political community of 
bios, and thus became object of humanitarian protection. However, the 
implementation of human rights had shown that it was impossible for those individuals 
to receive factual and substantial protections, missing a concrete inscription within a 
national political body. To quote the author: “It seems that a man who is nothing but a 
man has lost the very qualities which make it possible for other people to treat him as 
a fellow-man” (Arendt, 1943: 117). This sentence is constructed precisely on the 
dichotomy on which I framed the introductory part of the analysis. Those who are 
considered entitled to protection by means of human rights are actually those who have 
lost their qualification of bios as members of a defined political community, and are 
returned to the status of zoe, of naked existence found at the edges of the political 
order15. 
                                                 
15 The same engagement with the topic appears reformulated also by Agamben. The author deals with it in a text 
titled “We Refugees” (1995, also later included in Means Without Ends, 2000). The figures of the refugee or the 
stateless person highlight not only the relationship between unqualified political life and the system of nation-states, 
but in particular that of naked life in relation to the juridical order shaped after such system. In this regard, human 
rights replicate that mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion that legitimise the system of nation-states as the 
supreme biopolitical apparatus. By radically breaching with this organisational and functional principle, the figure 
of the refugee emerges as a form of existence which cannot be inscribed in the political world. Given this character 
of figure “at a threshold”, the category of the refugee is thus described as a limit concept. Conversely, the categories 
of citizenship (and their relation to human rights) demonstrate how it is possible for a biopolitical power centred 
around the role of the state to manipulate life and decide the conditions for its normalisation by ways of inclusion 
and exclusion.  
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 This analysis demonstrates that it is thus impossible for individuals to exercise 
and benefit from their human rights unless they are in fact recognised as deprived of 
any other protection, that is, unless they are first treated in the status of pure zoe of 
“naked human beings”. In such circumstance, the juridical device of human rights 
functions as a biopolitical apparatus that defines the boundary between politically 
qualified and natural life, or bios and zoe, here identified with the status of the naked 
humanity of the stateless person and the refugee. I maintain that the idea of nakedness 
of the human can be analytically framed and theorised through the notion of the 
unqualified life as zoe found in biopolitical apparatuses. In this reading, zoe is 
identified with “people who had lost all other qualities and specific relationships - 
except that they were still human. The world found nothing sacred in the abstract 
nakedness of human beings” (Arendt, 2013:92).  
 Arendt’s interpretation exemplifies the mechanism of the fabrication of the 
threshold between political and natural life through which the biopolitical system 
functions. The idea of “appropriate” life (in this case, the one inscribed in the political 
order of nation states of bios) is established and affirms its legitimacy by means of 
reasserting the exclusion of those who are not part of it, that is, the stateless people 
that cannot find a space in the logic of the nation state and the bounded national 
community. Connectedly, the latter are further relegated to a kind of life that is 
presented as the “improper”, a naked, unqualified humanity, which can find no place 
in the order of political existence.  
More importantly for the argument I advance at this stage, however, even 
though recognising the co-presence and even necessary coexistence of the two kinds 
of life, the emphasis in Arendt remains on the polarity of bios and the domain of 
organised life, with regard to which the unqualified life of zoe only appears as the 
negative counterpart. In this regard, the figure of the refugee emblematically stands as 
reminder of the persistence of natural life, which can never be avoided if not by 
questioning the foundation of the nation-state system in its entirety. Natural life is here 
exposed in its character of purely passive, diminished and subjected to the operations 
of (bio)political logics over it. Along with this assessment, it also derives that any 
political agency remains ascribed to the sole polarity of power expressed through the 
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idea of the national community and exacerbated by the experience of totalitarian 
regimes16.   
Moreover, a secondary argument can be added as to how forms of life become 
qualified. Going back to the specific case of the citizens/non-citizen dichotomy 
through the analysis of the discourse of human rights, it is possible to observe how, in 
a biopolitical interpretation, the “nakedness of being human” reduces stateless people 
to the status of an improper kind of life. In these circumstances, an individual cannot 
transcend the condition of the “dark background of mere givenness” (Arendt, 1943: 
117), once it loses any sign of belonging to the political community. While being 
produced by the sovereign management of life, zoe is downplayed and only judged 
negatively, in its function of being excluded from the political sphere.  
Ultimately, Arendt considers the laws in the two spheres of political and natural 
life as fundamentally irreconcilable17. Once stateless life is entirely excluded from any 
possibility of qualification or recognition (since incompatible with the sovereign 
system), it is not possible for it to be accounted for in the political realm. Naked life 
appears as entirely excluded and depoliticised: it is assigned any value only in light of 
its positioning within a political apparatus (the structure of state-system and of human 
rights ensuing from this order) that works precisely by structuring and ascribing 
meaning to forms of life. 
 In addition, as demonstrated above, the application of the grounding distinction 
of zoe and bios to the specific theory of Arendt (through the categories of citizen and 
non-citizen) exemplifies the result of a qualification of life which distinguishes a form 
of appropriate, qualified life (of bios, the citizen included in the system of nation-
states) and an improper, excluded one (in the form of non-citizen or zoe entirely 
subjected to power structures). An analysis from a biopolitical angle thus brings to 
light the rigid and binary way of conceiving life as object of biopolitical rationale. It 
shows how life is constructed as object of mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion, 
                                                 
16 An alternative reading has been advanced by Vatter (2006), who argues that there is a positive conception of the 
idea of natural and biological life in Arendt through her notion of “natality”. I argue that, although possible, this 
interpretation is marginal in Arendt’s work and risks downplaying the force and importance of her analysis of 
totalitarianism, on which her work focuses.  
17 In this regard, it could be claimed that a different ontology seems to be in place in the two different domains 
(public and private) here considered (Zakauskaite, 2017). On the one hand, the private realm stands as a sphere of 
difference, contrasted with the abstractedness and equality pertaining to the public, political life. In Arendt, in fact, 
a political community pertains only to equals, since individual nature would pose a threat to political activity. In 
order to safeguard the continuity of the political sphere, therefore, difference needs to be reduced to a minimum. 
Once again, the negative connotation attributed to zoe returns also in this further aspect of the biopolitical account 
of life in Arendt.  
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depriving it of any agency or meaning outside of the biopolitical order. Natural life is 
accounted for only as the negative, as what lacks any autonomous value if not in 
relation to the meaning assigned to it by biopolitical relations, which define the general 
politics under which life, in specific historical and social instances, is accounted for. 
In conclusion, it must be acknowledged that the very consideration of Arendt’s 
work in the strand of biopolitics may be object of criticism. However, the reason why 
I suggest that it is possible to include the author here is that, as commentators have 
noticed (Szerszynski, 2005), Arendt is among the first authors that, along and possibly 
before Foucault, was preoccupied with the question of the administration of life 
processes (through the rise of the social) and, even more, with the inclusion and 
treatment of modes of life (through the post-war human rights apparatus) as a political 
concern. In other parts of her work she also demonstrates how natural life can be 
reduced to the status of nakedness, of pure givenness and thus deprived of any value 
if not in relation to the negative one assigned to it by biopolitical control. Her account 
closely paves the way to how arguments around the biopolitical treatment of life have 
been further developed, starting from the work of the Italian philosopher Giorgio 
Agamben, to whom I now turn. 
 
Giorgio Agamben: sovereign power and bare life 
 As said, the concept of biopolitics is here understood as the large set of 
approaches engaging with the question of the intersection of life and politics 
(Campbell ad Sitze, 2013). More specifically, I have established a definition of 
biopolitics as any action of power that qualifies forms of life along the continuum bios-
zoe and that defines the conditions under which certain types of life acquire meaning. 
Power is here understood primarily as a form of domination which operates through 
normalisation of life and which acts directly on the biological dimension of the living 
by qualifying types of life – often with exclusionary and totalising effects.  
The Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben is certainly among the authors who 
engage with this question, by further elaborating on Foucault’s legacy. Yet, Agamben 
also departs from Foucault’s thesis briefly sketched above about the control of life as 
the specific form of modern politics, by arguing that the relationship with (bare) 
existence provides the mode of operation of politics across all times (Agamben, 1998). 
In his body of work, life is presented as the ultimate and timely object of the 
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“anthropological machine” of politics and works as the threshold where politics 
defines its boundaries by the continuous production and exclusion of life as zoe. The 
outcome is the political articulation and definition of the threshold between zoe and 
bios, nature and culture by sovereign power (Agamben, 1998: 102; Peters, 2014: 330). 
The focus on sovereign power as the centre of the (bio)political structure is primary in 
Agamben. According to him, the operation of sovereignty is already biopolitical from 
its very beginning: sovereignty works by constantly defining the bare life which 
remains excluded from the political realm.  
The latter point appears the most evident in his theory of the exception. 
Drawing from Carl Schmitt (1985), he identifies the sovereign with the entity that 
enacts the ultimate decision to suspend the legal order, thus effecting an anomie. 
According to Agamben, the exception serves the sovereign’s aim of entering into a 
direct relationship with biological existence: 
Together with the process by which the exception everywhere becomes the 
rule, the realm of bare life - which is originally situated at the margins of the 
political order - gradually begins to coincide with the political realm, and 
exclusion and inclusion, outside and inside, bios and zoe, right and fact, enter 
into a zone of irreducible indistinction (Agamben, 1998: 9). 
 The key relationship defining the function of power is no longer that between 
the sovereign and the law, but rather between sovereign and the biological dimension 
of life. With the suspension of formal rights in the legal order, life is disclosed in its 
pure, bare form, and exposed in its vulnerability and lack of qualification. The legal 
vacuum created by the exception enables a direct reach on life by the sovereign, to the 
point of its potential annihilation and reduction to the most naked and disqualified 
condition (Raimondi, 2016: 59). Agamben draws from these theses to claim that, in 
the current predicament, life-as-such becomes the fundamental political goal18.  
A clarification is necessary with regard to the idea of “life” found in 
Agamben’s conceptual apparatus. As seen, Agamben, along with Arendt, brings to 
new attention the Aristotelian distinction between zoe and bios. Despite the 
contentions around its historical reliability, such distinction plays a key role in 
Agamben’s theoretical apparatus. In this regard, “bare life” needs to be conceived as 
pertaining to the sphere of the natural, unqualified life opposed to the organised mode 
                                                 
18 As it has been suggested (Braidotti, 2013), Agamben’s could thus defined a specific legal-forensic strand within 
the biopolitical literature: life is here given meaning primarily in regard to its particular location within the juridical 
system.  
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of “ways of life” of bios. Bare life coincides with the naked form of existence that 
remains when life is disqualified politically, and therefore denied any value19. In Homo 
Sacer, the author defines bare life as “a zone of indistinction and continuous transition 
between man and beast” (Agamben, 1998: 109). It is precisely because “Western 
politics has not succeeded in constructing the link between zoe and bios” (1998: 11) 
that bare life becomes the principle and the instrument by which politics defines itself: 
it affirms its boundaries by constantly reminding of what is excluded from them, 
namely, the meaningless form of life that has no political significance20.  
 Agamben’s account of natural life as what defines the boundaries of the 
political also affects his idea of politics from a historical point of view. In Agamben, 
the difference between modern and ancient politics becomes one of quantity or 
intensity, and not of the quality, with regard to the exclusion of life21. Political power 
has always defined itself by means of the exclusion of naked forms of life outside the 
boundaries of the polis, the nation or the state. Yet, while in ancient times the exclusion 
remained factual – and homo sacer was physically banned from the city-state – in 
modernity, the exclusion takes the form an “inclusive exclusion” (Agamben, 1998: 22) 
and bare life increasingly shifts to the centre of the political domain. The “inclusion” 
of bare life within the geographical spaces of the polity, however, does not mean its 
equal integration within political existence. The bare life that continues to be excluded 
and yet physically present in the social body functions as a constant reminder: it is the 
visible sign of the presence of a sovereign that exercises the absolute decision – and, 
potentially, also violence – upon life (Ziarek, 2012:196). What still remains an outside 
to politics is made constantly present by means of a process of an excluding-
inclusion22. 
                                                 
19 Standing the description provided above, critics have noticed that, therefore, bare life cannot be seen as 
coinciding entirely with zoe either (Ziarek in Sussman, 2012:195). Similarly, Catherine Mills (2015) suggests that 
it is possible to identify four types of “life” in Agamben (the last being a form-of-life, found in his following works, 
1999). Although accepting this critical point, yet, this claim does not invalidate my argument. In fact, both bare life 
and zoe stand as fundamentally excluded from the political domain of bios against which their value is defined.  
20 The abstract character of Agamben’s analysis makes it difficult to give a concrete shape to the subject of “bare 
life” in the actual, ontic dimension. Possibly, he is referring to all historical manifestations both in the past and in 
the present, which demonstrate how forms of bare life have represented a constitutive aspect of Western politics 
with their systematic exclusion from the political realm (ranging from the ancient Roman exiles to current figures 
like terminally-ill patients in a vegetative state or refugees). However, many critics have taken issue with 
Agamben’s abstract and allegedly vague account of bare life, either by highlighting its a-historical and quasi-
ontological foundationalism (Blencowe, 2012; Mills 2015) or by pointing at the lack of differentiation among the 
forms of life that the author seems to pool together in a rather generic and vague notion (Colebrook, 2008; 2016; 
Lemke, 2011).  
21 This is one of the key differences between Agamben’s thesis and Foucault’s, which instead identifies the 
beginning of biopolitics in modernity specifically (Foucault, 1978).  
22 Meaningfully, Agamben also identifies the physical locus where this disjunction takes place in the exceptional 
figure of the “camp”. For the author, the camp represents not only a topological but also an analytical figure: the 
 51 
 With the mutation of sovereignty into modern biopolitics, understood as power 
over life, bare life ceases to be segregated outside the political and is rather included 
as a constant, normalised (even if sometimes hidden) presence. Differently from 
Foucault’s idea, then, for Agamben, the modern era does not mark any caesura in the 
historical modes of operation of politics; it rather brings to light and radicalises an 
element which is constitutive of politics across all times. Sovereignty and biopolitics, 
thus, are not subsequent and distinct paradigm but go hand in hand in organising and 
qualifying modes of life and existence. As Lemke (2011) puts it, sovereign power 
establishes itself by means of the creation and continuous reproduction of the 
biopolitical body. This “disjunctive inclusion” consists in the fact that inclusion in 
political society is possible only through the simultaneous exclusion of beings who are 
denied full legal status (Lemke, 2011: 54). 
 Once again, power decides about the ultimate qualification and meaning that 
life takes, whether it is a qualified and dignified form of life included in the structure 
of social relations or, on the contrary, an excluded and subjected mode of existence. 
The latter still serves the aim of the sovereign, since it enables forms of political control 
(through the absoluteness of its decision) through which political power maintains and 
reproduces its function. This occurs by means of the qualification of types of life which 
are considered politically relevant - by the full inclusion in the organised structures of 
bios - and those that, on the contrary, remain excluded from it in the form of bare life. 
The latter thus is defined only as the “negative” to mechanisms of power and 
domination and qualified as object to power logics. In Agamben, this process of 
classification and inclusion-exclusion of modes of life become particularly evident in 
the distinction between the human and the animal. 
 
Bios-zoe in the human/animal distinction 
 The idea of distinctions of forms of life and their qualifications by means of 
biopolitical logics appear evident in a short text by Agamben titled The Open: Man 
and the Animal (2004). There, Agamben, reflects on how the idea of human being rises 
historically by means of its progressive differentiation from the “otherness” of 
                                                 
camp is the lawless zone where the dynamic of inclusion-exclusion in the political order becomes the most manifest. 
In this zone of exceptional legal vacuum, power can gain an immediate reach on bare life and exercise a degree of 
violence “that [...] nevertheless still claims to apply the law.” (Agamben, 2005:86). The treatment of bare life in 
the paradigm of the camp is taken thus as pervasive by Agamben, to the extent of interpreting the camp as the 
“fundamental biopolitical paradigm of the West” (Agamben, 1998:181). 
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animality. The author names this historical process as the operation of an 
“anthropological machine” (Agamben, 2004). The latter term accounts for all those 
processes in history (scientific, social, political and ontological) which have 
contributed to the separation of forms of life between human and animal, and their 
hierarchisation in favour of the former. With this analysis, the author aims at 
emphasising the constructed character of any threshold between forms of life and of 
the labels conventionally used to define them. This threshold marks a grey zone of 
“indistinction” which has been fabricated and defined in different directions in history. 
With this vocabulary, largely borrowed from Heidegger (1995), the author 
alludes to the fact that, in the spectrum of entities that go from persons to things, there 
exists a vast area of biological life that remains undefined in its belonging to a clear 
classification as either human or animal. Far from being a fixed biological or genetical 
characterisation, the definition of what counts as human or animal is constantly 
recreated by processes of animalisation of the human (as for the figures of the 
“savage”, the “beast” or in more contemporary examples of detainees or inmates in 
inhumane forms of camps) and humanisation of the animal (as in the current debate 
on the extension of animal rights, see Calarco, 2008; Wolfe, 2010) by means of 
biopolitical logics. It is therefore power that, by continuously establishing systems of 
knowledge, defines the boundaries of those categories and thus subjects them to its 
control. Figures like the infant, the savage, the werewolf, the barbarian, the slave, the 
immigrant, the fool… are all examples of how the anthropological machine of 
biopolitics has been operating on different subjects and at different points of time. To 
quote the author: 
it is enough to move our field of research ahead a few decades, and instead of 
this innocuous paleontological find we will have the Jew, that is, the non-man 
produced within the man, or the néomort and the overcomatose person, that is, 
the animal separated within the human body itself. (Agamben, 2005: 37)  
All the categories mentioned demonstrate the constructed character of the 
threshold between the human and the animal that, far from being a natural distinction, 
has always worked as the instrument used by biopolitical power to structure the 
fundamental categories of zoe-bios. This differentiation, therefore, can itself be seen 
as nothing but another form of constructing the distinction between bare life and 
qualified life.  
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Through his analysis, Agamben clearly shows how zoe and natural life works 
as the passive object of the exercise of sovereign power, which requires its existence 
in order to maintain and establish the political order. As also Calarco highlights: “more 
and more “biological” and “animal” aspects of human life are brought under the 
purview of the State and the juridical order” (Calarco, 2008:94). Bare life, thus, 
appears as a form of “politicised” existence which functions as the correlative to the 
polarity of sovereign power. Simultaneously, the process whereby the human-animal 
distinction is constructed exemplifies the mechanisms of inclusive exclusion in the 
qualification of forms of life that has been introduced in the previous section. In this 
case, the mechanism of the anthropological machine causes some humans to be treated 
as non-humans and vice versa. This implies including some humans into a political 
operation (like the creation of the camps) while at the same time excluding them from 
the ordinary political order.  
The diagnosis provided by Agamben’s account of biopolitics demonstrates 
how, in this approach, zoe and natural life are defined and produced as effect of the 
discursive structuring of the political order by power: life is thus described as reified, 
diminished and objectified. Moreover, Agamben’s perspective also contributes to 
exemplify the process of qualification to which biopolitical regimes subject life. The 
operation of (bio)politics is identified with the establishment and construction of types 
of life, and distinguishes what can count as “proper” form of life as compared to the 
one that is instead diminished and disqualified. With the modern political discourse, 
the distinction between persons and animals is collapsed and reduced to a series of 
discursive practices that continuously shift the threshold of the very definition of what 
counts as human - and make it possible to reduce it into an animal (Agamben, 1998, 
2004; Esposito, 2012). The treatment of the human-animal considerations by 
Agamben, therefore, reinforces the idea of a classification of forms of life operated by 
the discursive biopolitical apparatus. In particular, it shows how life, in this 
understanding, is defined as passive, objectified and subjected element, incapable of 




Nikolas Rose and Paul Rabinow: the construction of biological life 
Beyond Agamben’s account, other authors develop an conception of 
biopolitics by looking more specifically at the biological dimension of life of 
individuals and populations as the ultimate object of governing power. Among them, 
Nikolas Rose and Paul Rabinow, whose work is often combined, suggest a synthesis 
where the Foucauldian core concepts of governing populations and formation of 
subjectivities in advanced liberal-democracies is analysed through the perspective of 
biology, medicine and mental health studies. Works like Governing the Soul: the 
Shaping of the Private Self (1990) or The Politics of Life Itself (2001, 2006b) by Rose 
focus precisely on how the biological, mental and bodily life of individuals become 
manipulated and managed under the current evolution of the techniques and practices 
of life sciences. The aim of the latter, in fact, seems no longer to coincide with taking 
care of or healing the individual, but with promoting an ongoing normalisation that 
enables a more and more capillary social control by means of biological and medical 
practices. Connectedly, individuals and communities are disclosed in their true nature 
of “artificial” anthropos produced by the current practices of “biopolitics”, “biopower” 
and “biosociality” (Rabinow, 2003; Rabinow and Rose 2003, 2006; Rose 2006b). 
 In many respects, the approach of Rose and Rabinow can be seen as opposed 
to that of Agamben within the spectrum of positions of biopolitics. In fact, the two 
authors are themselves explicitly critical of Agamben’s theory, which for them 
remains limited to an intellectual descriptive enterprise with very weak appeal, and 
ineffective in tackling concrete and existent realities of the biological rationalisation 
of the life of individuals and communities (Rabinow and Rose, 2003; Rose, 2006b). 
This criticism is elaborated around two points in particular.  
 The first is the too strong attention attributed to the sovereign power in 
Agamben and the ensuing deadly capacity that the latter exercises upon bare life. The 
two authors reject the idea that the biopolitical control of life and bodies is always 
exercised as a management of death (turning thus biopolitics into a factual 
thanatopolitics; Rabinow and Rose, 2006). Contrarily to this, they focus on the other 
side of Foucault’s definition and read biopolitics as the attempt of power to “make 
live” (Foucault, 1978). This brings them to concentrate on strategies of intervention 
aimed at fostering life and health by means of medical and biological practices 
(Rabinow and Rose, 2006: 197). As it is further demonstrated below, health and 
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wellbeing become thus the main characteristics that provide the criterion for the 
qualification of life emphasised by the authors’ account. 
 The second point of difference from Agamben concerns the methodological 
approach. Their intent is to focus on the concrete strategies and techniques that enact 
the biopolitical power of control and appropriation – and consequently, of qualification 
- of today’s medical practices. This approach is thus contrasted to any philosophical 
enterprise that aims at providing a purely theoretical account of what life is - especially 
in ontological terms. The empirical methodology followed by them equally highlights 
the classification and characterisation that life undergoes in biopolitical regimes under 
the effects of governing power. The criteria of definition are this time built upon the 
distinction between (and the production of) normal life complying with standards of 
health and wellbeing in contrast with the one that does not follow this goal. This is 
produced as the effect of the gathering of knowledge on the biological existence of 
subjects by means of medical practices.  
 Rose opens his “The Politics of Life Itself” (2001) by emphasising how “the 
biological existence of human beings has become political in novel ways. The object, 
target and stake of this new politics are human life itself” (Rose, 2001:1). Echoing 
Foucault just a few passages later, he adds:  
Politics now addresses the vital processes of human existence: the size and the 
quality of the population; reproduction and human sexuality; conjugal, parental 
and familiar relations; health and disease birth and death. Biopolitics was 
inextricably bound up with the rise of the life science, the human sciences, 
clinical medicine. It has given birth to techniques, technologies, experts and 
apparatuses for the care and administration of life of each and all, from town 
planning to health services (Rose, 2001:1).  
Rose and Rabinow interestingly connect their analysis on life to the 
development of life sciences and the knowledge that is acquired through them: being 
is deeply dependent and related to biological knowledge and medical practices, both 
in the capacity as their effect (insofar as it is produced by them) and their cause (since 
the study of being and life enhances further research and expertise). Medical practices 
therefore play a crucial role in both sustaining and enabling the very existence of forms 
of being (Rabinow and Rose, 2003).  
Reaching even further, Rose in particular is able to demonstrate how the 
identification of a political qualification of life with the biological dimension of 
existence does not pertain only to the sphere of concrete, everyday interactions and 
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practices, but has entered and redefined also the very conception of rights (Rose, 
2001:17). The author notices a shift in regard to the function and understanding of 
rights across time (and particularly with the advent of modern medicine): political, 
legal and social rights were once linked and determined by obligations and 
entitlements ascribed on to the individual in the name of a certain political belonging. 
Today, however, it seems that  
each human being has such rights, simply by virtue of their existence as being 
of this human kind. Individuals seem to have acquired a kind of biological 
citizenship – a universal human right to the protection, at least, of each human 
person’s bare life and the dignity of their living vital body. […] It is now 
possible for human beings to demand the protection of the lives of themselves 
and others in no other name than that of their biological existence and the rights 
and claims it confers (Rose, 2001:21).   
The passage here shows some resemblance with what mentioned in regard to 
Hannah Arendt and her consideration of bare life entitled to legal protection for the 
very fact of its mere existence, of its presenting itself as “pure naked being” – even 
though in her work, “naked life” was presented in purely negative terms. Moreover, it 
also reinforces the claim highlighted in the Introduction, whereby biopolitics marks 
the beginning (or conception) of an utterly different relationship between life and 
politics: politics is no longer conceived as the artificial domain for the creation of 
shared values and meanings – for instance, captured in the juridical system of rights. 
Rather, politics enters the domain of life and exercises its function by obtaining control 
over life processes and dynamics. In Rose and Rabinow, these processes are conceived 
strictly as the biological dimension of existence, subject to control by means of 
medical knowledge and practices.  
It must also be observed that in their description, the living body is described 
as “vital”. The reason why the authors fall into the first classification made here, even 
though acknowledging the “vital” character of life, is that, even if conceived as 
potentially adaptable and capable of bringing into existence new forms and modes of 
being and subjectivity, life remains dependent and constructed as effect of the power 
dynamics. This is made possible through the acquisition of knowledge upon life, by 
capitalising on its productive and vital capacities. In this context, the classificatory and 
control procedures of contemporary governing techniques produce subjects that vary 
along the axis of the level of health and well-being.   
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Bios-zoe in the healthy/pathological life distinction 
 In the biological account of Rose and Rabinow, the outcome of the biopolitical 
control on life is a classification of life forms by means of the knowledge acquired 
through medical practices - which stand as the form of power active in their particular 
understanding of biopolitics. This means that the “human person’s bare life and 
dignity” of living bodies (Rose, 2001: 22) obtains meaning only to the extent in which 
it enters and complies with the normalisation of systems of governing centred around 
the use of medical practices. Life becomes relevant for (bio)political consideration 
according to the way in which subjects partake in the regularising practices of power 
and how they perform along a ranking that varies between the healthy and unhealthy 
forms of living. In consequence, everything that does not fall into the standards 
enforced by these techniques appears as the radically excluded, the outside of regimes 
of governing.   
 In connection to what was just explored, it is also possible to specify what is 
the form of power active in this regime. Power is this time embodied primarily in the 
figures of entrepreneurs, geneticists, clinicians, in their interactions and relationships 
with patients. By determining the very possibilities and conditions of what exists and 
the way in which forms of beings should exist, power normalises the collective and 
individual sphere, reducing the subjects to variations between the “healthy” and “non-
healthy” living. The continuous manipulation and appropriation of the meaning and 
forms of life does not take place at the abstract, nominal level that ascribes each human 
life equal value. It rather occurs at the level of the biological life of individual beings 
that are constantly subject to judgments of worth (Rabinow, 2003; Rose, 2001, 2006).  
 Moreover, Rose and Rabinow add another important consideration as to how 
power logics are imposed on the individual and how the latter makes herself compliant 
to these very practices. They concede to Foucault and Agamben that, in modernity, 
sovereignty has in fact extended its powers over the living bodies of its subjects, and 
highlight that in this process, the sovereign has also established a “tacit” alliance with 
“the jurist… the doctor, the scientist, the expert and the priest” (Agamben 1998:21) 
and all other figures that are involved in practices of medical-biological care of the 
people. 
However, they also put the attention on the opposite move by which the 
members of the population make their behaviours compliant with the operations of 
power. They observe that within contemporary liberal-democracies, values like 
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hygiene and health have become shared and entangled within the aspirations of people 
themselves. The latter actively contribute to establish a tight correspondence between 
political and personal desires for health. Increasingly, we witness a growing attention 
for a personal reconstruction of the body in the aim of a psychological and, even more, 
physical fitness and well-being. These phenomena for the authors become thus a 
matter of ethics, which Rose develops fully in his idea of “ethicopolitics”23 (Rose, 
1999). 
This, to an extent, opens up to the argument that will be developed later on in 
the analysis of how subjects respond to the dynamics and forms of control and 
management of life operated by power. Nevertheless, it is also maintained that the idea 
of Rose and Rabinow in this regard could still be classified as a controlling and 
normalising power imposed on life, even though not of a repressive sign. In fact, the 
ethical account that they theorise is investigated and understood only as a compliance 
to power logics. It further reinforces the claim that I advanced above, when saying that 
the definition of life as “vital” that appears in their work does not fundamentally 
distinguish their position from the other analysed at this first stage of research, since 
even this productive element of life is co-opted and subsumed by the logics of power 
and their aims of managing life. Once again, thus, the relevant determinations that 
qualify life are those imposed by logics of power and interiorised by subjects whose 
behaviours and conducts are constructed and moulded after these very practices. The 
latter establish a system of power-knowledge about the status of wellbeing of 
individuals and the community in the form of medical knowledge and uses it to enact 
forms of normalisation and control. In the version of biopolitics that Rose and 
Rabinow offer, the subjects also partake in the reproduction of these practices by 
means of their ethicopolitical action and attitude, in the form of a compliance and 
adherence to them.  
 Also this account, thus, even though making a step further and acknowledging 
a productive capacity of modes of life to respond to biopolitical medical practices, 
demonstrates how modes of life remain fundamentally constructed as an effect of 
                                                 
23 To mention briefly, Rose (1999) also returns to the Foucauldian idea of an ethical work on the self, where the 
individual conduct has precisely the function of forging and fashioning oneself in relation to its political context – 
in this case, the standards constructed around the idea of physical and medical fitness and wellbeing. While 
meaningfully resorting to the conceptual terms introduced by Foucault – like “care of the self” or the idea of self-
refashioning – Rose develops them in an opposite direction. Differently from Foucault, subjective response here is 
not read as an attempt to resist the existent matrix of power. Almost the opposite, it is the instrument by which the 
shaping of selfhood itself is made compliant with power logics.  
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controlling power. The self-shaping of one’s life in the relationality of power does not 
function as a possibility of openness to further counteractions to mechanisms of power. 
Rather, it supports and reproduces them by reinforcing simultaneously the image of a 
normalised life divided in the definition between healthy and abnormal. The argument 
put forth here is that also in this particular variation, the sole definition of what counts 
as “life” assigned of meaning is decided by practices of normalisation operated by 
power. Rabinow and Rose once again demonstrate how life in a biopolitical 
perspective remains conceived as constructed by power dynamics and reduced to an 
object of power control. 
 
Roberto Esposito: life in the immunitas-communitas binary 
 Another author that deploys and further articulates the terminology and 
conceptual apparatus of biopolitics is Roberto Esposito. Like Agamben, the inspiration 
of his work can be drawn from Foucault’s idea of biopower, and particularly from the 
author’s lectures on The Birth of Biopolitics (2008) and Society Must be Defended 
(2003). From there, Esposito borrows the concern for the control over the biological 
dimension of the population and the management of bodies aimed at population well-
being. Esposito however, also develops his approach of biopolitics by grounding it 
into the analysis of the history of Europe of the last century.  
 Esposito’s conception of life and its emerging as object of political control is 
framed through the use of the duality of communitas-immunitas. The dichotomy 
captures the relationship existing between the biopolitical individual and the 
community or social body. In this couple, communitas denotes the bond of the 
individual to the community, that is, the dimension of existence that puts the individual 
in relation to its immediate collectivity. Immunitas, on the other hand, characterises 
the opposite movement of retreating and subtracting oneself from the collective sphere 
and from the expropriative effects that collective existence implies. Even though 
opposite, immunitas and communitas are coextensive and stand in a dialectical relation 
whereby each of them is already reciprocally inscribed in the logic of the other 
(Esposito, 2011).  
 Esposito sees immunitas as being operative already in the conception of the 
modern subject of contractualist theories and in the historical accomplishment of a 
system of rights, as an attempt to obtain immunity from the contagion of the 
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community (in all physical, personal and economic terms; Esposito, 2007:50). 
Following this view, immunity appears thus a historical category which is inextricably 
linked to modernity: 
That politics has always in some way been preoccupied with defending life 
doesn’t detract from the fact that beginning from a certain moment that 
coincides exactly with the origins of modernity, such a self-defensive 
requirement was identified not only and simply as a given, but as both a 
problem and a strategic option. […]. One might come to assert that it wasn’t 
modernity that raised the question of the self-preservation of life, but that self-
preservation raises itself in modernity’s being, which is to say it invents 
modernity as a historical and categorical apparatus that is capable of coping 
with it (Esposito, 2007:52).  
 Instead of turning in a self-reductive or even destructive mechanism by which 
the individual can succumb to the intromission of the community, in modernity, 
immunitas becomes the enactment of biopolitical practices that try to minimise the 
exposure to external social fractures. It fulfils the goal of securing and protecting the 
individual from the intromission of the society and therefore preserves and maintains 
individual life. In this sense, it also expresses the highest proximity between security 
and freedom of the individual, since it minimises external interference.  
 However, if the logic of immunisation functions as preserving attitude that 
saves the individual from the external intrusion of the community, the key focus of the 
author is that the same mechanism can also provide the source for a potential 
degeneration. His reference to the history of the 20th century is aimed precisely at 
capturing those instances in time where the logic of immunisation was ultimately used 
to enact and legitimise “immunisation paradigms”, that is, a mobilisation of modern 
biopolitical technologies with a deadly and discriminatory aim. The example cannot 
but be identified with the Nazi immunisation strategy culminated in the killing 
machine of a “thanatopolitics” (Esposito and Campbell, 2006; Kordela, 2013). The 
Nazi regime exemplified the highest case of the gradual transformation and 
degeneration from modern biopolitical logics to a thanatopolitics instrumental to 
extermination. The Nazi immunitary apparatus – operating by safeguarding and 
preserving the “purity” of the Arian population – enacted an absolute normativisation 
of life, by suppressing the kind of life deemed “deviant”. The degeneration of the 
immunising principle that defines modernity appears therefore evident particularly 
when it is turned into an instrument for the production of death (Esposito, 2007). It 
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starts to appear clear therefore how also in Esposito a differentiation between life as 
bios and zoe is present. Biopolitical mechanisms absorb all life and try to reduce it to 
their own laws in the construction of bios; thus, they normalise and qualify the kind of 
life that requires protection and safeguard against the intrusion of the disqualified life 
of zoe. 
 In his analysis of the functioning of the historical experience of the Nazi 
regime, Esposito puts particular emphasis on the notion of the norm (Mills, 2015). As 
said, the analysis of the Nazi regime in Bios shows how the latter was based on a 
normativisation of life. In this, Esposito takes distance from Agamben’s main point 
and argues that the establishment and maintenance of the Nazi regime was not based 
on a radical suspension of the law (the creation of a legal void that abolished any 
tutelage or safeguard of life), but rather from a capillary regulation of life, where the 
norm tried to capture and enable the necessities of the German people. That means, 
juridical and organisational norms of society tried to incorporate all dimensions of life 
into a norm that could achieve an absolute control on it, thus also turning it into death.  
 The operation of the Nazi project was thus based on the application of a 
transcendent norm (that derived from the point of power of the authority and the furer) 
to include all the domains of life. The authority gains control over life because it 
manages it by means of the normative system that can reach all aspects, including the 
natural and vital component of zoe. The latter under the control by power. Zoe is either 
incorporated in the politicised order or, where excluded, it remains utterly diminished 
and unqualified24.  
 Esposito’s starting account of biopolitical qualification of life fits thus into the 
classification proposed here. The idea of a normalisation of life by the mechanism of 
immunitas-communitas plays the effect of defining the ways of living within bios, 
often by incorporating also natural elements of life and raising them to the status of a 
                                                 
24 The further move of Esposito would thus be to look for a way out of this process of total appropriation of life by 
the political norm. It must be noted here that in the latest developments of his theory, the author attempts to look at 
possibilities of conceiving a form of life that is not passively reduced to management by the norm imposed by 
power but is capable to generate its own norm. This applies to the part of his theory that can be more explicitly 
associated with an “affirmative biopolitics” (Esposito, 2011). This theoretical move consists of superseding the 
initial conceptions of biopolitics as power over life - in a purely limiting and disabling sense - and replacing it with 
a biopolitics understood as power of life, which is located in the idea of the flourishing organism and the healthy 
social body in a more organic perspective, also in relation to its surrounding community of beings. In this regard, 
there could be scope to explore the relation of this part of his work with the other body of literature engaged by the 
thesis, that is, vitalism. I will point out below, however, why also this further development is not sufficient to 
address the shortcomings just highlighted. Since I am here looking at the initial debate that establishes the premises 
of biopolitics and its idea of life, this line of research falls outside the scope of the enquiry; however, a connection 
could be traced and this could be attempted in a separate project. 
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qualified existence. Conversely, where zoe remains excluded, it is then entirely 
annihilated, diminished, to the point that the power over life turns into a thanatopolitics 
with deadly and destructive effects. Esposito’s contribution to this debate consists thus 
of pointing out the possibility of an exacerbation and degeneration of biopolitical 
logics up to a point of utmost destructiveness and annihilation. The object of this 
annihilation is once again zoe, which is conceived as diminished, destructed, passive 
and purely subjected to biopolitical control. This mechanism of qualification of life 
and inclusion-exclusion by means of the bios-zoe dichotomy can be exemplified by a 
category that emblematically expresses (and, for him, questions) the convergence of 
law and life: the distinction between person and non-person.  
 
Bios-zoe in the person/non-person distinction 
 As said, Esposito’s criterion for the classification of life is not so much that of 
the law (as it was for the case of Agamben in relation to sovereignty and in the 
arbitrariness of any separation from animal life). Esposito identifies the logic of 
modernity with the paradigm of immunisation, which exercises the analogous function 
of a mechanism of inclusion and exclusion. In fact, the idea of immunity is a concept 
derived from the field of biology and medicine to define those mechanisms of 
protection that an organism enacts in order to maintain and preserve itself against 
possible pathological elements. Immunisation therefore can function as a double 
mechanism: on the one hand, it could appear as a negative practice of protection 
against risks (of disease of the organism, in this case, or of danger in the case of a 
polity or a population). On the other hand, however, immunisation could comprise also 
of a certain element of adaptation from the side of those exposed to the risk, to the 
extent in which life has to open itself to the incorporation of an alien force.  
 Central to this double tendency is the category that is found at the point of 
convergence of Esposito’s biomedical (life as a body) and socio-political (life as 
community) account of biopolitics: the modern juridical-political notion of the 
“person” (Esposito, 2012). Esposito argues that it is precisely the centrality of the 
individual (as said, identified with the single but that is also applicable to the idea of 
self-preservation of the political body as a whole) that has caused the paradigm of 
immunisation to become so central for the history of modernity. The only and most 
effective way out of this closing and limiting tendency for the author consists primarily 
of altogether getting rid of the centrality of the individual - and of the category of the 
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“person” that captures and expresses it in the legal sphere. This paves the way for his 
philosophy of the impersonal, which he elaborates in the latest work of his series 
(2012). This theoretical development represents a counterstrategy to the idea of the 
person foundational for the modern nation-state and the juridico-political system more 
broadly.  
 The condition of personhood captures the synthesis of the ideas of the citizen 
and that of the individual capable of self-determination, and thus portable of rights, by 
means of its inscription into a juridical system. Expanding to some extent the 
ambiguity that has already been pointed out in relation to Arendt’s analysis of the 
rights of the man and the citizen, also in the notion of personhood, human life remains 
fundamentally outside the protection of the law. In better words, personhood seems to 
provide a category able to operate that same mechanism of inclusion and exclusion 
between zoe and bios. 
 As in the case of Agamben’s bare life compared to normalised and qualified 
political life, also the concept of person defines a subject by way of determining to 
what extent it takes part in the organised life of the community (bios) but, at the same 
time, it is kept “immune” from the latter’s contamination by the device of rights. 
“Persons” are thus defined against non-persons, which also continue to be still present 
in the political system by means of their exclusion. Once again, the latter appear as 
diminished and disqualified, even up to the point of extermination and death. 
According to the different circumstances and points in time, therefore, a certain 
“normal” idea of what counts as the appropriate form of life (as person) is erected 
against that which is not. Bios is kept secluded and separate from zoe, but in this 
relation the latter remains utterly disqualified and annihilated. To quote the author: 
What really qualifies as person only occupies the central section: that of adult, 
healthy, individuals. Before and after this lies the no-man’s land of the non-
person (the foetus), the quasi-person (the infant), the semi-person (the elderly, 
no longer mentally or physically able), the no-longer-person (the patient in the 
vegetative state) and, finally, the anti-person (the fool, whom Singer puts in the 
same relation to the intelligent human being as obtains between the animal and 
the normal human being - albeit with a clear preference for the animal) 
(Esposito: 2012: 97).  
 It could thus be said that, also for the notion of the person, each epoch and 
context can identify the specific forms of being that are deemed to appropriately fall 
into the category and those which, conversely, remain fundamentally excluded from it 
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(the slave as non-person in the Roman empire; the current “incomplete” status of the 
body in the form of the embryo, the foetus; the subject in the vegetative state as 
distinguished from the health body…). All these concrete examples reveal the 
analogous function of the idea of personhood as a biopolitical apparatus that constructs 
the notion of life that can legitimately enter into the political realm. As consequence 
of this, while certain kinds of life are normalised, biopolitical mechanisms also select 
others that remain fundamentally excluded. Also in this case, processes of inclusion 
and exclusion remain the outcome of a power that operates through immunisation to 
ultimately establish what counts as appropriate, and thus, politically significant life.   
 The notion of the person functions thus as an apparatus of inclusion and 
exclusion. It imposes a norm that structures social relations and, most importantly, 
defines what or who can be recognised as an adequate subject of the political 
community. If, for Esposito, who is more in line with Foucault than with Agamben on 
this point, this becomes the most evident and specific for the juridico-political order 
of modernity (in relation to which he develops the very paradigm of immunisation), it 
is also true that similar operations of inclusion and exclusion have been active since 
very ancient times.  
Such an account demonstrates the constructed value and qualification assigned 
to life as effect of the operation of biopolitical logics, in this case identified with the 
juridico-political category of the person. Far from being a stable definition that relies 
on some given properties or essences, the category of person becomes a construct that 
structures modes of existence within the biopolitical regime. What is more significant 
for my analysis, along with the treatment of the biological existence, are the socio-
political implications of the biopolitical mechanisms: they attribute a value to the type 
of life that can be legitimately qualified and ascribed of meaning. Even more crucially, 
this operation produces logics of inclusion of the types of life that can legitimately 
enter political existence as opposed to those that remain fundamentally excluded from 
it. Thus, as object of biopolitical mechanism, life is regarded as passive, annihilated 
and emptied of any meaning of its own, even to the point of reaching totalising and 
annihilating outcomes as to the way certain types of life are treated. 
 This is well exemplified in Esposito’s analysis through the deployment of the 
conceptual binary of immunitas-communitas and the risks that the passage through 
immunitas implies: it recreates and justifies logics of “otherness” that culminate into 
pure destruction and suppression of certain modes of existence. Any attempt to escape 
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the paradigm modernity presupposes the passage through it in a dialectical and 
potentially destructive sense25.  
 In sum, Esposito’s formulation of biopolitics exemplifies the same 
mechanisms of inclusion-exclusion, which, in this particular case, is the result of the 
operation of the immunitas-communitas logic that structures the (bio)political domain. 
As seen, certain types of life remain excluded and even potentially denied also at a 
physical level. Life appears devoid and deprived of any value of its own, if not as a 
construction of the practices and mechanism of power that life applies on it and 
through which power structures the realm of politics. The examination of Esposito’s 
theory, therefore, further reinforces the discursive construction of life in which the 
approaches of biopolitics resolve their conception of the politics of life, which is 
considered one of the ends of the schematic here outlined. 
 
Conclusion 
 Chapter 1 has delved into theories of biopolitics in order to demonstrate their 
understanding of the politics of life as a central question of contemporary political and 
social theorising. Among the many directives and possible lines of development within 
this approach, the analysis has chosen to concentrate on the element of the 
qualification of modes of existence around a certain norm of life, and, connectedly, on 
the way in which life becomes defined in relation to given sets of normalising 
processes and apparatuses that assign meaning to forms of living. In order to address 
this aspect, the analysis has engaged with the distinction between zoe and bios drawn 
from the ancient Greek language and argued for its theoretical significance in 
examining how power operates on modes of life. The study has explored a selection 
of authors who have rearticulated this distinction and used it to structure their own 
theories around the working of biopolitical regimes. The question leading this stage of 
the enquiry has been concerned with how the distinction outlined above captures 
                                                 
25 This may be referred particularly to the further development of his theory defined as an “impersonal” politics 
(Esposito, 2012). What is missing in Esposito even in his latest affirmative opening is that the way out of 
biopolitical logics comes at the expense of passing through immunisation practices and to the risk they might 
produce when brought to a point of degeneration. Esposito’s call for a better appreciation of life immanent to living 
(Esposito and Campbell, 2006: 9) is derived only by the passage through a politics of immunisation and its deadly 
potentials. Thus, even if the solution for overcoming negative modes of biopolitics is put in an affirmative process, 
the importance of this immanent kind of life can be fully realised only through the dialectical passage through 
forms of immunisations and their potentially very destructive and annihilating outcomes. Even this opening cannot 
thus be sufficient to reconsider modes of life beyond biopolitical normalisation. 
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mechanisms of classification of life by the operation of a power aimed at its control 
and qualification.  
The first author identified in this regard was Hanna Arendt, of whom I offered 
a biopolitical reading by looking at her theory of the rise of the social as the progressive 
replacement of the artificial, autonomous sphere of politics by the dynamics of labour 
and material necessity. I also tried to show that the distinction between zoe and bios 
seems to be reproduced in her analysis around notions of citizens and non-citizens and 
the case of human rights. Then, the following sections of the chapter have looked at 
those contemporary authors who more recently have built on and further stretched the 
theory of biopolitics in new directions: Agamben, focusing on the dynamic of the 
suspension of the law by means of which sovereignty reaches control of bare life; 
Rabinow and Rose, who look at the normalisation of contemporary life in liberal-
democratic regimens by means of medical practices, and finally Roberto Esposito, who 
focuses on historical processes of immunisation. Beyond the specific theoretical 
content of each approach, the argument reverted around their articulation of the kinds 
of life above presented. All of them, even though with different understandings and 
formulations, demonstrate how the value and meaning ascribed to life appear 
fundamentally constructed by the discourses that power enacts upon life. In other 
words, life derives its meaning only as effect of the qualifying and categorising logics 
operated by regimes of power. All authors demonstrate how power is always grounded 
on a politics of life based on mechanisms of inclusion of types of life considered 
legitimate and exclusion of those that do not fall within the aims of power logics (or 
are maintained only as their negative correlative). The idea of a legitimate form of life 
is here identified with the norm enacted by biopolitical apparatuses. 
Moreover, a parallel layer of the argument has been concerned with the effect 
of processes of normalisation of lives ensuing from mechanism of power effectuating 
the bios-zoe distinction. For all of them, power informs certain norms as mechanisms 
aimed at the regularisation of modes of living around certain standards. These 
processes of qualification of life are captured by sharp binaries that operate often in 
exclusionary terms. It has been observed how forms of this categorisation (mostly as 
distinctive dichotomies) can be identified in the work of each author: citizen and non-
citizen in Arendt; human and non-human in Agamben; healthy and unhealthy life in 
Rose and Rabinow and finally person and non-person in Esposito. All of them 
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articulate variations of the starting binary between zoe and bios used as the premise to 
this debate.  
The synthesis of the politics of life as emerging by an overview of approaches 
of biopolitics is thus that of a life that appears as objectified, constructed, diminished 
and even repressed and annihilated as effect of logics of power. Biopolitical analysis 
brings to light how regimes of power-knowledge operate in various ways by moulding, 
controlling, normalising and qualifying modes of living. This account defines a 
discursive approach and occupies a first end of the schematic of the politics of life 
outlined in this first part of the analysis. The latter, however, leaves very minimal or 
no scope to capture and theorise the capacity of modes of life to respond to the logics 
of power and challenge forms of domination. In what follows, I will turn to a second 
perspective of the politics of life which grounds the qualification of life on a materialist 
and ontological understanding, and uses this premise to derive the meaning and 
function of politics. This approach is seen to coincide with the vitalist response to the 
politics-life problematic. By inverting the relationship between politics and life, and 
assuming the latter as grounding principle, vital-materialism appears to stand in 
antithesis to approaches of biopolitics and potentially paves the way to an engagement 





Vitalism and the Power of Life 
 
Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed the qualification of life within the biopolitical 
debate by starting from the dichotomy of bios-zoe. I suggested that approaches of 
biopolitics demonstrate the constructed nature of any definition of life, which is 
produced by discourses of power. Power, which has been identified either with the 
sovereign (Agamben), with medical practices (Rose and Rabinow) or with jurdico-
political apparatuses centred around the idea of personhood (Esposito) qualifies and 
gives meaning to forms of existence through a certain idea of “normal” life, also 
producing a classification of the types of life that are included in the political domain. 
I maintained that biopolitical practices also function through mechanisms of inclusion 
and exclusion that define what types of life can legitimately be included in the political 
sphere. The dichotomies highlighted in the analysis in the forms of citizen/non-citizen, 
human/animal, person/thing and healthy/pathological life exemplified this 
classification and demonstrated the mechanisms through which power operates by 
fabricating the threshold between natural and political, that is, normal and unqualified 
existence. Overall, approaches of biopolitics offer an acute diagnosis of regimes of 
power in which life is understood as diminished, exploited, objectified and subjected 
to power dynamics. However, I maintained that, at the same time, by focusing on the 
discursive fabrication of the meaning and value of life as object of power, an approach 
of biopolitics excludes the possibility of the existence of modes of living outside the 
action of power. In particular, they exclude that life in itself could be endowed of an 
intrinsic meaning derived from its very subsistence and materiality. Biopolitics has 
been identified with one of the ends in which a schematic of current debates around a 
politics of life can be understood and mapped out.  
Chapter 2 turns to a perspective that offers an opposite understanding of the 
question of the relationship between life and politics, that is, an approach of vital-
materialism. Vitalism starts from the assumption that, far from being merely a product 
or object of power dynamics, life exists as an independent and creative force that 
constantly escapes any attempt to appropriate, represent and dominate it. Life is the 
 69 
primary essence from which modes of existence and determinate forms of living 
derive. By seeing life as a force that cannot be reduced to any appropriation or 
explanation, vitalism appears thus to stand in opposition to perspectives of biopolitics. 
Vitalism could thus be seen as the opposite end of the spectrum in the schematic that 
captures current approaches to the politics of life.  
However, it is here argued that, even though starting from opposite 
assumptions and advocating a more inclusive account of forms of life, which 
seemingly escapes any possibility of fixture into a norm, current understandings of 
vitalism are not entirely able to get rid of a binary account of life either. In their 
subsuming their explanation of beings to a pervasive “power of life”, a classification 
of forms of life between human and non-human, nature or things still remains, even 
though with an inverted order. Moreover, the political project that is derived from these 
assumptions appears itself over-determined by the priority given to natural life. The 
ideas of Gaia as the living planet, “vibrant matter” or the “liveliness” of life, which 
provide some examples of this approach, appear to put pressuring demands for specific 
and substantive ethical and political commitments. In other words, it appears that it is 
now life that defines and constructs the principles according to which politics should 
be informed. If there are many strengths to the contribution that a vital-materialist 
approach brings to the debate, especially in terms of enlarging the sphere of life and 
living beings considered in political discussions, yet, it is also maintained that these 
approaches are ultimately unable to escape the qualification of types of life and 
attribution of value, and the ensuing exclusions, which was the problem highlighted in 
Chapter 1.  
The chapter is structured as follows. First, it clarifies what is meant by vitalism 
and how it has emerged in contemporary debates. The first section looks at a “vitalist 
turn” that seems to enter many approaches in the social sciences. Then, the following 
section goes on exemplifying some of the debates in which this understanding of life 
is applied: among the possible, I discuss the perspectives of Gaia and the living planet; 
the idea of an eco-sophy of zoe-centred egalitarianism and finally “vibrant matter”, 
which underpins some contemporary perspectives of new materialism. The discussion 
of all these perspectives jointly demonstrates how they all uphold an idea of life as 
productive, generative and endowed of its own living force. However, it is also 
intimated that this gesture maintains a classification of modes of living along a 
distinction similar to the one presented in Chapter 1, even though inverted in favour 
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of the side of natural life. This risks resulting in a move which puts strong and biding 
demands on the ethics and politics implied by it – in fact, affirming a power of life 
from which political practices should be derived. Hence, this step of the argument 
maintains that, despite providing a criticism to biopolitics and arguably presenting 
themselves as an opposite approach, perspectives of vitalism here considered cannot 
fully provide a response to the question of rethinking the normalising and qualifying 
operation that biopolitics applies to life. The literature in Chapter 2 thus cannot be seen 
as addressing the question posed by the thesis about how to rethink modes of 
engagement with life beyond the binary and often exclusionary outcomes highlighted 
in the analysis so far. The following stages of the study will then attempt to explore an 
alternative account whereby a power over life and a power of life appear interacting 
in a more complex and open fashion, by going back to the work of Foucault and his 
idea of “vital critique” to power. It is argued that, in his theory of ethics, resistance and 
critique, Foucault introduces an element to escape the normalising effects of power. 
This will pave the way to an alternative response to the question of the treatment of 
life grounded on idea of singularity, which I will complete by looking at the naturalism 
of contemporary Spinozist literature. 
 
Tracing the “vitalist turn” in social sciences 
 The use of the term “turn” to identify a breaking point in epistemic and 
intellectual debates may always sound problematic in the identification of novel or 
emerging theoretical perspectives. However, the recent series of “turns” advocated by 
a range of disciplines within and outside academia appears unprecedented not to be 
acknowledged. Recently, there has been an upsurge of several theoretical “turns” 
termed in various ways: affective (Halley and Clough, 2007; Hemmings, 2005; Thrift, 
2008); practice (Cetina et al, 2005; Bueger and Gadinger, 2014); material (Mukerji, 
2015; Coole and Frost, 2010); ontological (Escobar, 2007; Martin and Hail, 1999; 
Widder, 2012). With different theoretical and methodological concerns, multiple 
approaches spanning several fields and areas of study are increasingly looking at the 
materiality of earthly processes and phenomena as the starting point for their epistemic 
endeavours. Across many discourses, there is a proliferation of attempts to supersede 
purely rationalist and cognitive explanations of the world and construct accounts that 
move beyond mere human conscious sense-making of it (Flanagan, 2009; Thrift, 2004; 
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2008)26. What seems at stake is a deep renegotiation of knowledge practices towards 
an engagement with the immanent vitality, matter and embodiment that precedes the 
construction of theory (Coole and Frost, 2010; Cottingham, 2003).  
More deeply, the tendencies just mentioned take place in the climate of a shared 
radical questioning of the ontological and knowing categories that have historically 
defined Western thought (Baggini, 2005: Eagleton, 2008). Since modernity, epistemic 
enterprise had relied on the assumption of the transcendence of human consciousness 
from the external world, be the latter identified with the physical realm, nature or any 
object of knowledge (Flanagan, 2009; Greenfield, 2008; Lawlor, 2006). The paradigm 
of “Cartesianism” precisely expresses the idea of this subjective character: as all-
encompassing narrative, the legacy of Descartes (2013) has been associated with a 
fundamental dualism that separates human consciousness from the external reality. 
Such separation has ultimately created the condition for knowledge extraction from 
the world and for any theory formation. As Colebrook notices: 
If ‘Cartesianism’ functions in the history of philosophy as the false turn whereby 
we took embodied mind to be inert substance detached from the world, so 
‘theory’ is often overcome by turning to history, philosophy, affects or bodies. 
‘Theory’, today, bears within itself the marks of its own failure […]. But there 
can now be a ‘theory after theory’ that maintains critical rigor while also allowing 
for history, politics and life. (Colebrook, 2010:129). 
This chapter is concerned with the shared vitalist assumptions that seem to 
underpin these developments in theory across areas of the humanities and social 
sciences. The latter commonly advocate a vitalist immanent perspective, which is 
particularly concerned with an investigation around the idea of life (Lawlor, 2006). 
Jointly, these perspectives seek the rejection of intellectualism and linguisticism and 
the embracement of a radically new way of thinking. By marking an apparent rupture 
with the dominant trajectory of Western metaphysics, thought and experience are 
reconceived on a radically mundane and immanent horizon where “life” is 
encountered. This celebration of immanent materiality of worldly processes and 
phenomena has become an unquestioned good for part of continental philosophy, and 
                                                 
26 The shared bases for the series of approaches here mentioned is a renewed interest in materialist, corporeal and 
vitalist ontologies. In particular, in the humanities and social sciences, this is translated in the central emphasis put 
on the material dimension of human life. As far as knowledge production is concerned, this is manifested in an 
increased attention on the concrete practices, performances and enactment of relations (both among humans and 
non-humans); on processes that operate before conscious and reflective thought and on the superseding of 
representation as the key epistemological tool for extracting knowledge “from” the world (McCormack, 2005).  
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is increasingly affecting also the social and political sciences (Coole and Frost, 2013). 
In countering linguisticism and discursive practices, the vitalist approach thus stands 
in opposition to the claims of biopolitics, which are grounded on the discursive 
construction and understanding of the world and life by power and the latter’s attempt 
to subjugate life to systems of knowledge.  
The aim of the chapter is to explore the idea of vitality of life as emerging from 
some of these contemporary perspectives. In particular, the first stage of the analysis 
is interested in looking at the idea of “life” as the ultimate register where new 
possibilities of knowledge and experience are reimagined, after overcoming the idea 
of thought’s separation from the material world (Cottingham, 2004). The focus on life 
in these debates also conveys a reference to the ethical: the call for “life” that many 
discourses are pointing out invites to a completely and paradigmatically different way 
of thinking and engaging with the world. The analysis explores the origin of these 
claims. However, it also intimates that, by doing so, vitalist approaches also posits 
compelling normative demands as to the political vision that can be derived from these 
assumptions. Therefore, they lend themselves to a potential similar criticism to the one 
that has been ascribed to the perspective of biopolitics, that is, fostering a prescriptive 
understanding of life to which social and political practices should adjust. This will be 
evident in the last part of the discussion. 
 
The definition of “life” in vitalism 
Before moving on to discuss some positions that exemplify a vitalist perspective, 
it appears necessary to clarify what is understood by “life” in these approaches. It is in 
fact difficult to establish an all-encompassing definition which would not result in a 
reduction of the variety of these perspectives and of how they are treated; nevertheless, 
some common elements can be pointed out.  
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, vitalism is commonly equated to the 
philosophical trajectory that runs through Bergson and Deleuze and upholds the 
inherent liveliness, productivity and self-organising capacities of living forces 
(Thacker, 2010). More specifically, life is understood as an expansive force that is 
deemed to flow across all forms of living beings; it is described as self-generating, 
self-enhancing and lively. Vitalist approaches are thus primarily interested in the 
ontological question around the living and the principles of life. In this regard, life is 
thus described a force that embraces all material beings (organic and inorganic) in a 
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lively continuum. This conception of life is often captured by the idea of zoe, which 
identifies a generative and persistent force of material transformations (Radomska, 
2016: 68). My interest here is not so much going back to the very origin of the 
discussion in the authors mentioned above, but rather examine how this legacy has 
been taken on by contemporary developments, reflecting on what has been above 
defined as a “vitalist turn” in contemporary theorising. To this aim, I will attempt a 
characterisation of these approaches by looking at the contribution offered by Fraser 
et al. titled “Inventive Life. Approaches to the New Vitalism” (2005), which appears 
to fit the aims of my analysis and introduction. 
Fraser et al. open their contribution with a quote from Bergson: “[I]n vain we 
force living into this or that one of our moulds. All the moulds crack. They are too 
narrow, above all too rigid, for what we try to put into them” (Bergson, 1911: x). The 
visually powerful description of Bergson well identifies the character that is attributed 
to life in vitalist perspectives. Life is considered as a force that cannot be delimited or 
incapsulated in any finite form. More importantly, life is what escapes forms of 
“containment” or representation27. The latter aspect is thus of primary importance 
when put in relation to the conception of power in biopolitics. In the previous chapter, 
I illustrated how biopolitical regimes function precisely by establishing forms of 
domination of life, understood as its construction, qualification and attribution of 
meaning, thanks to the knowledge that power gathers about life.  
By defining life as what inherently escapes knowledge and representation, 
vitalist approaches directly respond to the challenge highlighted by biopolitics: life is 
what constantly disrupts attempts to know and to appropriate it. Thus, by definition, 
the assumptions of vitalism seem to invalidate the possibility that life can be mastered 
by regimes of power-knowledge through which relations of domination are 
established. A vitalist understanding opposes the treatment of life implied by 
biopolitics as an attempt to constrain life into normalising systems, with the intent of 
entirely controlling or subjecting it. The aim (of ethics, of power, of any system which 
                                                 
27 It must be noted that this will be the very important distinction to be made between the approaches explored at 
this still critical part of the discussion and the understanding of vitalism that will be taken on by following stages 
of the thesis. In fact, “life” in vitalist understandings can be defined more broadly as an expansive force that 
constantly escapes representation. However, as it will be argued at the beginning of Chapter 4, the difference in 
possible interpretations by these approaches consists precisely in the divide between positions that tend to 
essentialise and reify life, and turn it into a new metaphysical principle whose normative and epistemic effects are 
not different from that of a regime of control by the “power over life”; and, on the contrary, an understanding of 
vitalism primarily as a normative and regulative principle, that is, the idea that even the biological understanding 
of life always escapes attempts to know it – and thus, in a biopolitical outlook, to enable power over it. The latter 
line of interpretation is deemed a more productive and fruitful approach that will be followed in Part II of the thesis.  
 74 
attempts to order life) can no longer be that of “knowing” life through representation, 
since life becomes known and experienced by other modes and channels, for instance, 
by alternative forms of experimentations and expression (Fraser et al., 2005; Zylinska, 
2013).  
Another point to be added is the focus on processes, defined by the assumption 
of the radical relationality of which life is part, conceived as shifting relations between 
open-ended objects. This does not imply that such relations are pre-existent but rather 
that objects, subjects and concepts are composed of relations, “reciprocal enfolding 
and gathered together in temporary and contingent unities. Furthermore, since a 
relation cannot exist in isolation, all entities can be understood in relation to one 
another” (Fraser et al., 2005: 3)28. The enlarged idea of life that is found in vitalism as 
grounded on processes and relations thus invalidates any clear divide between the 
natural and human sciences. It breaches any distinction between types of life forms 
(conflating them in an idea of a common and continuous life-force, often identified 
with the idea of zoe, see Braidotti, 2013; or the analogous idea of “biophilosophy” 
found in Thacker, 2015; Schildrick, 2015; Radomska, 2016) as well as among any 
system of knowledge acquirable over them. This stands therefore in sharp contrast and 
can represent another issue of criticism against the mode of operating of biopolitical 
logics, which, as seen in the previous chapter, work precisely by producing 
qualifications and differentiations among forms of life (for instance, between person 
and non-person; animal and human; healthy and pathological) by means of processes 
of normalisation. 
An additional characteristic and difference from biopolitics is how the two 
perspectives envision the relationship between the defining elements of the human 
condition. Humans, as well as all other beings, are not separated entities that can be 
isolated and endowed of their own individuality. Rather, they are already part of a 
series of contingent phenomena. This invites a re-understanding of liveness or 
presence as a pattern out of which even ideas of time and space emerge, insomuch that 
they are experienced through embodied existence, and not as separate or abstract 
notions given a priori of any determination. Hence, this approach emphasises the 
                                                 
28 The author demonstrates this through the work by Stengers, who formulates the idea about a “cosmopolitics”. 
By this term, Stengers means the understanding of a deep commonality among living beings in a posthumanist 
sense. Quoting her: “The pre-fix ‘cosmo’ takes into account that the word common should not be restricted to our 
fellow humans, as politics since Plato has implied, but should entertain the problematic togetherness of the many 
concrete, heterogeneous, enduring shapes of value that compose actuality” (Stengers, 1997: 248).  
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interconnections among living beings, that are not considered as separate and 
independent but rather already in relation to one another. They are thus capable of 
transformation, exchange and, ultimately, they “perform their living function through 
their interconnections and interactions with other organic and inorganic entities” 
(Radomska, 2016: 70). 
Finally, an element that is attributed to perspectives of vitalism is the 
endorsement of a perspective of immanence. The idea of immanence is certainly not 
new as dimension in philosophy and intellectual investigation. Its first traces can be 
brought back already to certain manifestations of pre-Socratic thought and ancient 
Greek cosmologies, which fostered an all-encompassing dynamic reality enlivened by 
internal natural forces (Galloway, 2014; Spindler, 2010). As Kerslake (2002; 2009) 
notices in outlining the historical development of the idea of immanence, there are two 
features that pre-eminently pertain to such a perspective: a formal and an ontological 
aspect. On the formal level, an approach of immanence produces a philosophy that 
does not appeal to anything outside the terms and relations constructed within that 
same philosophy. Commenting on the recent “ontological turn” occurred across many 
social sciences, Nathan Widder echoes the same assumption by defining immanence 
as a “state of being internal or remaining within, free from external conditioning” 
(Widder, 2012:17). Ontologically, moreover, immanent thought is taken to be fully 
expressive of being. There is no moment of “transcendence” from which being 
originates and, therefore, what exists can never be determined from above, beyond or 
outside of this very same plane (Kerslake 2002:10)29.  
The incompatibility of oppositions or dualities with a standpoint of immanence 
is thus implied by the radical reconfiguration of reality. Immanence challenges 
dichotomies traditionally conceptualised as subject-object, matter and thought, of 
mundane as opposite to spiritual or extra-earthly dimension of reality. This starting 
point naturally brings with itself the sweeping away of a series of historical 
philosophical perspectives deemed guilty of producing a retreat from life in multiple 
                                                 
29 Hardt and Negri (2000) point out that, because of this reason, it may not appear surprising that, at first, the call 
for immanence sounded most appealing in the dawn of modernity. Modern philosophy expressed precisely the 
attempt to “world” reason against truths derived from postulates about theology or god. In this line, the Cartesian 
revolution and its culmination with Kantianism and the Enlightenment manifested the historical necessity of 
dismantling systems of metaphysics and regrounding truth in an entirely immanent, earthly and human dimension. 
The Kantian enterprise in this direction, however, had resulted in a retreat towards reflexivity and self-
consciousness and had ultimately put forth the assumptions of a foundational human “nature”, thus falling back 
into a transcendent standpoint. On the contrary, it is only in the affirmationist trajectory of Spinoza - the “anti-
modern” figure per excellence in modern political thought – that the flourishing of an entire system of immanence 
had found its highest expression (Hardt and Negri, 2000:80).  
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forms of transcendence (Israel, 2001)30. From the critical analysis of current vitalisms, 
Western political thought has produced continuous forms of self-imprisonment of 
thinking and a retreat from the complex, emergent and productive character of life. 
The latter has been reduced to an inert secondary domain that stands passively in 
opposition to an active and sense-producing thought. Regaining a horizon of 
immanence, on the contrary, is deemed to open up the opportunity of rethinking life 
beyond the categories of a given objectivity or a representing subjectivity, as a 
dynamic flow where all beings are immersed. In this sense, the recuperation of an idea 
of active and generative life also brings to light the deep network of relations that 
embrace all entities before their individual existence. 
The “turns” to life in the forms of theories of vitalism, body, matter, living 
systems produce therefore the effect of detaching existence from any idea of a finite 
and fully-fledged subject as unitary point of experience and cognition. Classical 
conceptions of the subject variously characterised as Kantian, Cartesian, Humanist, 
modern are discarded altogether along with the associated attributes of autonomy, 
intentionality, sovereignty, reason and rationality (Pin-Fat, 2013), which are deemed 
to be empirically false (Schmidt, 2013). All these reductionist properties are instead 
replaced by an immanent vision where subjectivity and objectivity cannot pre-exist 
one another and are defined only in the unfolding of concrete relations. Even though 
this critical take might not be the defining and exclusive intent of approaches of 
immanence, it is certainly one of its consequences. In better terms, the dismantling of 
the modern idea of the Western “human” appears one direct effect of the theoretical 
standpoint of immanence here analysed (Zimmermann, 2012)31. 
                                                 
30 Platonism created the illusion of a realm of perfect ideas against which the physical world appears as imperfect 
and lacking (Plato, 1988). Cartesianism spread the conception of a detached and picturing mind opposed to matter 
in order to introduce the empirical fallacy of the rational representative “subject” (Descartes, 1968). Kantianism, 
even more, had extended the idea of a judgmental subjectivity to the sphere of ethics and morality by establishing 
universal principles and categories (Kant, 1997). Finally, analytic philosophy, as only the latest in time, has reduced 
thinking to the study of ordinary language and logical analysis and exhausted all the possibilities of knowledge in 
this horizon (Habermas, 1987). 
31 In fact, claims of anti-humanism and the “death of Man” (Foucault, 1970; Althusser, 1968) had already been a 
cornerstone in the discourse of many post-structuralist sensitivities. Moreover, the theoretical rejection of the 
modern Western idea of subjectivity has specific impact on conceptions on morality and on the ethical. The 
transcendental knowing subject introduced by Kant (1997) provided in fact the source of human moral nature and 
its universal applicability, which was inferred from the primacy of human reason. Thanks to its rational nature, the 
human subject is seen as participating not only to the physical but also to the noumenical dimension of moral and 
ethical values. The denial of the conception of the self and the individual as a primarily rational being in favour of 
the stronger emphasis on elements as emotions, bodily affects, desires, impulses breaks thus the direct connection 
linking rationality to the inner ethical nature of the subject and independent from its physical reality.  
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Although recognising the relevance of the questions that vitalism as 
philosophical perspective poses, I maintain that some of its articulations in 
contemporary theory cannot entirely liberate themselves from an idea of ordering and 
qualification of types of life and thus reaching potentially exclusionary outcomes 
which are only specular, but analogous, to the ones highlighted in regard to the 
biopolitical perspectives analysed in Chapter 1. This outcome, which follows from 
their theoretical premises, appears particularly evident when considering the ethical 
and political implications of some of the claims advanced. I will now proceed by 
exemplifying some current forms that build on the vitalist perspective outlined above, 
before moving on to discuss their normative and political implications in the last 
section. 
 
The forms of life in types of vitalisms  
As I started to mention, the range of perspectives that can be gathered under 
the umbrella term of vitalism is very diverse and any grouping may risk reducing the 
inherent differences and nuances that characterise each of them. Across this range, it 
is yet possible to identify some common elements that appear to define a shared 
understanding of the idea of life by these approaches. Life can be there identified with 
the positive, enabling sign ascribed to it as vital power. In this first take, life is 
conceived as a productive, self-preserving and self-furthering force. Across several 
theoretical perspectives, there seems to be a tendency to reclaim life as a lively 
principle that infuses the world. In particular, I here focus on three streams of analysis.  
First, there is a renewed celebration of the idea of life as self-producing force 
in the discourse of Gaia and the living planet, which takes life as all-encompassing 
principle animating both human and non-human entities and ecosystems. Partially 
connected to this, a second take can be identified with the idea of an eco-sophy and 
posthumanist perspective fostering a form of zoe-centred egalitarianism (Braidotti, 
2013). Finally, a further take within this comprehensive perspective coincides with the 
form of vitalism that emerges from the idea of “thing-power” and lively matter 
deployed across many discourses within the recent new materialist wave. The 
following sections of the chapter focus on the analysis of these different sub-streams.  
Along with the analysis, however, I also maintain that in their engagement and 
qualification of modes of life, they are not able to free themselves from analogous but 
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opposite qualifying and exclusionary outcomes seen in biopolitics, which yet, they 
allegedly counteract.  
 
The planet as living organism: theories of Gaia 
One discourse that can be listed in the first group consists in how vitalist 
approaches are currently applied to the theory of a pan-natural world infused by a self-
furthering living principle. The most representative of these perspectives may be 
captured by Lovelock’s idea of “Gaia” (2000) and the living planet (Margulis and 
Sagan, 2013). These theories, moreover, share close commonalities with conceptions 
of nature and the earth that appear in approaches of “deep ecology” (Naess and 
Rothenberg, 1990; Naess and Kuman, 1992)32. Overall, they elaborate versions of geo-
centred theories that foster the return to an idea of the earth as a single, complex, all-
encompassing and interconnected whole that functions analogously to a living 
organism. In a materialist account, they offer a celebration of an active life that 
constantly perpetuates itself by flowing as continuum across all living and non-living 
beings. The Gaia theory, in particular, originates from the field of natural science (at 
the intersection of earth-science, biochemistry, geology, system ecology) to claim that 
all living systems and planetary complexes interact with their surroundings and 
generate an overarching synergy among mutually regulating networks. These 
processes help maintain and perpetuate the conditions for the reproduction of life on 
earth. The underlying assumption is that all living organisms coevolve and develop 
only in strict relation to their environment and this ultimately produces effects on, 
modifies and finally contributes to the stabilisation of the conditions of their inorganic 
surroundings. The name “Gaia” denotes precisely the one single planetary being of 
which all entities are considered a necessary part. In this view, elements like the 
atmosphere, the seas and the terrestrial crust would result from planetary processes 
through the coevolving diversity of living organisms (Lovelock, 2000). 
It is possible to go deeper in illustrating the key tenets underpinning the theory. 
As said, the idea of Gaia prefigures an extra-human world that encompasses an 
                                                 
32 “Deep ecology” as first elaborated by Arne Naess, offers an ecological and environmental thought which 
advocates the radically equal value of all living beings beyond their instrumental utility for humans. It claims the 
profound interdependence and inter-relationality of all ecosystems, which are reciprocally linked to one another for 
their maintenance and survival. Consequences of these preliminary assumptions are the rejections of any 
anthropocentric standpoints, human exceptionalism and of environmental logics that still maintain a qualitative 
division between human and other living beings. Because of their similar outcomes, I will here treat this approach 
along with the Gaia perspective. 
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overarching and interconnected web of life. The primary attribute assigned to life-
force is the capacity of stabilising the conditions for terrestrial life. Similar to deep 
ecologism, planetary systems are seen as inter-dependent and mutually regulating one 
another, missing human attempts to modify or destroy the natural world. Secondly, the 
all-encompassing life principle is assigned of an expansive tendency that achieves an 
overarching reach of both the core and the peripheries. The effects and outcomes of 
each action or transformation are therefore seen as profoundly respondent to the part 
of the system in which the action takes place, revealing a deep interconnection.  
Finally, both Gaia and deep ecologism look more deeply into the actual 
conditions of humanity’s relationship with the natural realm. They reach the 
conclusions that mankind, populations and cultures can flourish only while 
maintaining the broadest diversity of species and life-scapes, which all play a role in 
the comprehensive natural equilibrium. They thus endorse a holistic view that goes 
beyond the vision of a traditional ecology or environmental problems and embrace a 
comprehensive philosophy of life. This approach calls into question also the role that 
humans play in it. In Lovelock’s description of the Gaia world: “We have assumed 
that [Gaia’s] role is the maintenance of conditions favourable for all life in all 
circumstances […]. We have in addition made the assumption that from its origin the 
human species has been as much part of Gaia as have all other species and that like 
them it has acted unconsciously in the process of planetary homeostasis.” (Lovelock, 
2000:119).  
Humans, thus, like all other living beings, are equally integrated in the 
processes of stabilisaton and self-maintenance of the planet. In the latest centuries, 
however, the mass-scale introduction of industrialised processes has entirely subverted 
natural mechanisms of self-regulation and played an opposite, destructive effect. The 
consequence is that anomalous phenomena are read as effect of the alterations 
produced by the human breaching of the natural order. The alleged interconnection 
among all form of beings becomes then ultimately interpreted as the subordination of 
nature to the exploitative and utilitarian purposes of human use. It engenders a negative 
perspective and charges the idea of ecological interconnection with an apocalyptic 
tone, which becomes further expanded and linked to problems of environmental crises, 
climate change and ecological sustainability (Grey, 1993).  
The unidirectional way in which human intervention is inscribed within natural 
processes is the point where the theory of Gaia shows a first limit. The principles 
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underpinning the theory have the merit of offering a more inclusive account of life, 
that embraces mankind and expands beyond human boundaries. The way in which this 
deeper interconnection is developed, however, produces an ultimate closure, rather 
than opening, of possibilities of thinking human action and interactions with other 
forms of life in an alternative way. Instead of interpreting the deeper human/extra-
human bond as opportunity for a new positive interaction and responsibility endorsed 
by humans, Gaia theory closes down productive developments and turns into a claim 
of blame on the human side of the relationship. The bond between humanity and 
environment becomes thus read in a still vertical way that reinforces the natural-human 
or, to use the terminology deployed in Chapter 1, the human/non-human dichotomy, 
by seeing the second term as entirely negative. Instead of using its conclusions to seek 
for a different approach and ethics of living, Gaia ends up formulating a profound 
accusation that reproduces a classification of modes of living, this time by ascribing a 
negative character to human life. 
The outcome just described itself derives from other complementary 
shortcomings observable within the theory. As noticed, first, these approaches are not 
entirely able to overcome a dualistic division of modes of living (Braidotti, 2013). 
There is a remaining tendency to oppose the idea of a pure, untouched nature to the 
sphere of the human and social construction. In other words, divisions between natural 
and cultural, environment and society still persist; however, this time, they celebrate 
and take the side of the natural element of the binary. Even if these readings have the 
merit of pointing out the destroying and harmful tendencies of indiscriminate 
industrialism, massive consumerist logics and modern individualism, they hardly offer 
a contribution in deconstructing the very bases of discourses where these dualisms 
originate. To quote Braidotti, this approach still remains biased in a deeply  
essentialist way. Because there are no boundaries and everything is interrelated, 
to hurt nature is ultimately to hurt ourselves. Thus, earth environment as a whole 
deserves the same ethical and political consideration as humans. This position 
[…] is a way of humanizing the environment, that is to say, a form of residual 
anthropomorphic normativity, applied to non-human planetary agents (Braidotti, 
2013:76). 
In the exaltation of a deeper understanding of the earth and the planet, thus, there 
appears to be an ultimate reproduction of a form of naturalistic foundationalism. Claire 
Colebrook (2010) advances a similar criticism against the unsuccessful overcoming of 
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old patterns of normativity in vitalist approaches analogous to Gaia. In her view, a 
profound contradiction remains at the basis of these holistic perspectives. On the one 
hand, they reject pre-Gaian or Cartesian models which exalt the cognitive capacities 
of the mind. They criticise the latter’s inability to account for processes that take place 
beyond the narrow range of human subjects and their domination of matter (Colebrook 
2010:146). However, this move produces an exaltation of the vitalist principle deemed 
to operate within nature. Overall, vitalist approaches here ultimately fall prey of an 
essentialising gesture, that takes life as absolute and undiscussed principle. Life 
functions as taken-for-granted a priori that continually produces and gives meaning 
and direction to reality. Rather than the absorption of human exceptionalism within a 
homogeneous realm of living nature, the outcome is the maintenance of dualistic 
normative schemes, this time inverted in their polarity. Gaia, therefore, operates a 
humanisation of the environment, by conflating all forms of life in the same condition. 
Moreover, the pre-eminence of this living principle subsumed to all nature ends up 
over-determining the possible contents and action also in the sphere of the social, 
ethical and political human interaction. This “appropriation” of the social domain by 
natural life produces a shaping of the laws governing the human and political sphere 
by the assumption of the absolute principle of life: this time, it is natural life to define 
the laws and norms regulating socio-political existence. 
To summarise, therefore, the merit of Gaia is to open up a way to conceive 
modes of life beyond the human and potentially extend them also to forms of inorganic 
existence. However, it still attaches a qualification and attribution of value and 
meaning to types of life, this time in favour of the natural term of the relationship. The 
distinguishing features that were assumed to be privileged attributes of human life (in 
the criticism outlined above) are now extended to life in general. In particular, 
properties of self-renewal and relationality can now be observed in the capacity 
attributed to a self-perpetuating nature as productive, creative and relational. The 
figure of Gaia becomes thus symptomatic of a “theological aesthetic of the living 
being” (Colebrook, 2010:164). If humans were once understood as the original point 
of meaning assigned to the world, it is now nature that manifests this subjective 
character. A normativity that distinguishes among subjective and objective faculties, 
inert or lively matter, then, is not abandoned, but simply replicated and reaffirmed in 
an inverted sign. Holistic approaches remain entrapped into this essentialising gesture 
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that still places its normative standpoint into an absolute source of life and cannot grasp 
the multiple relations that constitute its forms. 
 
The vital-materialism of “thing-power” 
A second sub-stream that can be identified in the larger group of vitalism 
corresponds to some recent positions in the horizon of new materialisms. This account 
advocates a “vital” or “thing-power” ascribed to materiality. In this account, matter is 
not considered an inert and passive element, but is endowed of a lively and emanating 
life force. The primary effect of this assumption is the attribution of agency to 
materiality. The theory of Jane Bennett’s “vibrant matter” (2010) is possibly the most 
exemplary position in this direction. Referring to past trajectories of thought, “thing-
power” (Bennett, 2004) wants to identify the strand of materialist philosophies that 
runs across Lucretius, Spinoza and Deleuze33. The very definition of “vibrant” or 
“vital” matter is aimed at distancing her materialist standpoint from claims of historical 
and dialectical materialism of Marx and Adorno, but also from the “body materialism” 
deriving from the trajectory of Foucault and more recently Judith Butler (2006, 2011).  
Ultimately, her position of vital materialism could be gathered in the wider 
perspective of current trends of new materialism. As shared principle held across such 
positions, the renewed interest in matter provides the touchstone of a novel radical 
ontological project sensitive to a vital and dynamic philosophy of processes 
(Whitehead, 1929; DeLanda, 2006, 2013) and new forms of human-material 
entanglements. From an ontological perspective, new materialists advocate a 
philosophy of protean monism, which rejects the dualistic assumptions of cultural 
modernity (in the forms of mind-body; nature-culture; subject-object) in favour of a 
unitary account of reality where multiple and interconnected entities are continuously 
linked to one another34.  
                                                 
33 In this regard, it could be objected that my analysis also looks at contemporary readings of Spinoza to complete 
an alternative account of the politics of life. However, my argument in that regard applies especially to a Spinozist 
theory of parallelism and relation between mind-body, along with the impact that ideas have on the surrounding 
environment, which have been highlighted in the contemporary Spinozist turn by authors like Deleuze and Sharp 
(Spinoza, 1985; Deleuze, 1998b; Sharp, 2007). Even though I also build on the premise of the profound relationality 
that a Spinozist system suggests, the result of my reading is very different from the one elaborated by Bennett.  
34 New Materialism, possibly like biopolitics, has itself become a very largely (and often loosely) deployed term to 
characterise a variety of perspectives in many disciplinary fields. The main authors I refer to with the summary 
provided here possibly prioritise the following: Bennett (2001, 2004, 2010); Blaagaard and van der Tuin (2014); 
Coole and Frost (2013); DeLanda (2006, 2010); Barad (2003, 2007). The principle at the core of new materialism 
have been collected by some authors into a “decalogue” (Connolly, 2013b; Coole, 2013; Cudworth and Hobden, 
2015). A fuller discussion of the key claims of these positions would require much more space and room for 
analysis. However, my interest here is again to insist on the analysis of the function and meaning assigned to the 
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The underpinning assumption of Bennett’s particular variation of material 
vitalism is based on the idea that all entities in reality are endowed of “thing-power” 
(Bennett, 2004; 2010). “Thing-power” is taken as all-encompassing ontological 
category that defines the capacity of any sorts of entities to generate influence or 
produce effects, which eventually become themselves part of a complex set of 
interconnections. What is distinctive of this theory is that “thing-power” pertains to 
materiality in all its forms, and provides thus a unifying principle for all the organic 
and the inorganic, the biological and the inert, the human and the non-human realms. 
From this starting point, it would thus seem to directly engage and respond to the 
processes of classification of life explored in regard to biopolitics, which were built 
precisely on the fabrication and structuring of forms of life. The attribute “vital”, which 
is placed before the label of “materialism”, denotes precisely this force inherent to all 
matter constitutively. Thing-power manifests itself as a constantly active, 
performative, generative and self-creating energy (Bennett 2010:17). Material 
assemblages and complexes are thus endowed of capacities for self-organisation, 
emergent properties, adaptability and, above all, agentic potencies that are recognised 
in all forms of beings35.  
The assumptions of vital materialism suggest a deep rethinking of the division 
between humans and non-humans, persons and things deemed a false dichotomy 
applied to reality. Similar to some outcomes already discussed, vital materialism 
encourages to develop a deeper sense of consciousness and responsibility for human’s 
attachment and embeddedness in the world. Bennett voices it by saying that the 
acknowledgement of thing-power should enhance the pursuit of “greater recognition 
                                                 
concept of life in these perspectives; I then need to shorten the discussion of the deeper context in which this 
discourse is situated.  
35 In this regard, some aspects of the approach of vibrant matter can be considered as overlapping with the claims 
already seen in the Gaia perspective. However, some differences between the two remain in that Gaia focuses on 
the interconnection of (eco)systems that ultimately produce the stability of the planet by coordinating with and 
balancing each other. On the contrary, thing-power focus more broadly on an idea of elan vital (Bergson, 1911) 
that appears present in materiality in general. This is used as fundamental attribute to ascribe agentic capacities to 
matter. They thus overlap on the idea of a “life” as self-furthering force that is present in the natural and in the 
material, along with the human domain. Where they remain distinct is instead the finality that they pursue: Gaia 
theory wants to stress the interdependence and openness of systems to their surroundings, in a form of 
comprehensive organicism. The “thing-power” approach, instead, is interested in situating vitality in matter to 
counter reductionist understandings that tend to equate materiality to a sphere of pure determinism and linear 
causation. As highlighted in the first section, moreover, they reach different conclusions as to the possibility and 
patterns of human action in their accounts of vitalisms. Gaia, as said, ultimately ends up in a closure that reads 
human agency as fundamentally detrimental and destructive. This assumption ultimately depicts the current mode 
of human-nature relationship as generally precarious, unstable and fundamentally hostile. Vital materialism, on the 
contrary, embraces a more constructive reading and uses the renewed interest in materiality and nature as an 
invitation to develop more constructive interactions between the environment and humans.  
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of the agential powers of natural and artifactual things, greater awareness of the dense 
web of their connections with each other and with human bodies” (Bennett, 2004:349). 
Human beings should develop an increasing sensitivity and awareness of their being 
part of complex networks of processes that cross the natural-social divide and 
encompasses all beings.  
These premises also result in the shaping of an ethico-political project that 
enables the acknowledgement of thing-power and the inclusion of all entities that 
count as “actants” (Bennett, 2004: 354). The ethical attitude suitable to a vital 
materialism is built on a positive affirmative “fascination” for the material world. The 
non-human is a manifestation of “thing-power” that raises awareness of the vital 
abundance and the liveliness of materiality (Bennett 2001:5). The author names her 
project a “political ecology” (Bennett, 2004: 365). The term “ecological” can be 
applied in a twofold sense. First, ecology describes her account of ontological 
relationality. Moreover, an ecological ethical and political attitude is the objective to 
which she addresses her materialist theory. Bennett’s interest in a political ecology 
leads first to the practice of new ways of looking at the world of humans and non-
humans jointly. Her whole theorisation of thing-power and ethics is driven by her 
intent to discuss whether it is possible to build new forms of publics and assemblages 
comprising humans and non-humans (Bennett, 2010:106). In her work, she often 
quotes Latour as an author who shares a similar goal (Latour, 2005a, 2005b).  
Her aim is thus directed at experimenting on alternative practices, in order to 
reinforce the unification of all forms of matter and involve agents politically in this 
shared enterprise. As seen, such aspect is already present in her first theorisations on 
thing-power, but emerges in particular in Vibrant Matter (2010), where she devotes a 
chapter to the analysis of “Political Ecologies”. The definition of what counts as 
“political” in her account is found in the concluding remarks on thing-power: “Its 
political potential [of vital materialism] resides in its ability to induce a greater sense 
of interconnectedness between humanity and nonhumanity” (Bennett, 2004:367). 
What emerges is therefore a normative invitation to contribute to the development of 
an “ecological ethos” that can be transposed also to the collective sphere (Bennett, 
2004:347).  
The attempt to overcome the human-nonhuman divide in the name of a vitality 
of materiality that is found in any forms of being (and the ensuing rejection of binary 
logics that follows from this) seems to put her work in relation to the analysis 
 85 
performed on biopolitics. This, however, can be the point where the shortcomings of 
her position emerge. It is worth noticing that, whereas biopolitics appeared to be 
grounded on mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion, this variant of vitalism starts 
from an opposite perspective, which postulates a priori the inclusion of all forms of 
being in what can be defined as “the social”. This ensues from the assumption of an 
ontological egalitarianism that assigns an a priori value to all forms of being. Although 
sympathetic with the claim, yet, the latter seems not to resolve the problem of how 
modes of life and being are produced and become object of consideration also as an 
effect of power discourses. Rather, the solution seems here to be found by bypassing 
the problem altogether and starting from the unconditioned affirmation of the value of 
life, which thus becomes grounded on an absolute and transcendent principle.  
The criticism about the inability of this theory to overcome a binary and dualist 
treatment of world entities has been expressed also in other criticism. Zizek (2016a, 
2016b) for instance, claims that in the overall discourse of thing-power, there is no 
fundamental abandoning of dualist schemes that are criticised in modern thought. The 
perspective of vitalism that comes from expressions of more recent forms of 
materialisms seems to challenge the distinction between a subjective and an objective 
form of experience. However, the argument with which this attempt is developed ends 
up putting the responsibility again on the side of the human. This operation reinforces, 
rather than weakening, the differentiations of the agents that are able to make a 
difference and the classification of what entities and beings count in the making of a 
natural and social world. This manoeuvre, therefore, ends up reaffirming ideas of 
nature-culture, subject-object, nature-world divides that the perspective tries to 
oppose. In this, the position of a vitalist thing-power could be pooled in the same 
objections that have been advanced in relation to the first sub-group of spiritualist 
theories of nature of Gaia. What they operate is ultimately a humanisation of the 
natural world now infused with the same anthropomorphic subjective properties. 
A similar critique is expressed by Andrejevic (2013), who also emphasises how 
the celebration of vital materiality and new modes of interconnection between the 
natural-social or human-nonhuman world have the effect of re-establishing the pre-
eminence of human intentionality and agency that they claim to undo, or at least 
disperse. In fact, the emphasis on ‘‘agentive capacities’’ of objects and things and on 
the emergent character of multi-actant interactions is supposed to replace the primacy 
of human subjectivity and responsibility that has been the key focus of discursive and 
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linguistic turns (Van der Tuin and Dolphijn, 2012). Bennett even explicitly uses the 
language of a democratisation in a posthuman sense aimed precisely at breaking the 
boundary between human and nonhuman (Bennett, 2010). However, this reading does 
not seem to take into account the processes through which life becomes assigned of 
meaning and value. Moreover, the outcome obtained proves almost the opposite to the 
one that is declared in the intention of the work. To quote Andrejevic: 
In Bennett’s case, the result is the clear affinity between an account of, say, global 
warming that embraces the logic of what she calls ‘‘thing power’’ and a critique of 
environment activism for fetishizing human agency. The spirit of Bennett’s 
account pushes in the opposite direction: her hope is that an anthropomorphizing 
tendency that cultivates an attentiveness to the call of matter might deflate the self-
importance that fuels a destructive sense of human entitlement. However, her logic 
pushes in another direction: the dismissal of the very notion that global warming is 
the result of human agents and activity as yet another symptom of an overweening 
anthropocentrism. (Andrejevic: 2013: 226).  
Thus, the framework in which assessment of the value of life and its modes are 
assigned is not challenged in its binary and exclusionary structure, but continues to be 
present even though with a reversed polarity. Although Andrejevic’s argument in the 
article is primarily addressed at making a point on the possibility and room left for 
critique in these approaches (which he sees in highly sceptical terms), the criticism 
advanced proves effective. It demonstrates how, far from freeing itself from the 
normative assumptions of the approaches it aims to reject – those enforcing a clear 
dichotomy of political-natural world, society and nature, human and animal and other 
non-human beings – a vital materialism, too, also remains within this same framework, 
of which only the polarity and focus are reversed.   
Ultimately, the form of vital materialism here explored seems unable to 
propose an alternative to a treatment of life beyond the potential exclusions and 
qualifications among forms of being that had been highlighted by biopolitics. It 
appears to remain within the same framework that establishes a normative assessment 
and hierarchy of the types of life that should be included in the political domain, thus 
reproducing similar, even though potentially opposite, logics. These shortcomings are 
produced by the assumption of a force of life that seems to dissolve the order and 
structuring of the material and social world in its ontological presumption but also, 
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crucially, in the normative demands that it imposes on the political and social worlds36. 
In this account then, life is not freed from the constraints of being assigned value or 
meaning; it is equally absolutised as an active, generative principle which becomes 
itself the source that infuses meaning and direction to the world. Even though specular, 
thus, the answer it provides regarding the treatment of the idea of life (and its 
interaction with the political and social) does not succeed in addressing the problems 
identified in biopolitics37.  
 
A zoe-philosophy of affirmative life 
Among perspectives that celebrate an affirmative and generative force of life, 
there are positions that formulate types of posthumanist theories, often defined with 
the labels of a “zoe-philosophy” or eco-sophy (Braidotti, 2013; Davis, 1986; Guattari, 
2005). Among those, Rosi Braidotti in particular elaborates a version of this 
sensitivity, which she labels a philosophy of zoe-centred egalitarianism. I explore this 
position in order to exemplify this further strand. Braidotti’s interest, particularly in 
her latest work (2013) is to outline a new affirmative theory of a posthuman 
subjectivity. The author defines her attempt as a “critical” posthumanism (distinct 
from alternative forms of reactive and analytical posthuman, 2013: 38), which seeks 
to inscribe a renewed idea of the subject into the assumptions of a vitalist ontology and 
a philosophy of becoming. She presents her theory as an eco-philosophy of multiple 
belongings that places particular emphasis on a subject’s relationality with the world 
                                                 
36 In other perspectives, this ethico-political demand is charged with a more historical character as imposed by the 
acknowledgement of the current historical conjuncture. This is the case of a minor author that yet can still be 
connected to the approach of new materialism: Zylinska (2014), who engages specifically with the discourse of the 
Anthropocene. To present it shortly, in the author’s view, the current, more and more precarious bio-geological 
condition of the whole planet brings to light the unprecedented threat directed against life in all its forms and 
humanity as whole species. Her starting concern is the experience of a threat to life in major proportions, especially 
towards the human population as a whole. In this context, the current ecological and historical conjuncture can 
have the merit to function as a new “ethical pointer” (Zylinska, 2014:125) that could enhance the development of 
a qualitatively different ethical mode in order to address this threat. In this sense, she might be seen as regaining a 
broader claim than the more specific focus seen in Bennett. The author’s intent is rather to outline a viable position 
on ethics as a way of living a good life. That means, searching for a new “affirmative framework for the times when 
life is said to find itself under threat on a planetary scale” (Zylinska, 2014:13). This can also be read as an additional 
example of the connection between ontological assumptions and ethical demands that pertains to perspectives of 
vital materialism.  
37 It must be noted that, to a certain extent, the claims that Bennett derives in relation to the ethical attitude and 
responsibility projected on to the human may not be entirely dissimilar to the claims that will be made by the thesis 
in regard to the ethical perspective derived. However, what is found problematic is the assumptions underpinning 
these claims and the absolutisation of a role of a power of life which is not mediated or does not take into account 
the structures and relations of power which inform ways of living and being. Reversing the problematic in favour 
of a pure affirmation of a power of life does not address the impasse of the enigma of biopolitics highlighted in the 
Introduction, but rather it bypasses it altogether.  
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and other beings, and owns a deep sense of collectivity and community building 
(Braidotti, 2013:49).  
What is interesting for my engagement with this work is that Braidotti vocally 
and explicitly takes position against current developments of biopolitics, of which she 
is highly critical. In particular, she rejects the outcomes of some contemporary 
biopolitical perspectives that put emphasis on life as the horizon of death. Targeting 
especially the work of Giorgio Agamben, she criticises his definition of life/zoe 
produced by the lethal effects of sovereign logics exercised on a subject that is utterly 
reduced to its bare life (Braidotti, 2013). In her view, the latter is portrayed in a 
condition of absolute vulnerability, annihilation, subjection. In a full section devoted 
to the possibilities for moving “beyond bio-politics”, she argues that the new practices 
of bio-political management of life mobilise subtler degrees of death and extinction 
(Braidotti, 2013: 115).  
It must be recognised that her criticism, as it will become clearer later, concurs 
with a part of my argument: many of the current developments of contemporary 
biopolitical discourses have departed from (for her, perhaps, betrayed) the initial 
assumptions of Foucault and have rather put a stress on the necro-political and 
thanatopolitical function of (sovereign) power, by locating its operation only on the 
horizon of extinction and finitude of life. In fact, there are more than one point that my 
analysis could seem to share with some of the yet interesting claims that Braidotti 
advances. However, what is found problematic is not so much the critique but the 
alternative answer that the author provides to address the problems inherent in 
biopolitics. To contrast the annihilating and totalising outcomes of biopolitical 
rationales, she invites us to look at the vital and self-organising powers of Life/zoe and 
the way in which the latter “undoes any clear-cut distinction between living and dying” 
(Braidotti, 2013: 115). The solution provided thus consists of celebrating and 
practicing a politics of life itself, conceived as a generative force able to transcend the 
division between life and death. The latter approach is made possible by a move 
beyond any notion of the self and the individual, in order to transcend one’s identity 
into a continuous, impersonal flow of life.  
I maintain that this argument lays the ground to criticism when discussing the 
qualification of life that emerges from this system. The response to the annihilating 
and totalising operation of biopolitics is there searched in an eco-philosophy that takes 
life as a foundational principle and absolute term of value and meaning. The latter 
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account seems to result in a metaphysical system that reproduce an analogous binary 
and qualification of forms of life to the one seen in operation with biopolitics, even 
though with a specular and inverted sign. More specifically, zoe-centred philosophy 
fosters a clear definition and characterisation of what natural life amounts to: life is 
defined in purely positive, generative and productive terms. Therefore, those elements 
and forms that do not conform to the infinite productivity and liveliness of life are not 
accounted for or are ultimately excluded from any consideration. This is important, 
since, by applying a reading of these positions as an ontopolitics of life discussed in 
the Introduction, it emerges how certain modes of life, or the struggles and conflict 
that characterise them, remain excluded from analytical and practical consideration. I 
will demonstrate how vitalist accounts are unable to grasp the struggle and domination 
to which certain modes of life are subject in the short example discussed at the end of 
Chapter 4. 
Moreover, an additional observation could be applied to the ethico-political 
implications that the author draws from this metaphysical stance. Her attempt to 
formulate a specifically post-humanist theory takes as critical object an understanding 
of humanism, and particularly of the subject that the latter implies. As the following 
excerpt demonstrates: 
My position is in favour of complexity and promotes radical posthuman 
subjectivity, resting on an ethics of becoming […]. The focus is shifted 
accordingly from unitary to nomadic subjectivity, thus running against the grain 
of high humanism and its contemporary variations. This view rejects 
individualism, but also assert an equally strong distance from relativism or 
nihilistic defeatism. It promotes an ethical bond of an altogether different sort 
from the self-interest of an individual subject, as defined along the canonical lines 
of classical Humanism. A posthuman ethics for a non-unitary subject proposes 
an enlarged sense of inter-connection between self and others, including the non-
human or “earth” of others, by removing the obstacle to self-centred 
individualism. (Braidotti, 2013:50).  
The removal of a position of individualism (and particular of the key figure of 
Man that has been put at the centre of humanist assumptions, Pin-Fat, 2013) implies 
the renegotiation of the relationship with any form of “otherness”, be they human, 
animal or the environment. This is another key point to relate to the argument that I 
have advanced in the previous chapter with regard of the qualification and binary 
exclusions that are produced by biopolitical discourses. The centrality of the idea of 
the human is deemed to have dictated the model or norm in determining ethical and 
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political relations (particularly in the history of Western political theory and 
philosophy). Addressing this problem, for her, means re-engaging imaginatively and 
affirmatively with the categories that have been excluded from this qualification, 
which, similar to my analysis, could itself be read as the operation of a biopolitical 
machine. This entails embarking in a process of cultivation and experimentation of 
new relationships with the many forms of “other” that the hegemonic discourse of 
humanism has produced: the gendered and sexualized “other”; the racialized “other”; 
the animal “other”; the natural and earthly “other”; the machine “other” (Braidotti, 
2013: 67-95). 
However, once again – and not too dissimilar from the critique that she herself 
had moved against the previous approaches of Gaia – this solution seems more the 
result of a same inversion of the categories at stake, without yet problematising the 
very binary logic on which these attributions of meaning to life are based. By 
celebrating a posthumanist mode of living (and in fact, collecting all the excluded 
categories listed above in the label of the “posthuman”), she still provides a solution 
that does not fundamentally challenge a foundation around the idea of the human in 
the first place. In other words, her thought remains still heavily defined around the idea 
of the human self, seen in charge of renewing itself in the name of its embeddedness 
into a cosmological dimension. The form of species-egalitarianism and “critical” 
posthumanism that she offers is not ultimately able to overcome the problems around 
the notion of the human that generated her question and criticism in the first place; 
rather, it simply inverts the emphasis on the opposite polarity, by celebrating the 
incessant, self-perpetuating and vital forms of life. 
This point has been highlighted by Cornell and Seely (2016), who develop a 
similar argument by taking issue with all forms of celebratory posthumanisms, which 
build their critique on the claim of dismantling the idea of the human, when in fact 
they reassert and reaffirm it by the apologetic gesture of enlarging the consideration to 
all those forms of othering that had been excluded from this discourse. To quote the 
authors, this move stands as a form of  
recuperative gesture which enables Man to continue surviving vampirically by 
appearing to be dead while appropriating his previously excluded Others as his 
now proper domain. […] While making atonement for his past exclusion and 
exploitation of the rest of the universe (i.e., women, the colonized, nonhuman 
animals, “life itself”, the Earth), Man redeems himself while simultaneously 
annexing these prior exclusions (Cornell and Seely, 2016: 4).  
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Despite the critical claims, also in this form of posthumanist discourses the idea 
of the Human, or Man, continues to provide the normative ground on which attribution 
of the value of life is made.  
Moreover, a similar and complementary point is advanced by Colebrook 
(2014), who, with reference of the concept of the Anthropocene more specifically, 
argues that in order to accomplish a real “posthumanist” standpoint, any attempt that 
defines itself in this way should free itself from any reference to human and 
anthropocentric condition and being able to embrace and grasp the meaning of the 
nonhuman and extinction as such. Once again, thus, this series of critiques 
demonstrates that philosophies that celebrate the value of life, or life as such, as in the 
case of an impersonal, generative flow of life as zoe, are not able to liberate themselves 
from the normative and qualifying discourses that impose a fixed and absolute value 
on certain types of life, and derive their ethical, political and normative stands from 
these assumptions.  
Therefore, even though, as mentioned, there might be potential points of 
commonality between my argument and Braidotti’s theory, the solution that she 
suggests cannot be considered satisfactory in two main regards. First, she offers an 
absolutising and almost transcendent idea of Life-zoe as a metaphysical principle 
which gives meaning to beings. In an ontopolitical perspective, this assumption 
excludes certain modes of living and being from consideration in the ensuing political 
and philosophical project derived from it. Secondly, even though taking issues against 
the binary and exclusionary logics pertaining to some alternative discourses (like 
biopolitics or humanism), this approach is not able to overcome these dichotomies and 
end up reinforcing them, even though with an opposite sign.  
 
Normative implications of a vitalist idea of life 
After discussing some perspectives that draw from assumptions of a vitalist 
ontology, I would like to focus on the normative and epistemological implications that 
can be drawn from these accounts, especially with regard to the idea of a norm of life 
that provides the starting point of the thesis. In the biopolitical perspective, modes of 
life and the standards and qualifications that defined them were seen as generated and 
constructed by the discursive action of power and systems of domination. In the latter 
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account, life appears subjected to an external source of meaning and norms, which 
detaches life from the dynamism, openness, creativity and productivity of relations. 
  An account of vitalism, which starts from the assumption of the value ascribed 
to life in its material force and encompassing all beings, may seem to potentially find 
an answer to the problem posed in Chapter 1 about how to rethink the norm of life in 
non-exclusionary and binary terms. First, as mentioned, the emphasis on life as 
immanent force encountered in the world poses the problem of something that cannot 
be constrained in any scheme or fixed representations. It suggests a new “(non)-
paradigm” that moves beyond stable models and normative structures. The turn to life 
explored in the first section formulates the call for a model of thinking and acting that 
embraces “relationality as such” beyond schemes of representation. Vitalism excludes 
the assumption that the meaning of life could derive from any source that is extrinsic 
to the phenomena and processes that happen within life itself. The liberation from all 
schemes and structures in a post-transcendental standpoint invites us to abandon any 
strict idea of normativity (Patton, 2002). Hence, as it has been suggested, the 
unprecedented epistemic challenge that an approach of vitalism suggests is not just 
another dispute on the content of the norms that should regulate life, but a deeper 
question on the very conditions of normativity itself (Smith and Patton, 1996). To put 
it in the words by Colebrook, “what is at stake in an immanent turn (to life), then, is 
not a dispute regarding the norms toward which life relates […] what is up for debate 
in the turn to life is not this or that political model, but the relation one bears towards 
models” (Colebrook, 2010: 133).   
However, simultaneously, the way in which certain approaches analysed here 
develop this implication seems to result in a replication of a normative and qualifying 
understanding and definition of modes of living. In the previous sections, I maintained 
that many of the discourses that are nowadays championing “life” fail in 
accomplishing this step by replicating certain qualifications of life. Their account of 
relations among beings, and particularly the ethical and political models grounded on 
the assumption of immanent vitality, result in projects that reinstate opposite, but 
analogous, divisions to the ones highlighted by the biopolitical literature. The versions 
of vitalism explored at this stage do not abandon the idea of a principle that, by being 
already endowed of its own meaning and properties, defines the qualification of other 
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forms of living and being38. This was apparent in the perspective of Gaia, which 
proved not able to overcome a division between the human and the natural or living 
and non-living world. Hence, it proved ineffective in providing an alternative account 
where an engagement with life is instead discussed in its contingent, situated and 
multiple character beyond any pre-given characterisation. 
Moreover, another criticism could be advanced. It could be claimed that, across 
all the discourses presented, life seems to be turned into a foundational constitutive 
principle pervading, and indeed, informing and giving meaning, to the plane of 
immanent materiality. To phrase it better, in these discourses, life ultimately emerges 
as an ahistorical and absolute category that appears already oriented towards a 
predetermined outcome of liveliness, positivity and harmony. This move turns life into 
an a priori principle, which betrays a closing-off and inherently foundational character 
(Rekret, 2016; Noys, 2010; 2011; 2012). Despite the declared intentions to remove 
any residual principle or “essence”, these discourses end up absolutising and 
essentialising “life” and ascribing it a specific and well-defined set of attributes. A 
similar point appears in Colebrook, who notices that “a certain image of life has now 
become dominant [and] life is accepted as prima facie good, and as the foundational 
virtue in a world without foundations…” (Colebrook, 2010:134).  
Finally, and most importantly for my discussion of a politics of life, I argued 
that the problem that remains inherent to these approaches from an ontopolitical 
perspective concerns the exclusions that their strong metaphysical stance implies. The 
latter makes them unable to take into account the role that also possible agonism, 
conflict and momentary dynamics of disruption can play in the opening of possible 
developments of life. Life and reality are portrayed rather as dynamics that nurture, 
fuel and reproduce life necessarily – almost in a direction stated a priori. In other 
words, there appears to be an assumption upon the positive and affirmative sign in 
which relations will necessarily develop. The ethics that they suggest remains 
                                                 
38 A distinction of organicistic and immanent perspectives to life in different categories, in fact, is present in other 
contributions from the social sciences and cultural studies (Colebrook, 2010; also in Radomska, 2011, 2016) or in 
philosophy of science (Hoyningen-Huene and Wuketits, 2012). The former, for instance, distinguishes between an 
active type of vitalism (characterised by a teleological dimension and holistic account of life, particularly pertaining 
to living organism) and a passive, which instead fosters multiplicity and generativity as defining characteristics 
(Colebrook, 2010). In an analogous way, Hoyningen-Huene and Wuketits distinguish between a kind of animist or 
mystic vitalism, which still conceives of life as a metaphysical principle, and a naturalistic and materialist type, 
whose main element is instead the irreduction of life to any fixed biological law. My analysis tends to side with the 
second term of these distinctions and establishes a link to biopolitics precisely around the possibility of 
appropriating knowledge on the biological dimension of life. Nevertheless, the study conducted here moves beyond 
the objectives and premises of these discussions and looks at the naturalism emerging from Spinozist approaches 
in particular (Chapter 4).  
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therefore marked by the same bias of infusing a unidirectional meaning and orientation 
for action in the world. By equating life and relationality primarily to harmony, love, 
union or agreement, similar positions neglect the productive element that can derive 
instead also from moments of partial destitution and disagreement.  
As Butler suggests, the affective intensity of life can rather be theorised as more 
multifarious, ambivalent or multivalent dynamic (Butler, in Blaagaard and van der 
Tuin, 2014: 21-28). Perspectives of vitalism seem to neglect this other possible side 
and therefore to lose the enriched potentiality that could be supported by a more 
multidirectional account of life and relations. In this regard, Weinstein (2016)39 has 
suggested to read this move as a misapplication of Hume’s naturalistic fallacy, 
whereby a stringent normative obligation is derived from a single ontological fact.  
Therefore, perspectives of vitalism engaged above have the merit of bringing 
to attention an enlarged domain of life, which takes into account a wider and more 
encompassing range of entities and beings. Nevertheless, the way in which they 
articulate the question of the value and qualification of life is still subsumed to the 
position of a principle, which is, a vital and productive life, that defines the value 
ascribed to living beings. This ontological principle animating reality produces 
exclusions and qualifications in the consideration of forms of life that can take part in 
the political and ethical projects that can be derived from it. 
 
Conclusion 
After introducing the debate of biopolitics and the idea of life emerging from 
it, Chapter 2 moved on to analyse the perspectives of vital-materialism, which seem to 
stand at the opposite polarity of the schematic of current debates on the politics of life 
devised in the first part of the thesis. In particular, the analysis has focused attention 
on the idea of life that perspectives of vitalism uphold, in comparison to the one found 
in biopolitics. First, I have sought to point out its main constitutive elements and 
described the idea of life emerging from these perspectives as endowed with enabling, 
productive and lively capacities. Life is identified with a living force that reproduces 
and furthers itself by flowing into an interconnected whole across all planetary scales 
and registers of existence and variously defined as “zoe”, life-force or “eco-
                                                 
39 Even though Weinstein’s argument refers more specifically to Object-Oriented Ontologies (Weinstein, 2016) 
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philosophy”. This has been discussed in the frame of an overall trend here defined as 
a “vitalist turn” in theory that seems common to many subfields in the social sciences. 
The overall tendency found in the many discourses that take such direction consists in 
a deep questioning of the modes of knowledge and experience that have characterised 
modernity and Western thought, particularly from a standpoint of immanence. Vitalist 
assumptions lead to a profound reconsideration on the one hand of the perceptual, 
affective, sensorial and corporeal dimensions of experience, as opposed to the sole 
rational sphere. On the other hand, moreover, they draw deeper attention on the 
character of relationality, intertwining and mutual dependency that binds humans to 
other forms of life in a planetary scale. In other words, they claim for a more genuine 
recuperation of the dimension of life itself and use this as a starting point to develop 
their epistemic and ethico-political projects. 
These observations have been derived from the diverse sub-groups drawn 
within the set of vitalisms. I have focused on three sub-streams: the discourse of Gaia 
(with connection to deep ecology); the idea of living matter and of “thing-power” 
within some forms of new materialisms and the theory of an eco-philosophy of life-
zoe. The analysis has also tried to point out the merit of the “vitalist turn” presented. 
It intimated that the unprecedented epistemic challenge that theories of immanence 
pose is not to articulate a dispute on the content of the norms or rules that should 
regulate life in this dimension. The dynamism, openness, creativity and productivity 
of relations that is experienced in a vitalist idea of life require confronting a different 
kind of norms or rules of conduct, able to acknowledge and embrace the idea of 
relationality as such.  
This point, however, has allowed me to identify also some of the remaining 
limits within this set of theories. In fact, even though advocating a questioning of 
norms and values of life as captured in discursive and linguistic representations, they 
do not fundamentally challenge a qualification among forms of existence and the 
ensuing attribution of value assigned to life. More specifically, they appear to maintain 
the division between natural and social domains of life and even extend the normative 
idea of the human to characterise also other modes of living and being. This derives 
from the way in which such perspectives characterise life as productive, self-furthering 
and generative and ascribed a positive sign. They appear to maintain a preliminary 
assumption that life develops in a productive and enabling direction. Also in this case, 
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even though in an inverted sign, the value ascribed to life seems to potentially produce 
an analogous hierarchy and, potentially, exclusion of some forms of living. 
 The next stages of the research will thus explore an account that challenges the 
normalising effect of biopolitics on life in an alternative way. It maintains that a more 
complex account of life not reducible to either of the two perspectives can be seen as 
already present in Foucault, who appears to acknowledge a positive or productive idea 
of life as able to respond and resist to power logics. The analysis will explore in 
particular Foucault’s idea of ethics as source for generating an action against power 
dynamics, which I will attempt at expanding by moving on and recuperating a 
naturalist system of norms and ideas as emerging from contemporary readings of 
Spinozian thought. The overall aim is to provide an alternative answer to the politics 
of life that does not reduce life to a sole object of a power exercised over it or to the 
sole expression of a power of life, but engages with modes of life beyond pre-given 
qualifications and categories. This is relevant since it seems to address the exclusions 
of certain forms of life and the incapacity to grasps their condition, which, has seen, 












Part II | Norm, Life, Singularity: An Ethics 
 
Chapter 3 
Foucault’s Ethics of Vital Critique 
 
Introduction 
The chapters in Part I of the thesis engaged with the treatment of the idea of 
life in the main debates that are concerned with the relationship between life and 
politics, namely, biopolitics and vitalism. I demonstrated how they offer two opposite 
accounts of the qualification of life: a discursive approach that conceives of life as an 
object of power logics, pertaining to biopolitics explored in Chapter 1, and a 
perspective which takes life as vital principle capable of its own power, as seen for the 
vital-materialism explored in Chapter 2. I have maintained that they provide the two 
approaches that sit at the opposite polarities of the schematic along which current 
debates around the politics of life can be read. This schematic runs through the ends 
of a power over life unveiled by biopolitical accounts and a power of life proposed by 
vitalisms, which ascribes the capacities of agency and productivity to the side of life 
only, thus underplaying the role of the discursivity of power. I also intimated that, 
however, vitalism, too, could be seen to result in analogous binary logics and outcomes 
to the ones highlighted through the literature on biopolitics. Therefore, vitalism seems 
itself not to sufficiently address the question posed by the thesis regarding how it is 
possible to re-imagine the qualification of life beyond processes of biopolitical 
normalisation. 
Chapter 3 tries to open up a further path in order to address the question of the 
meaning of life as relevant for politics. Moving beyond the classification outlined in 
the first part of the thesis (life as positive and productive and life as controlled and 
diminished), this stage of the argument maintains that a more comprehensive and 
receptive account of forms of life beyond biopolitical normalising logics needs to be 
found in the dynamic ground of the contingent interaction between the vital element 
of life and the power dynamics that inform it. In order to make this step, I look at 
Michel Foucault and at the understanding of life and power that emerges from the 
author. The main reason for returning to Foucault is, first, to highlight that the author’s 
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work seems to imply a much more nuanced, complex and ambivalent idea of life than 
the one that has been taken on by the literature that has further developed his thought. 
Along with highlighting the mechanisms in which power becomes progressively 
exercised through normalisation at the social level, he seems to contemplate a 
productive and active capacity of life grounded on the materiality of experience and 
the body, that is presupposed and at the same time escapes the ends of power.  
I advance this suggestion by offering a thorough discussion of the concept of 
dispositif, which the author uses to describe the working of mechanisms of power. In 
my reading, dispositif shows how power mechanisms accommodate and, in fact, 
require, an idea of a productive and responsive capacity of life, which is not captured 
by biopolitics, and which perspectives of vitalisms assumed as an a priori principle. 
Dispositives provide the structure in which the production of subjectivities takes place, 
not simply by a unidirectional movement that proceeds from power to modes of life, 
but in which also active forms of life respond and resist to power. This vital, productive 
element of life is the space of subjective action and provides room for developing 
forms of resistance as a critique to power. In advancing this thesis, I also highlight 
that, in Foucault, exercising forms of critique is connected with a deeply ethical 
attitude: it is argued that critique to forms of biopower from the perspective of a 
positive account of life do require ethics. This dimension of analysis will then be 
further expanded in the next chapters.  
The chapter is structured as follows. The first section discusses Foucault’s 
original theorisation of biopolitics and looks at how Foucault deploys the notion of the 
“norm”. The second section then focuses specifically on Foucault’s concept of 
dispositif, which appears particularly relevant to capture the co-presence of the two 
complementary characters of life highlighted above. By capturing the structure in 
which power logics and subjective formation take place, the idea of the dispositif 
seems to carry a central analytical weight. Section three introduces the notion of “vital” 
critique to express the forms of responses with which life responds to power dynamics 
and puts a central emphasis on ethics, seen here as the instrument to enact forms of 
resistance. The following sections add some clarifications about the idea of subject 
and subjectivity found in Foucault and on the positioning of Foucault with regard to 
theories of immanence. In the final section, then I discuss the development seen in 
Foucault in light of the lesson he himself borrowed from George Canguilhem. 
Canguilhem explicitly endorsed the capacity of life to generate new norms beyond the 
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knowledge acquired by power on it and matched this capacity with the expression of 
a force of existence. This is crucial for my paving the way to a Spinozist naturalist 
system in the next chapter, where the analysis will look at the effect that the emergence 
of new ways of being generated within life can hold on the surrounding environment 
of relations.  
 
Michel Foucault and the shift to modern politics 
 Michel Foucault tends to be recognised as the first author who popularised the 
idea of biopolitics and charged the term with its contemporary significance40. The 
author is in fact the first to formulate a coherent theory of how the administration of 
life becomes the specific mode of governing in modernity. He demonstrates how 
politics moves away from an idea of power associated primarily with the models of 
sovereignty and the law and turns into a process of qualification of life by effect of the 
operation of multiple and intersecting lines of power upon subjects, defined as a 
“power over life” (Foucault, 1978, 2008). The analysis here wants to put the emphasis 
also on another dimension of his thought. I argue that Foucault’s theory already 
identifies an idea of the productivity of life beyond the full qualification that is ascribed 
upon it by regimes of power: this type of life escapes the logics of biopolitical control 
and reveals a form of material, non-appropriated life able to critically respond to power 
logics. This appears particularly visible in the part of his work dealing with the 
concepts of freedom and resistance, which he sees as coexistensive and 
complementary to biopolitical mechanisms.  
 
The establishment of a “power over life” 
 Foucault’s work on biopolitics can be identified with the intermediate phase of 
the author’s intellectual journey, mostly corresponding to the series of lectures held on 
the topic and collected in Society Must be Defended (2003), Security, Territory, 
                                                 
40 However, it must be noticed that the first use of the term is not Foucault’s and the author himself borrows it from 
previous studies conducted in the area of organicistic theories of the state, which became particularly prominent at 
the beginning of the 20th century through the work of authors like, primarily, Swede Rudolph Kjellen (see Holdar, 
1992; Tunander, 2001). An exploration of the previous debate around interpretations and applications of biopolitics 
from which Foucault himself draws is not in the interest of the research here (primarily in its organicistic, 
anthropological and naturalistic interpretations). For a full overview of these discussions see Lemke (2011) and 
Campbell and Sitze (2013). Moreover, for the analysis of the relation of Foucault’s work with these theories and 
the way it departs from them, I send to the discussion already outlined in the Introduction via Lemke (2011).  
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Population (2007) and The Birth of Biopolitics (2008)41. Yet, the ideas developed at 
this stage cannot be entirely separated from the author’s previous enquiry into the 
archaeology of power-knowledge and systems of truth in an historical dimension 
(1972). As Campbell suggests (2011, also in Marks, 2006), yet, the roots of the 
biopolitical theory of Foucault can be already identified in The Will to Knowledge 
(1978). The final chapter of the book, titled “Right of Death and Power over Life”, in 
particular, clearly stresses out a fundamental change that for Foucault marks the 
starting point of political modernity: the shift from the ideas of sovereignty and the 
law to that of the norm as the main instrument to govern society.  
 The “shift of regimes” is related to the end of monarchic and absolutist orders 
at the dawn of modernity. At this point, populations and individuals become less 
subject to sovereign power and more and more to the effects of regularising and 
ordering norms (Foucault, 1978). The modern regime of power becomes thus an 
endeavour of managing and regularising life, by focusing on techniques of 
organisation and administration, more than on the display and deployment of visible 
and spectacular measures of sovereign force (Foucault, 1977). In the modern 
framework, the decision over the death of subjects is no longer consigned entirely to 
the arbitrary will of the sovereign. The management of life is mainly aimed at avoiding 
deviations from the normalised order. Governing is thus reconceived as an ongoing 
process, whereby signs of abnormality are contained and transformed from the 
beginning by means of regimes of power-knowledge.  
In his subsequent lectures, Foucault deals with the theory of biopolitics in a 
more systematic way. In his analytics of power (2003, 2010), he distinguishes three 
kinds of power regimes: the juridical power revolving around the law; the disciplinary 
power concerned with the control of individual bodies and the biopolitical power 
dealing with the administration of the population as a whole. The latter two kinds are 
themselves merged into the common category of a disciplinary-biopolitical “power 
over life” (also in Gane 1986; Schwan and Shapiro 2011).  
Disciplinary power targets the anatomical and physical dimension of the body 
and aims at regulating the everyday actions that define both the private and the 
productive life of subjects (Foucault 1978). It focuses on the shaping of basic 
                                                 
41 However, as discussed in the Introduction, it is worth clarifying that, in line with the question analysed by the 
thesis, my analysis follows the invitation (Fassin, 2010) to return to an exploration of the idea of “life” in Foucault, 
more than focusing on its subsequent cooptation by analyses on governmentality (Foucault, 2007; Burchell, Gordon 
& Miller, 1991).` 
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subjective motions and bodily capacities within a system of minute and efficient 
control, techniques, mechanisms of conducts and behaviour by means of training and 
automatisation. The object of discipline is thus the actual, “natural body, the bearer of 
forces and the seat of duration” (Foucault 1977: 166). A disciplined society is that in 
which the several institutions that operate in the domains of life can reach a capillary 
and punctual control of each and every subject, by means of a codification and 
normalisations of actions and conducts. 
The opposite pole, defined as biopower, looks at the population as a set of 
individuals conceived as “living beings” (Foucault, 2003). More than individualised 
subjects, biopower targets macro-scale patterns, processes and tendencies that define 
the life of a community (Foucault 2003: 246). Biopower, therefore, intervenes on the 
entirety of “life” of the collectivity, which is rendered normalised and, thus, 
controllable in its characters and variables by processes like testing, examining, 
measuring, classifying. Both dimensions of disciplinary and bio-power apply to life in 
its material, corporeal and visible dimension, which becomes the key concern of 
governmental control (Foucault, 2003: 239).  
Overall, the aim of power over life, understood comprehensively across the 
two modalities, is to achieve a direct reach over the physical-biological life, be that of 
individuals (disciplinary power) or of collective groups (of the population or 
communities through biopower) 42. In the words of the author, biopolitics has “taken 
control of life in general—with the body as one pole and the population as the other” 
(Foucault, 2003: 253). With this move, power is thus radically resituated on a 
dimension of analysis different from that of sovereignty and the formal sphere of the 
law. Whereas sovereignty was defined by a form of linear, vertical, well-definable 
power running from the ruling authority to its subjects by means of an explicit and 
overt law, the new regime of “power over life” implies a more spread, less identifiable, 
capillary methodology of actual exercise of disciplinary-biopolitical power. This latter 
sort flows at the edges of formal structures of authority or the state and is found at its 
ends, in mechanisms, techniques, technologies and discourses that enact controlling 
                                                 
42 As Lemke (2005) carefully notices, however, a distinction should be made as to the way the two regimes of 
discipline and of population control realise their outcome. Discipline operates in the mode of an individualisation 
applied to already existing individuals. On the contrary, population starts from the combination and aggregation 
“of individualized patterns of existence to a new political form” (Lemke, 2005: 37). “Individual” and population, 
or “mass”, as the two subjects of a “power over life” are not opposite, but rather are the two complementary sides 
of a global logic of ordering and regularising power. He analyses the case of sexuality to exemplify this 
complementary role.  
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practices43. In the words of Lemke (2011), repressive power over death is replaced by 
a power over life that deals less with legal subjects than with actual living beings: 
Power would no longer be dealing simply with legal subjects over whom the 
ultimate dominion was death, but with living beings, and the mastery [la prise] it 
would be able to exercise over them would have to be applied at the level of life 
itself; it was the taking charge of life [la prise en charge de la vie] more than the 
threat of death, that gave power its access even to the body (Lemke, 2011:37). 
 The premises put forth in the key short text The Will to Knowledge, thus, 
already point out how (and as effect of what historical processes), the idea of “life 
itself” emerges as the centre of political strategies. For Foucault, this defines the 
modern way of exercising power. In this sense, biopolitics cannot simply be 
considered as an extension or addition to traditional sovereign power. Rather, it 
constitutes a qualitatively different regime, one that transforms the core of power 
rationales into the management of life at the individual and collective level for the sake 
of the efficiency of control, and whose aim is that of extracting knowledge about the 
subjects with the purpose of dominating them.   
 
The shift from the law to the norm 
In addition, the shift in regimes of power has an implication also for the kind 
of laws operating in them. The sovereign action through the juridical sphere of codified 
laws is gradually supplemented by power mechanisms reaching directly the dimension 
of life. The complementary spheres of the juridical and the informal proceed hand in 
hand in harmoniously ordering the society. In this move, the latter form of power 
becomes organised around the regularising capacity attributed to the “norm”. In 
History of Sexuality, Foucault notices  
the growing importance assumed by the action of the norm, at the expense of 
the juridical system of the law. […] A power whose task is to take charge of 
life […] effects distributions around the norm. […] The law operates more and 
more as a norm. A normalizing society is the historical outcome of a technology 
of power centred over life (Foucault, 1978:144).  
The binding and coercive function once exercised by the sovereign’s law is 
replaced by the logics of domination aimed at the normalisation of life. Norms operate 
                                                 
43 In this regard, some critics trace a qualitative difference between the stage of the disciplinary and the biopolitical 
forms of control in terms of the subjectivity and, crucially for my research, of idea of life that they imply (see 
Blencowe, 2012). I do not follow entirely this reading and I rather treat them as manifestations of the same “power 
over life”, which operates according to the two different and complementary modalities just described. 
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in a radically capillary and immanent dimension, since they are enacted by the matrix 
of practices, techniques and discourses that shape the bodily-corporeal existence of 
their subjects. In this perspective, a radically different form of normativity is in play. 
As Macherey notices (1992; also in Juniper and Jose, 2008), the norm functions as an 
immanent cause: it does not pre-exist its own intervention but constantly produces both 
the plane and the objects on which it acts44.  
Macherey (1992:176) draws another distinction between two typologies of 
norms in Foucault: on the one hand, a negative notion that identifies norms with 
juridical exclusion and forbidding – what coincides with the formal normative function 
of the law. On the other hand, however, there is also a positive notion in which norms 
act through a biological process of inclusion and regulation. This second element 
indicates the presence of a productive character of life that biopolitical norms use to 
develop and establish themselves, and to ensure their own maintenance and 
reproduction. Drawing from what Colebrook also comments on a similar point, life 
can be here defined extensively, as the “basis of the living and the lived, by surveying 
bodies and living systems” (Colebrook, 2010: 137). These bodies, moreover, 
themselves function as the cause that nurtures power mechanisms, since they continue 
to reproduce them in their striving for self-maintenance. Life engaged by biopolitics 
thus, in Foucault, is not reduced simply to the passive and diminished object of power 
logics (as discussed in Chapter 1) but has a manifested positive and productive side. 
Based on this, Foucault provides a comprehensive account of the technologies of 
power that constitute disciplined and bio-managed bodies. In his account, the aim of 
modern power is to render bodies docile, compliant, and to operate an all-
encompassing regularisation of life both in the sphere of individuals and of the 
population as a whole (Foucault, 1978). 
Under the assumption of the norm and its function in structuring the social 
body, it is thus possible to comprehend why, in The Order of Things, Foucault 
maintains that, until the 18th century, the “concept of life” did not exist (Foucault, 
2002:139)45. The idea of life, for him, begins at the dawn of modernity, since only in 
                                                 
44 It can also be noticed that only the recognition of the working of biopolitical norms in a dimension of immanence 
can justify the inclusion of this productive and positive element. I will come back to the discussion of Foucault and 
immanence more specifically in the last section of the chapter.  
45 This claim is used by Tarizzo (2011, 2016) to argue that the very idea of “life” is a modern invention and 
underpins any philosophical as well as biological study of life. For Tarizzo, life, defined by Foucault as an “untamed 
(savage) ontology” (Foucault, 2002: 303) defines the very metaphysics of modernity. Even though this discussion 
goes beyond the scope of the analysis here, it provides a relevant intervention to build and at the same time move 
beyond Foucault’s claims on the subject.  
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its generative and productive interaction with the norm, does life become meaningful 
for the purposes of governing (in the form of the management, manipulation and 
administration of bodies by means of the systems of power-knowledge established 
upon it). Through this reading, then, Foucault profoundly undermines the idea of life 
and the body as ﬁxed and closed entity and shows how they remain subject and porous 
to the effects of relations of power. If the analysis above provides the premises to 
Foucault’s theorisation of norm and life, in what follows I focus on how Foucault 
develops the idea of the productive character of life to articulate a response to logics 
of power. This affirmative and positive element finds further explanation through the 
analysis of Foucault’s concept of dispositif.  
 
Dispositif and the space for resistance  
 With the shift from the law to the norm, the administration and control of life 
operate through the fabric of society and have norms as their key instrument and mode 
of operation. They operate at the informal, relational level and spread configuration 
and arrangements of practices and discourses that are well captured by the Foucauldian 
concept of “dispositifs” (Bussolini, 2010). “Dispositif” expresses the moving 
articulation of power between technology (and the concrete arrangements of its 
enactment) and the law. Dispositives establish both the logical and the material 
possibilities of experience that remain available to the subject in a certain context or 
point in time. Normalising techniques may appear to define life only as object of a 
power exercised over it by governmental logics, and thus to treat life primarily as 
suppressed and as an utterly controlled instance. Being acted upon by a norm means 
positioning oneself “as a subject in a context of a normalised society which guarantees 
the efficacy of its laws” (Macherey, 1992:180). 
 In Foucault’s thought (1977, 2003), however, the productive capacity of norms 
also acquires an alternative direction. Norms imposed by governmental logics do not 
operate in a vacuum, but generate a response by the life on which they act upon. The 
author puts an increasing attention on the way in which a subjective element of 
resistance can be inserted and made systematic in the operation of biopolitical 
mechanisms. In this way, the subject is no longer seen only as the passive recipient, 
but in fact plays an active part as the author, the craftsman of its own modes and ways 
of being (Foucault, 2003). There is therefore a fundamental shift, or, more precisely, 
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an addition, to the directives of power which are at play in processes of subjective 
formations. By returning to the terminology with which I characterised the forms of 
power in Part I, I suggest that this can be read as the co-presence of an idea of a power 
over life and a power of life, which participate in the shaping and enacting of power 
dynamics. In order to explain how Foucault paves the way to the idea of a productive 
force of life in his system, I will thus concentrate on the concept of dispositifs46.  
As Bussolini (2010) notices, dispositives are crucial to characterise Foucault’s 
idea of power in a more distributed and ontological sense (Bussolini, 2010: 87). In 
curating the translation of Foucault’s work where the concept of dispositif appears for 
the first time, Graham Burchell describes them as designating the “configuration or 
arrangement of elements and forces, practices and discourses, power and knowledge, 
that is both strategic and technical” (Burchell, 2008: xxiii). I interpret it as the 
discursive-material structure where both mechanisms of reproduction of the control 
operated by power as well as responses by life through practices of resistance take 
place. They capture the configuration of relations between power and life in a certain 
time and space as result of regimes of power-knowledge. They thus provide the 
structural “network” informing the spaces and modes of such relations. As also 
Foucault puts it, they express a “general line of force which transverses local battles 
and links them together” (Foucault, 1978: 124). Thus, dispositives are primarily 
responsible for defining the range of possible modes of existence and experience 
available to subjects at a certain point of time47. It follows that also the subjects that 
are produced by such mechanisms cannot be thought of in terms of stable essences or 
being, but are always already subject of becoming and open to the changeability and 
productivity of power dynamics.  
                                                 
46 Olssen (2008, 2010) seem to run a partially similar enquiry by analysing the idea of discourse. However, my 
analysis ultimately departs from the author’s in two main regards: first, the idea of dispositif is fundamentally 
different to that of discourse, by referring rather to the tactics with which a broader discursive regime is constructed. 
Moreover, Olssen’s focus is primarily on how discourses work historically (and thus his aim is that of distinguishing 
Foucault from other thinkers like Marx, Hegel and Habermas), whereas my enquiry into the dispositif is primarily 
aimed at discussing the relationship of the latter with the ideas of subjectivity and norms, and the possibility of 
carving a space for resistance to apparatuses of power. Moreover, both Deleuze (1992c) and Agamben (2009) have 
discussed this problem, particularly advocating a distinction of the term (both in the translation and in the meaning) 
from that of “apparatus”.  
47 The argument advanced here in regard to the notion of dispostif appears similar to the reading that Claire 
Blencowe (2012) gives of the concept of “experience” in Foucault. “Dispositif” in fact, also captures the structure 
of the experience that is available to the subject in a certain point of history and time. More specifically, dispositives 
provide the “structures” through which subjects are produced along with objects through the organisation of 
domains of experience (Blencowe, 2012: 11). Although my analysis stretches much further and the use of this 
specific term is primarily meant to establish a connection to the development in Spinoza in what follows, it is 
anyway worth highlighting this analogy.  
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This latter aspect becomes particularly crucial when introducing the further 
element of resistance, which Foucault considers co-extensive to power. It is worth 
quoting the passages where this notion is introduced by the author. According to him: 
“as soon as there is a power relation, there is a possibility of resistance. We can never 
be ensnared by power: we can always modify its grip in determinate conditions and 
according to a precise strategy” (1988: 123). Foucault’s statement asserts that at a time 
when there is power, there is the possibility of resistance (Fontana and Bertani 2003: 
280). Similarly, in “The Subject and Power” (1983), Foucault notices that: “I would 
like to suggest another way to go further toward a new economy of power relations, a 
way which is more empirical, more directly related to our present situation, and which 
implies more relations between theory and practice. It consists of taking the forms of 
resistance against different forms of power as a starting point” (1983: 210–11). With 
this intervention, Foucault explicates the relational character of power, which 
simultaneously generates oppositions to its very operation across a complex network 
of dispositives (Foucault, 1978: 93).  
Power, thus, plays an ambivalent role: it tames and simultaneously generates 
possibilities for counteraction by those who are subject of its same mechanisms. With 
this addition, productivity does not remain limited to the polarity of power as the sole 
point structuring the regimes of existence, but is now shifted to the side of the self and 
the active role that it can play in changing or maintaining such logics. Given the plural 
forces shaping the field of power, the enactment of new articulations by subjects is a 
necessary correlate to the dynamics of controlling power, meaning that the possibility 
of enacting forms of resistance and freedom is left constantly open. Practices of 
resistance pertain uniquely to the specific configuration of power relations that 
generate them. As Lorenzini notices:  
Foucault himself suggests, we should rather speak of practices of freedom, 
because it is always the singularity and specificity of a given situation, of a 
certain actual configuration of power relations, which confers a singular and 
specific form to the effort and the practices of freedom aiming at giving rise to 
an other conduct. (Lorenzini, 2016:19). 
 The concept of dispositif is thus crucial in Foucault’s theoretical apparatus, 
since it expresses how both directions of power control and resistance are already 
present and possible. Dispositives capture the coexistence of both repressive and 
productive capacities of power. As to the second category of the productive component 
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of power, it appears split into two forms: one still exercised in the top-down direction 
of the power’s enforcing control on bodies and experiences (in the aim of achieving 
their regularisation and normalisation) and the other identified with the productive and 
positive response of subjects, which become able to challenge and intervene actively 
on the very formation of the norms operated by power.  
 In the argument developed in the chapter, thus, dispositives function as the 
structure that defines norm-formation as an operation of controlling power, but 
simultaneously, with the introduction of practices of resistance, which capture also the 
space for the emergence of possible different modes of life. Meaningfully, they are 
tools for analysing and describing the multiplicity of forces and movements through 
which power in all directions is constantly expressed and performed in a perpetually 
dynamic social field (Bussolini, 2010: 90)48.   
The latest observations have thus established the positive element that can be 
found in Foucault and that the analysis of the idea of the dispositif helps grasp and 
conceptualise. In order to further substantiate the characterisation of this kind of life 
and the types of conduct it generates (that is, the idea of resistance to power logics), 
the following section expands on this notion. I argue that the source of this resistance 
expresses an excess of life that strives to affirm itself against power logics. In Foucault, 
the practices of resistance are expressed through a form of (positive) critique that is 
enacted by means of ethics. Ethics becomes thus essentially tied up to the vital, 
material existence that escapes, and, as I try to show, can be deemed prior to the 
normalising effects that are operated by power on life.  
 
Ethics of the self as vital critique 
It is now possible to move a step further in the argument and connect the 
positive element of life expressed by resistance to power to the notions of ethics and 
critique that Foucault associates with it. Dissecting how ethics is introduced by 
Foucault requires looking more closely at how dynamics of power relations operate 
within each node of the dispositif. It is here that an element of resistance is introduced: 
                                                 
48 This point helps add also another clarification regarding the concept of power in Foucault’s work. Quoting the 
author, this needs to be understood as “the multiplicity of relations of force which are immanent to the domain 
where they operate, and are constitutive of their organisation; the game which by way of continual battles and 
confrontations transforms them, reinforces them, inverts them” (Foucault, 1976: 140). Thus, the concept of power 
in Foucault looks at the wider sphere of power relations as they are found dispersed and suffused in society. 
Foucault rejects any transcendent origin of power: power needs to be thought of as a constantly open and immanent 
field and liable to further ruptures, fractures and new constitutions. 
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dispositives operate not only and no longer as the sole instrument of the application of 
power, but are also exposed in the limits of their functioning. As found in Foucault: 
We must make allowances for the complex and unstable process whereby a 
discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, 
a stumbling point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy. 
Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines 
and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart (Foucault 1978: 
100)49. 
Nathan Widder (2012) provides a most clear analysis of the dissection of the 
lines of power active at any node of the dispositif. A first movement concerns the 
formation of disciplines and techniques by the controlling authority from which action 
is ushered. A second and connected line of the exercise of power, then, consists of the 
way in which these practices are managed and maintained after their establishment 
(Foucault, 2010). These more apparent logics, however, are supplemented by a third 
dimension, which can be identified with the structures in which individuals come to 
recognise themselves as subjects embedded in disciplinary and biopolitical discourses. 
Knowledge/power is no longer ushered by the authority and exercised over those 
subjected to it. Rather, it concerns the relation that one maintains with oneself. For 
Foucault, this consists in an ethical stance whereby “the individual constitutes and 
recognises himself qua subject” (Foucault, 1978: 6). One critically positions oneself 
in regard to the modes of normalisation and standardisation operated by power. It 
amounts, thus, to a form of critique. To quote Povinelli commenting on this aspect, 
Foucault sketches  
a theory of critique as particular stance (ethics) against statistical reduction of 
life rather than as any specific normative proposition (morality) about the 
content of what the good life is or might be. If, for Canguilhem, all things that 
gamble against the inert and entropic are life, for Foucault all that resists the 
uniformity of existence are critique” (Povinelli, 2016: 97). 
I will return to the reference to Canguilhem and to how his version of vitalism 
can be applied to the idea of “resistant life” in the next section. At this stage, my aim 
is to suggest that the critical attitude with which the self responds to power logics 
captures the vitality and productivity of life that is not reducible to the technologies of 
                                                 
49 Even though Foucault uses the term of discourses here, I argue that applying this analysis to the wider structure 
of the dispositif is legitimate, since, as seen in the definition of dispositif  above, discourses are part of the operation 
of dispositives. 
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power aiming at controlling it. I argue that the reference to this element of life reveals 
a vitalist element present in Foucault’s theory which appears irreducible to the sole 
discursive dimension in which life acquires meaning as effect of a socio-cultural 
construction. Significantly, the endorsement of this vital element in Foucault is 
connected and requires a practice of ethics, as the critical positioning of oneself with 
regard to relations of power. It can then be suggested that biopolitics in the formulation 
that Foucault gives contains a vitalist component of life and this is captured by the 
dimension of ethics that supports critique, as also Povinelli defines it. 
In her analysis of the concept of experience in Foucault, Claire Blencowe 
(2012) uses the term of “positive” critique to charcaterise the forms of responses by 
the self – even though the author does not pay direct attention to the dimension of 
ethics in her analysis. The attribute of “positive” captures precisely the productive 
capacity of life which is implied by the biopolitical experience of the subject. It 
expresses the assumption that the idea of a positive and vital character of life is entailed 
by biopolitical mechanisms and by how power generates productive responses and 
capacities. I here follow this qualification and adopt the term “vital” critique, which, 
in my argument, is closely connected to the presence of a vitalist idea of life in the 
working of mechanisms of power. As I will return to briefly below, moreover, the use 
of the adjective “positive”, or vital, also allows me to distinguish Foucault’s account 
from other theories and perspectives of critique in political theorising (see Andrejevic, 
2013).   
To return to Foucault’s idea of ethics, the observations above are further 
supported by the subsequent work by the author. In the interview collected in “The 
Ethics of the Care for Self as a Practice of Freedom” (1997), Foucault points out that 
“there has been a sort of shift: these games of truth no longer involve a coercive 
practice, but a practice of self-formation of the subject” (Foucault, 1997: 282). This 
implies a transformation in the subjective attitude: from a pure object of discourses of 
power, the subject becomes itself the actor of its own self-definition and self-forging. 
Deploying the terminology that is introduced further on in the same work, there 
appears to be a change from a purely “passive” subjective mode, which is made object 
of a certain discourse (the treatment of categories like the “mad” or the “prisoner” are 
the most exemplary in this sense, Foucault, 1977, 2013) to an “active” kind of subject, 
which critically positions itself against power institutions and logics. 
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The mentioning of the subject’s “activity”, however, does not necessarily 
imply a reference to open actions or deeds. Rather, it refers to a more profound state 
of “an exercise of the self on the self by which one attempts to develop and transform 
oneself, and to attain to a certain mode of being” (Foucault, 1997: 282). What defines 
the practice of ethical self-formation does not simply coincide with an ethical action. 
Ethics turns into a deeper attitude or disposition that must constantly apply to the 
individual, and must be continuously cultivated, practiced and exercised across all 
spheres of existence. “Ethical” shifts therefore from a predicate attributed to exterior 
actions – and often codified by a set of norms or rules – to a mode of being, a way of 
existence, which is indistinguishable and inseparable from the subject that embodies 
it. The conception of ethics, therefore, becomes primarily associated to a disposition 
that one acquires.  
The author names such process as a constant practice of a subjective “care for 
the self” (Foucault, 1990: 73, 211). Care for oneself identifies the set of techniques 
and practices through which the subject defines its own relationship with the 
surrounding environment, responding to the effects of power (Foucault, 2011: 45-54). 
The assumption of an attitude of care for the self is therefore primarily a highly 
relational practice, which can be generated and developed only in response to the 
concrete set of relations and configuration of dynamics in which one finds herself 
embedded50.  
The author defines the sphere of the ethical as one’s attempt “to develop and 
transform oneself, and to attain to a certain mode of being” (Foucault, 1997: 282). 
Drawing from ancient ethics, for him, this space requires a margin of freedom, where 
one can conceive of oneself as amenable to self-formation and self-fashioning beyond 
coercive practices. In its careful embodiment and exercise, care for the self, understood 
as the form that ethics takes, becomes thus an instrument of escape and reversal of 
power, since it makes it possible to limit and contrast its effects.  
Foucault describes this attitude of “care for the self” as a work of art or an art 
of existence. Elsewhere, he describes it as “those intentional and voluntary actions by 
                                                 
50 Significantly, in his latest analysis, Foucault links these reflections around ethics to practices of ancient ethicality. 
Several references to both the Greek and the Roman world recur, which look both at specific philosophies (the 
Stoics in particular, but also the Cynics, at a later stage, 2011; also in Prozorov, 2017) as well as to concrete socio-
political modes of collective organisations (like the ways of citizens’ living in the community or the polis). From 
the reference to the ancient world, the author borrows the link that he traces between ethics conceived as a 
fundamental care of oneself across all dimensions of one’s life and the experience of freedom. I will explain below 
why I do not look at this particular phase of Foucault’s work in my argument.  
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which men not only set themselves rules of conduct, but also seek to transform 
themselves, to change themselves in their singular being” (Foucault, 1978:11). It is 
significant that Foucault makes reference to process of transformation, accomplished 
through a constant activity of crafting and recrafting of the self, and ultimately aimed 
at minimising the spaces and possibilities of domination by power. Practices of self-
formation, therefore, are still partially conditioned by the external structures, but also 
save a space for individual liberty. Meaningfully, Foucault defines freedom as the 
“ontological condition of ethics” (Foucault, 1978). It allows a space that is not subject 
to previous determination and therefore leaves open the question of how to live.  
Practices of resistance and freedom are thus deeply intertwined with the 
dimension of ethics. Moreover, ethics itself contributes to enhance freedom when it is 
practiced as a work of self-liberation and formation, in order to free oneself from the 
normalising logics of power and to realise a harmonious relation with oneself, and, 
consequently, with others. At this point of the analysis, I want to emphasise that 
practices of resistance as envisioned by Foucault start precisely from the bodily and 
affective dimension and aim at subtracting oneself from the control of power. This 
(counter)conduct, then, critically interacts with the practices and discourses that shape 
an environment and system of relations. I will return to this point in the next Chapter 
when expanding Foucault’s conclusions with some aspects of the naturalism found in 
contemporary Spinozist approaches. 
Furthermore, the analysis advanced above also opens up an observation with 
regard to the role and the function of morality (Foucault, 2007). Drawing from the 
quote of Povinelli above (2016), morality can itself be considered as a regime of truth, 
which is established, transmitted and embedded in the set of institutions and practices 
that shape life. Morality, thus, plays the role of an external force, which analogously 
to other modes of power, is imposed on the individual to influence and shape its 
conduct. Therefore, if morality fulfils the function of a certain discourse of truth, then 
the ethical work on the self needs to operate on a radically different level from the 
former. The ethical that is embodied by a subject in processes of self-fashioning 
becomes a force, which is complementary – and, possibly, stands in productive friction 
– with morality.  
Some critics (Colebrook, 2010) read the formulation of the biopolitical regime 
by Foucault as the statement that morality itself may be no longer possible. Whereas a 
precise and commonly shared moral code establishes clear conceptions of good or bad 
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– which affirm themselves as natural properties within a certain truth regime – what 
decides about the conducts adopted by the self is rather the interstice left to the ethical. 
The individual is ultimately determined by its turning on itself through processes of 
self-formation, that open up new possibilities for experimentation and development. 
This reveals the space of freedom where the subject can subtract itself from the direct 
effects of power. As Foucault again highlights: “ethics is the considered form that 
freedom takes when it is informed by reflection” (Foucault, 1997: 184). All these 
points will be crucial to establish a continuity between the account here provided and 
the idea of ethics in what follows.  
In this understanding, ethics corresponds therefore to a deeper mode of being, 
which captures a disposition, a comprehensive attitude of one individual towards 
oneself and one’s surrounding. This approach also recalls an interpretation of ethics as 
defined by the collapse of the distinction between fact and law. Ethics concerns the 
manner in which one forms oneself as a subject, of how one conducts oneself in 
response to a certain historical and material situation but also in order to carve out a 
space of freedom within it. In this sense, ethics is understood as concerned with the 
cultivation of the self as a “singular being” which subtracts itself from the 
normalisation involving patterns of behaviour and standardisation. The latter point                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
around the situating of the singular self with regard to external systems of laws and 
norms can be given further attention. 
 
The subject and the singularity of experience 
One of the key points that can be advanced in regard to the analysis just 
performed applies to the centrality that the ideas of the self and the subject still play in 
Foucault’s theorisation. Even though Foucault problematises the modern vision of 
politics grounded on the idea of the autonomous individual (Foucault, 1972), it could 
still be argued that, in the very description of biopolitical apparatuses, and particularly 
disciplinary ones, the idea of power in Foucault still gives centrality to the subject and 
the individual. In order to clarify this possible objection, I will complete the analysis 
just put forth in relation to the idea of dispositif and particularly the practices of 
resistance through ethics by looking at the compelling argument advanced by 
Macherey in regard to the subject in Foucault, which also opens up to considerations 
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on the surrounding system of relations, that will become even more central in my 
analysis of Spinozism in the next chapter. 
In some of his essays dedicated to Foucault’s ethics and subjectivity, Pierre 
Macherey (1992, 1998) suggests that the idea of the subject in Foucault should always 
be interpreted as possible at the limit. By this, he means that the self recognises itself 
as partaking in a double order of existence. On the one hand, the subject is part of a 
certain order produced by the configuration of mechanisms of power, knowledge, 
truth-regimes and thus perceives itself as part of such operations. However, by 
complying with these truth games and thus subjecting itself to power logics, it also 
does not identify entirely with this order. In other words, the individual becomes aware 
of something subjective, that pertains to its unique condition as a singular being and 
that carves out the space for resistance, and therefore, enables the realisation of the 
space of freedom that has been highlighted above.  
What is relevant for my argument here is that Macherey uses the specific term 
of “singularity” to characterise this condition. The term captures the double dynamic 
whereby one sees oneself as both part of a certain broader order, but also as partly 
detached and distinguished from it, and capable of a mode of existence that is not 
exhausted simply in the compliance to power logics. “Singularity” is the unique term 
that helps express the relation between the being of one entity and its surrounding 
milieu or environment, in a way that simultaneously captures the specificity of the self 
and the broader context in which the latter is inserted, in a relational sense51. 
As seen above, the space in which the self positions itself in regard to the 
surrounding system of power relation is the space for the ethical. Macherey defines it 
as the space for the “elaboration of a form of relation to itself that enables an individual 
to fashion himself into a subject of ethical conduct” (Macherey, 1992: 99). This 
captures precisely what I have analysed in the previous section with regard to 
techniques of the self and Foucault’s ethics. It needs to be specified however that here 
ethical does not refer to the compliance with external and given sets of rules. Rather, 
in this context, ethics pertains precisely to the critical positioning of oneself in regard 
                                                 
51 A similar point on the possibility for the subject to find a genuine space for free agency and creativity is discussed 
also by Olssen (2008), in a piece analysing Foucault’s work in light to the more recent developments in complexity 
theory. Moreover, the author develops the analysis by making reference to the debate between Foucault and 
Chomsky in 1979, which, significantly for my research, is one of the only two instances in which Foucault makes 
a direct reference to the work of Spinoza (see also Chomsky, 2011).  
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to those rules, with the possibility of resisting them by means of practices of positive 
critique.  
I previously made a reference to the relationship between ethics and morality 
to try to exemplify this point. The same dual dynamic can be expanded and applied to 
the very operation of thinking more broadly. Macherey argues that, for Foucault, to 
think is always to think about a system of norms, not for the purpose of legitimising 
or justifying them, but, to a certain extent, to challenge them and highlight what is 
wrong with them, especially in regard to the self and its possible experience 
(Macherey, 1992: 100-101). By thinking, the subject can thus open up a space for 
intervention that challenges the established system of norms. However, this 
intervention takes place not in any point outside the system, but inside the system, and 
in fact, it is generated by it. This happens because of the subject’s taking a critical and 
yet positive position in regard to the existent system of rules, and thus carving out the 
space to free oneself (at least partially) from them.  
The solution that Foucault provides is thus to work on certain practices of the 
self as a way to cultivate this self-awareness of one’s own situation in regard to the 
largest system of relations of power. They act on the relation that the self as singularity 
maintains with the broader set of power dynamics. In this regard, the self must be seen 
not only as the passive subject that is entirely produced by power logics, but as itself 
contributing to the maintenance and continuous reproduction of the latter. 
Significantly, and following from the point above, the self can create a space for 
thinking differently, and challenge established ways of thinking starting from its own 
experience. 
The experience of the subject in Foucault is thus interpreted as always situated 
at the margin or at the “limit”. Significantly, Blencowe (2012) returns to a similar idea 
by arguing that the experience of the subject is tied to life and to the transgression of 
limits: processes of subjectification and resistance are produced by the critical situating 
of the self in regard to norms. That means, Foucault attaches experience to the 
epistemic and ethical enterprise of questioning oneself as the sole result of dynamics 
of power. This consists in exercising one’s own power of action as a singularity with 
regard to the (universal) norm. In this regard, the self is not entirely object of a power 
over and completely appropriated by the system of truth-knowledge in which the norm 
of power is established, but also is not the sole expression of its own power of life 
freed from any external conditioning. The practice of critique highlighted above has 
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the function of questioning the subject’s relation to both itself and the system of norms 
in which one is situated. Quoting Foucault in this regard, critique as ethics is something 
“that permits a change, a transformation of the relationship we have with ourselves 
and with the world where, up to then, we had seen ourselves as beings without 
problems […] a transformation of the relationship we have with our knowledge” 
(Foucault, 2000: 244). The latter points to the knowledge that is derived from regimes 
of truth-power that work towards the formation and the constitution of the subject. 
Ultimately, by his or her own experience, the subject can problematise such knowledge 
and thus challenge the structures of power that use knowledge to exercise forms of 
control.  
It is also possible to spell out the kind of knowledge through which mechanism 
of control by power are exercised. In his theorisations on biopolitics, Foucault 
certainly has in mind primarily forms of biological knowledge, through which power 
tries to appropriate and gain control over forms of life either through disciplines or 
through the control of the population as a whole (by means of statistical data on the 
variables of life). However, with the development of experience and practices of 
resistance, it is also possible to show how life fundamentally escapes the laws of living 
being as they are known and understood by means of contemporary biological 
knowledge only. The very formation of human subjectivity is thus driven in a process 
of radically moving beyond the known limits of the experience defined within the 
power matrix, of transgressing these limits and generating new modes of existence. 
As I will shortly expand by looking at Canguilhem, the challenge to existent 
systems of norms needs to be initiated from the point of view of the limit, of the 
margin, of the error of life as what exceeds and escapes the known boundaries of the 
established norm, thus challenging it and, possibly, bringing about something new. 
This explains why the idea of the subject in Foucault can already be closely compared 
to that of a singularity which is always active at the margin, at the limit of seeing 
oneself as driven by forms of self-expression and, simultaneously already relating to 
the wider environment.  
 Significantly for my analysis, Foucault argues that “The fact that man lives in 
a conceptually structured environment does not prove that he has turned away from 
life […] just that he lives in a certain way, that he has relationship with his environment 
such that he has no set point of view towards it, that he is mobile” (Foucault, 2000: 
475). The point around the connection with the surrounding environment and the fact 
 116 
that the production of concepts is not ultimately separated from the subjective life and 
experience is close to what will be pointed out in regard to possibilities of action in the 
“ecosystem of thought” that I will elaborate in regard to a Spinozist system52.  
 Ultimately, when ethics is turned into a constant practice to be cultivated and 
enacted, there is no distinction between concept and the experience of life, since the 
enterprise of formation of concepts and knowledge is already immanent to life. 
Knowledge organises and distributes dimensions, horizons and possibilities of 
experience. Moreover, as demonstrated through the reading of the concept of dipositif, 
knowledge is itself reproduced and maintained by the way in which life responds to 
these operations. Knowledge, therefore, cannot be seen as external or imposed upon 
life from any external dimension, but is immanent to life and to its norms and 
functioning. Therefore, there is no distinction between concepts and experience of life, 
but the two are co-extensive and mutually reproducing53.  
The idea of singularity bridges the gap between a “vital” idea of life as 
something that is not individualised but still practiced at the level of the individual (in 
the form of resistance). Singularity help trace this connection by applying to the 
individual subject and the processes of subjective formations through resistance, but 
simultaneously implying the context in which subjective experience is situated, in 
relational terms.  
At this stage, however, it could still be argued that, if it is true that the operation 
of challenging norms and transformation takes place within the system, this is still very 
much centred around the self and its own way of being within structures of power. In 
better terms, if there is scope for one to form and work on the self, a much lesser 
concern seems to be put by Foucault on the possibility of producing change also in one 
surrounding environment (Lorenzini, 2016). Crucially, in his essay titled “What is 
Critique?” (1996), the author explicitly declares that: 
                                                 
52 The latter point also proves how Foucault’s idea of life and his use of it remain fundamentally different from the 
understanding of the philosophies of life analysed in Chapter 2, which considered conceptual structures and 
representations as a hinder to life - as seen in the overview of the “vitalist turn” in social sciences in Chapter 2.  
53 In this regard, it could be objected that Foucault reaches exactly this apex at the latest stage of his work, when 
exploring ascetic practices, in which he searches for a coincidence of life and truth (understood not as a concept, 
but as a living truth). However, as I have already pointed out, the reason why I do not look at this part of the author’s 
work specifically is that at the latter stage, the question and concern seem no longer political. In other words, the 
solution offered by Foucault in the last stage of his work does no longer interrogate how to deal or respond to 
relations of power, but rather is concerned with cutting existence outside relations of power altogether (what could 
be defined the search for an “unpolitical” life, see Viriasova, 2013, 2018 on this concept). My exploration, on the 
contrary, is still concerned with the “politics of life” and with modes in which life relates to power (even though 
not in confrontational and oppositional terms). 
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I would therefore propose a very first definition of critique, this general 
characterization: the art of not being governed quite so much” (Foucault, 1996: 
390) 
 I will attempt the further step of expanding on ways to seeking change of the 
surrounding environment of norms starting from the affective and relational position 
of the self by moving on to a materialist system of ideas put forth by contemporary 
readings of Spinoza. The continuity between the level of the self and the surrounding 
environment – and the capacity of the subject to affect the latter – will be investigated 
and enquired by looking at the expansion of Foucault’s ethics, which introduces 
possibilities of new modes of living, through Spinozist naturalist theories. In order to 
do so, though, another step of analysis is required. I argue that an exploration of the 
thought of Georges Canguilhem can help me further unpack and explain the vital and 
positive element of life that I read in Foucault’s theory and how the latter is tied to the 
generation of norms. I will turn to Canguilhem in the final section of the chapter. 
Before moving on, I would like to point out an additional reflection in regard 
to the use of the term “critique” here. Many commentators have discussed this point 
and would object the very use of the term critique in the context of biopolitics and the 
literature engaged here more broadly (Andrejevic, 2013). The attribute of “positive”, 
or, specifically in my reading, “vital”, distinguishes the account provided here from 
more “classic” understandings of critique in social theory emblematically addressing 
“the social problem” of injustices and inequalities. In biopolitics, the latter is deemed 
to be fragmented in a myriad of multiple – and, thus, often seen as problematic – range 
of social problems (Andrejevic, 2013: 227). Blencowe suggests that the idea of 
biopolitics captures the diversity of power relations characteristic of modern societies, 
which does not deny but rather supplements the modes and concerns of traditional 
social critique, particularly Marxian (Blencowe, 2012: 12). This short observation is 
meant to make a point on the function of critique in Foucault and the way it relates to 
other analyses of critique in political theorising. This is possibly only a secondary layer 
to the study here centred around the question of the qualification and politics of life. 
Nevertheless, it is worth pointing this out since it will relate to a similar observation 
in the argument advanced with regard to contemporary Spinozism and finally in the 
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last chapter, when enquiring the political significance of the ethical approach 
elaborated here54.  
 
Foucault and the immanence of the norm 
 I have previously demonstrated that, in my reading, the concept of dispositif is 
crucial for paving the way to an affirmative opening towards an idea of an inherent 
force of life present in Foucault’s thought. As Macherey so effectively puts it when 
looking at the function of norms in Foucault, this starts suggesting the idea of the 
immanence of the norm. The norms that regulate life are not exterior to their field of 
application, that is, of the actions that they aim to inform. Norm cannot be interpreted 
as a cause acting externally to its effects or applying to a field of reality that pre-exists 
its intervention. Rather, it operates in a plane of complete immanence: it orders its 
normative function only gradually while being exercised and thus taking into account 
the subjective responses that are productively and positively opposed to it (Macherey, 
1992). Foucault’s idea of the norm as shaped through dispositives is thus fundamental 
to reflect on its immanent functionality, which admits an affirmative force of life as 
constitutive element.  
The point just suggested is related to the reinterpretation of the very idea of 
causality in immanence. Juniper and Jose (2008:7) define immanence as the plane 
where the very idea of causality dissolves, since the cause is already contained in its 
effects, or, in better terms, the cause is taken to be immanent with the effect. This 
implies the abandonment of the very possibility of an outside to immanence. 
Everything that happens in immanence is generated and produced within such plane 
in a state of deep entanglement. The entire dimension of being is thus flattened in one 
horizon, which plays the role of both theatre of continuous production but also of the 
object which is generated (Toscano, 2006).  
 In fact, many authors have discussed the role that Foucault plays in marking 
the shift from a transcendent to an immanent historical idea of life. Hardt and Negri 
                                                 
54 Along with my reference to Blencowe, I shall also highlight how my argument fundamentally departs from her 
in many regards. In fact, Blencowe’s account runs the opposite risk of putting too much emphasis on the way in 
which biopolitical rationality is directed to “the generation, manifestation, protection and the deferral to, life, 
vitality, creativity, spontaneity” (Blencowe, 2012: 16). By so doing, she risks neglecting that these dynamics are 
not unique, but rather complementary to the repressive side of power that I demonstrated above. I maintain that the 
thanatopolitical logics embedded in biopolitical rationale remain present and cannot be ultimately be downplayed 
from an analytical or a normative standpoint. Nevertheless, hers remains a useful formulation not to limit the 
analysis of biopower to its repressive action and rather acknowledging its positive and productive character, which 
functions as the space where alternative possibilities for forms of life can emerge and be investigated.  
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highlight that Foucault’s rejection of transcendence is endowed of a revolutionary 
impulse that leads him to the rediscovery of a radical plane of immanence (Hardt and 
Negri, 2000). Their reading confirms what has been argued here that, particularly when 
using the developments in biopolitics to introduce possibilities of self-creation and 
experimentation, Foucault’s aim is not a resignation vis-à-vis the loss of absolute and 
transcendent truths. Rather, he wants to look for the possibility of a revolutionary force 
that is entirely located in the immanent plane of living practices, starting from the 
dimension of the body and of corporeal existence. By so doing, he not only proves 
wrong any religious or metaphysical origin ascribed to the meaning of life. He also 
discredits universalising assumptions that are associated with the very ideas of 
humanity and of Man (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 91). The latter in fact, only apparently 
seem to debunk naive beliefs around a religious supernatural origin of the human 
nature. In concrete, it merely creates the illusion of transferring the divine principle to 
the assumption of universal human freedom and autonomy.  
Foucault thus succeed in rearticulating the meaning of life in a radically 
worldly dimension (1972; 2002; 2011). The author’s prime concern is to retreat from 
an understanding of life as derived from an authority or principle outside of the 
production of life itself, be it either a divine law or the rule of reason (Widder, 2012: 
142). Conversely, the author reverses this starting point and takes the biological 
dimension as the defining ground for a mundane understanding of life (Foucault, 1978; 
1983), focused on the biological and bodily dimension and the way in which they are 
constructed and regulated by mechanisms of power. This passage, moreover, is 
projected beyond the individual level and applied to the intersubjective dimension of 
society in order to explain the mechanisms of governing of the population as a whole 
(Foucault, 1978). 
The same movement towards immanence, moreover, can be read in the 
relationship between ethics and morality which I referred to above. As suggested, in 
the biopolitical analysis by Foucault, morality would itself stand as one of the forms 
of power and knowledge aimed at regularising life and subjecting it to their control. 
Ultimately, a stable set of moral norms would itself be part of mechanisms of 
biopolitics. This is also the reason why the ethical response that the author envisions 
needs to be played at a different level, that is, in the domain of the relation that the self 
maintains with oneself, in order to produce forms of resistance and the experience of 
freedom. This kind of ethics, explained as tactics of the self and aimed at reducing the 
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level of domination as much as possible, could therefore never coincide with given 
and established moral rules.  
It is possible to make a deeper reflection about theories of immanent life in 
regard to Foucault’s rearticulation of the role of ethics against a given morality. The 
ethical approach introduced by Foucault is also clearly situated in a perspective of 
immanence, by moving away from the idea of the very possibility of establishing any 
clear and overtly shared set of codes (see again Povinelli, 2016: 97). This highlights a 
broader reflection on the conditions of thinking of an ethics in a perspective of 
immanence. The latter is not shaped along a clear and defined set of rules captured by 
a shared morality or absolute values embedded and expressed by institutional 
practices. Rather, it is transferred to the ethical work of continuous self-formation, 
which enables to express the character of life beyond power constraints. The outcome 
of an action is not decided prior to the action itself, but depends on the contingent and 
situated conditions that are singularly experienced in one’s specific location. This 
operation expresses and acts upon life and saves a space for freeing it beyond the 
effects of power control. This will be further expanded in the context of the material 
naturalism found in the philosophy of the contemporary Spinozist turn. 
 
Canguilhem and the “error” of life 
The section above tried to demonstrate that a vital idea of life is present in 
Foucault’s work, and, in many regards, can be considered part of his developments 
around the idea of critique, resistance and power (see also Piasentier, 2018 on 
Foucault’s double approach to biopolitics). In order to substantiate the argument 
around the complex and ambivalent understanding of life in Foucault, and particularly 
the capacity of life to escape the norms of power, I will shortly go back to the work of 
Georges Canguilhem and his studies around life in a specific biological perspective. 
Canguilhem played a pre-eminent role in laying the foundations to the contemporary 
philosophy of science in the 20th century, and certainly had a strong influence in 
inspiring the idea of productive life in Foucault. Looking at Canguilhem helps me 
further clarify the use in which the term vitalism can be understood in reference to 
Foucault and why it is possible to establish a connection between the latter and the 
theory of Spinozism in the following chapter.  
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Canguilhem is possibly the first author who offers analytical reflections on the 
concept of life and on the way in which modern biology has enabled the emergence of 
this field of research. In many respects, Canguilhem can himself be considered a 
vitalist thinker55. He initially defines vitalism as an account that refuses to conceive of 
life in mechanical terms and sees living phenomena as fundamentally irreducible to 
principles of sciences like physics or chemistry (see Benton, 1974; Lenoir, 1982; 
Hoyningen-Huene and Wuketits, 2012: 9-10). Thus, and significantly for my research, 
he has a very particular take on vitalism and describes the latter approach not so much 
as an essentialisation or reification of life, but rather invites to treat vitalism itself 
primarily as an ethical principle. Rejecting an account of life as emerging from modern 
biology and identified with either a fixed finality or an organicist order and totality, 
according to Canguilhem, life itself should be considered as a normative activity. 
Ultimately, the reason for looking at the work of Canguilhem is that he demonstrates 
how vitalism can work as an intellectual and ethical standpoint, more than and before 
a factual positive philosophy of life – of the like of the approaches explored in Chapter 
2. It is in this second meaning that I deploy the definition of “vital” life in regard to 
what discussed above in Foucault. 
Such understanding is important because, in the first place, Canguilhem’s 
position takes distance from any essentialising reading of the idea of life itself56. 
Rather, for him, vitalism indicates that life is traversed and subjected to organic laws 
that can never be reduced to sole physical and biological explanation (in a variant that 
could be called as “naturalistic vitalism” or “material vitalism”, as defined by 
Hoyningen-Huene and Wuketits, 1989). Consequently, vitalism can and needs to be 
thought of in a strictly historical dimension: across the epochs and specifically in 
relation to the development of biological sciences, vitalism has worked as the 
(negative) term of reference against which biological thought and techniques have 
progressed. In other words, biological knowledge could develop only as a science of 
the specificity of life and of living beings, which at any point in time has escaped 
attempts to entirely regularise and appropriate it. From the latter point, it derives that 
                                                 
55 In fact, some critics have labelled his work as a “polemical vitalist” (distinguished thus from the “animist” strand 
of this approach, see note below). This well capture the regulative, critical and normative character of his work, 
which does not attempt to formulate a positive ontology of life. See Greco (2005), Hertogh (1987). 
56 Some commentators have suggested to consider the latter variety of vitalist thought as a form of “animism”, 
Hoyningen-Huene and Wuketits, 1989: 9). However, as I have demonstrated in the previous chapter, also some of 
the current developments of neo-vitalism seem to reach a similar outcome, to an extent. For a broader classification 
of theories of vitalism and their use in the 19th century, see Benton (1974). 
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a vitalist character cannot be considered as absolute and unchangeable reality, but is 
rather liable to the evolution of the very idea of life in time. As Monica Greco suggests 
(2005), vitalism also forces to look at life in a diachronic dimension: its function is to 
point to a motor force, that, while not identifiable in fixed and absolute terms, opposes 
tendencies towards reductionist explanations.  
Related to the latter point is the notion of “error”, which leads Canguilhem to 
speak of the “vitality of vitalism” (Canguilhem, 2008, 2012; Gutting, 2002; Greco, 
2005): biological sciences have been able to make advancements precisely because an 
element of life constantly escapes rational definition. In fact, biological knowledge 
could progress only insofar as “the problem of the specificity of life and of the 
threshold it marks among all natural beings was continually thrown back as a 
challenge” (Canguilhem, 1989: 18). Importantly, then, vitalism indicates a normative 
direction for thinking about life: on the one hand, it points to the specificity of living 
beings. Secondly, it intimates that these forms of living themselves can never be 
entirely subsumed to systems of appropriation and knowledge, especially of the kind 
that biological sciences aim at providing. To put it in the words in which the 
problematic of the thesis has been formulated, they cannot be assigned given and fixed 
categories and qualifications. 
The latter account thus speaks directly to the problem and objectives that an 
approach of biopolitics sets up, by aspiring to establish regimes of domination on 
modes of (human) living by means of the biological knowledge that can be acquired 
about them. Knowledge is here seen as co-extensive with error: it “undoes the 
experience of life, seeking to analyse its failures” (Canguilhem, 2008: xviii). The strive 
to engage with life that continuously escapes possibilities of absorption and reduction 
to systems of understanding can thus open up avenues for new non-sovereign 
knowledge that escapes the domination by power regimes (Strausz and Zevnik, 2013). 
Vitalism, thus, conceived primarily as an ethical disposition and attitude, amounts to 
a form of resistance to any reductionist attempts. It invites to think of life as always 
excessive to any possibility of reducing and subsuming it to any positive knowledge, 
not as a factual assertion on life but as a regulative principle that allows one to think 
of new modes of being.  
Thus, by framing his work on life in terms of a discussion of the “error” that 
pertains to life (well captured by the dichotomy of the normal and the pathological, 
Canguilhem, 2012), Canguilhem enables us to reframe the very understanding of what 
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should be understood as “normal” and pathological states of life, against the positivist 
accounts of health and disease dominant at his time. “Normal” is not identified with 
what is established by the data gathered by the positive sciences. Rather, “normal” 
expresses the movement whereby life establishes and expresses itself despite and 
regardless of this scientific and statistical knowledge: it is the manifestation of the 
“error” which affirms itself despite attempts to know or dominate it. It is worth quoting 
at length a passage from Povinelli (2016), who provides a most accurate and beautiful 
description of this point in her analysis of Canguilhem:  
Canguilhem rejects the idea that what was normal about any particular organism 
could be found in a set of the statistical distribution defining its kind. What is 
normal about organic life is not defined by how close or distant the individual 
is from the statistical norm of its species […]. What is normal about an 
organism, and about organic life is an indwelling capacity and drive to seek to 
establish the norms that would allow to persist and expand its powers of 
existence. Life is creative striving (conatus) to maintain and expresses its 
capacity to establish norms (affectus), not the reduction of its being to a set of 
quantitative data (Povinelli, 2016: 96) 
  With Canguilhem, the ideas of the normal and normality, thus, become entirely 
redefined against the dominant assumptions coming from the biological and 
mechanical sciences of its time. Moreover, the definition of the norm of life becomes 
now explicated as expression of the affective dimension and of a striving as a conatus. 
I maintain that, through the analysis of Canguilhem, it is now possible to explicate the 
idea of the excess of life that I pointed out above in relation to Foucault and that feeds 
into practices of resistance. Resistance, which corresponds to an escape from power, 
derives precisely from this striving impulse of life, a conatus that escapes any exterior 
attempt to representation and appropriation, and is driven in its mere existence by its 
own norms. Actions of resistance thus are generated by a material and affirmative 
impulse of life, yet, the latter is not simply affirmed a priori, but it continuously 
interacts – and escapes – dynamics of power. Even though it might be counterintuitive 
to move from Foucault back to Canguilhem, I argue that this move is necessary and 
productive in order to unpack and explicate the vitalist element that is implied by the 
theory of Foucault. In order to further discuss the affective capacity of life to generate 
its own norms as expression of its own striving for existence, and why this need is 
regarded as ethical, I will then turn to a Spinozist theory of ethics and naturalism.  
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With his analysis and contrast between the two perspectives highlighted, 
moreover, Canguilhem brings to light a shift in the purposes of the sciences of life that 
was occurring with the emergence of statistical and positivistic sciences of the 
population (in fact contrary to vitalist assumptions): he shows how the question and 
the scientific interest in the study of life progressively ceases to be a concern for life 
self-preservation in vital, biological and organic terms. Rather, the attention on life 
becomes a question on the norms regulating it. As Nikolas Rose clearly highlights in 
a masterful piece on Canguilhem’s work, “the productivity of Canguilhem’s 
reflections on norms in life lies less in his insistence on the vitality of life than on the 
light that it sheds on the character of those other norms that traverse our culture” (Rose, 
2006a: 164). More specifically, Canguilhem demonstrates that “Normativity (of life) 
now becomes a matter of normality, of social and moral judgments about whether 
particular lives are worth living” (Rose, 1998: 165). This seems to summarise and 
capture precisely what has been highlighted in Chapter 1 about the qualification of 
kinds of life and their positioning in regard to the interest of power. The knowledge 
obtained about life is no longer aimed primarily at safeguarding or ensuring the 
preservation of life itself, but rather at regularising and normalising modes of 
existence and making them controllable under the effects of power logics. 
By so doing, Canguilhem thus demonstrates that the oscillation between fact 
and value is never fixed and defined in absolute terms. Rather, according to his view, 
it stems from a “dynamic polarity” between the normal and the pathological, between 
a standard and a deviant account of forms of existence. This means that rather than 
considering forms of life as a matter of fact defined outside a historical and temporal 
account, distinctions of facts and values are produced by the discursive practices in 
which they are inscribed. In other words, there is no neutral ground to define the 
distinction between natural and qualified life, but rather the practices exercised over 
life themselves produce the way in which life is qualified and accounted for.  
The latter point reinforces what I have illustrated in my analysis of the 
normalisation of forms of life by biopolitical systems of domination examined in 
Chapter 1. Most crucially for my argument, however, the passage through 
Canguilhem’s theory demonstrates that in order to establish mechanisms of 
appropriation and regulation, an element of “error”, of vital conception of life must 
constantly exceed biopolitical regimes. Canguillem’s theory thus proves not only that 
a natural life is always already co-present to the regulated life of norms or bios. It also 
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shows that natural life needs to be conceived as active and productive, as always 
potentially escaping the logics of biopolitics, and cannot be reduced only to their 
passive and negative correlative entirely produced by effect of power logics. Yet, life 
also escapes the possibility of fully grasping and qualifying it. It thus requires the 
search for an alternative way to engage with it, beyond the grasp of systems of 
knowledge and qualifications. 
The account given by Canguilhem also supports the criticism against the 
literature on vitalism examined in the previous chapter and the need for differentiating 
between the two. I make the case that the idea of vitalism used here should not be 
conceived as a positive and substantive philosophy of life. Rather, vitalism works as a 
regulative and normative principle: the assumption of acting “as if” possibilities of life 
always escape the capacity of systems of power-knowledge to regulate and appropriate 
them provides the starting point to search for forms of escape or resistance to power57. 
 Finally, and most significantly to pave the way to the analysis that follows, 
Canguilhem helps identify the element of vital and productive life as an impetus, a 
conatus that expresses each being’s striving for existence and the capacity to impose 
and affirms its own norms. I argue that this definition captures the specificity of each 
being that escapes normalisation and qualification, and whose basis is identified with 
the expression of a natural, material order of life beyond the discursive operation of 
power. In order to expand on this element and further analyse how it can be 
productively expanded to challenge the problem of qualification – and exclusion – of 
types of life set out at the beginning of the enquiry, I thus turn to the naturalism of 
Spinoza in contemporary readings. The naturalist philosophy inspired by Spinoza and 
especially the link established between the affective status of existence and the 
production of ideas that can have an effect on the surrounding environment through 
ethics help me expand what I argued in regard to Foucault and to the ways of escaping 
the normalisation operated by power. 
 
                                                 
57 Along with Povinelli (2016), another piece that offer a compelling analysis of Canguilhem and the function of 
his thought for past and contemporary politico-philosophical studies of life is Greco (2005). Greco compares 
Canguilhem’s thought to the function that is today fulfilled by complexity studies. In an analogous way, she sees 
them working as a new normative compass that inspires different disposition to knowledge and analysis, one not 
aimed at the grasping of certainties in a teleological assumption but that rather is aware of the impossibility of 
reaching such certainty. A more thorough discussion of this analogy and line of enquiry is beyond the scope of this 
research. However, this suggestion certainly provides an interesting focus that might deserve further research and 
expansion. Finally, another interesting contribution to clarify the role of Canguilhem in the philosophy of science 
is Wolfe (2007). 
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Conclusion 
 The chapter offered an alternative reading of the definition and kind of life that 
is implied by Foucault’s analysis and his moving beyond the problem of the 
qualification of life operated by biopolitics. Against the conclusions reached by both 
the debates of biopolitics and vitalism explored in Part I, the current chapter has tried 
to build an alternative attempt by returning to the theory of Michel Foucault. It 
demonstrated that, in fact, in his ground-breaking analysis of biopolitics, the author 
already shows the presence of a vital component in the idea of life implied by 
biopolitics. After exploring the introduction of Foucault’s system and theorisation of 
biopolitics, envisioned in the shift from the juridical dimension of sovereign power to 
that of capillary mechanisms of social control by the norm, the analysis focused on his 
concept of resistance as a way to carve out a space for subjective freedom. For the 
author, this resistance of life is already co-present and is part of the mechanisms 
through which life that is made object of control and domination responds to power 
logics.  
To the ideas of a resistance of life and freedom, which is significantly found 
primarily at the level of the corporeal or the bodily experience, I associated the idea of 
a vital understanding of life, in fact something that escapes the logics of appropriation 
and knowledge by power. This has been captured particularly by an analysis of the 
concept of the dispositif, as a way to explain the structure of relations in which both 
elements, life subjected to power and life reacting and actively responding to it, are 
formed, interact and become manifest in their mutual dependency. In order to reach 
the conclusion about a vital component of life and the role that the latter plays in 
explaining and justifying the working of mechanism of biopolitics, moreover, I also 
referred to the theory of Canguilhem, who plays a key role in inspiring the 
developments of Foucault’s theory. The main contribution drawn from Canguilhem is 
to take vitalism not as an essentialising and foundational perspective, but primarily as 
a regulative principle. The very idea that a certain dimension of life always escapes 
the possibility for power to gain knowledge-control over it can lead to attempts to 
escape power dynamics and practice resistance. In this regard, it can be noted that 
Foucault understands critique of power dynamics through resistance not as a direct 
opposition to forms of domination, but rather as an attempt of the self “not to be 
 127 
governed quite so much”. I also attempted to formulate and frame this by borrowing 
the concept of “positive critique” used by Blencowe. 
Once the co-presence of a productive understanding of life in the justification 
of power mechanisms have been established, then the following part of the chapter 
went on looking more closely to the way in which practices of resistance are realised 
and enacted. I have thus looked at the dimension of ethics that Foucault identifies with 
practices of freedom from power. An ethics understood as practices of “care for the 
self” has precisely the aim of attending to processes of subject formation in a way that 
is not simply passive or compliant to the aims of power, but rather productively 
interacts with it. If it is true that power mobilises states of being also in the affective 
dimension, then it is also possible for the subject to capitalise on these affective states 
and turn them into the source of action. This is the explanation that the function of 
Foucault’s ethics captures.  
 Both the latter points are crucial for bridging the way to the following steps of 
the analysis and particularly to the engagement with the discussion of Spinozist 
theories. First, the idea of subjectivity in Foucault has been described with the idea of 
singularity, which captures the relational and situated character in which subjectivity 
emerges. Moreover, I also highlighted how the processes and norms that define the 
formation of subjectivity need to take place in an immanent plane, where logics of 
power are simultaneously the cause and the effect of processes of subject formation 
and nothing is external to these dynamics. The next step of the enquiry will build on 
these conclusions. It will show how Spinozist approaches help move from the 
individual dimension on which Foucault’s analysis seems to be situated to the broader 
sphere of the context of relations in which the self is encumbered. In particular, the 
main difference and addition is that a similar ethical attitude built on the premises of a 
vitalist understanding of life will lead not only to a reaction to mechanisms of power 
or norms constituting one’s surrounding environment, but also to the possibility of 
their modification. This will be explored through an analogy and expansion of the 
concept of dispositif here analysed to that of an ecosystem of ideas, where ideas are 
thought to have a material dimension. This will have implications also for the very 
understanding of the modes and possibility for critique (under assumptions of 





The Naturalist Norm of Life in the Spinozist Turn 
 
Introduction 
After providing a discussion of the idea of life in the two perspectives of 
biopolitics and vitalism, Chapter 3 explored Foucault’s theory of biopolitics and 
resistance to introduce a different line of enquiry. I argued that Foucault’s thought 
breaks with the qualification of life established by these perspectives; I suggested that 
the concept of dispositif accommodates the co-presence of a subjected idea of life and 
one that is seen as positive and productive. In this analysis, life can become the master 
and the agent of its own mode of being, even though still in response to the 
mechanisms established by power. Through the idea of critique, Foucault carves out 
the space for subjective freedom within the structures of biopolitical normalisation.  
Chapter 4 moves on and expands the conceptualisation of the positive element 
found in the analysis of Foucault. It looks at the natural materialist thought of Spinoza 
elaborated and expanded upon by contemporary literature, as an approach that can help 
recognise the generative character of norms in immanence, by considering them not 
only in their discursive but especially in their material nature. It intimates that 
developments of Spinoza’s materialist conception of thought, as found for instance in 
Deleuze’s reading of the author or in more contemporary thinkers like Hasana Sharp, 
help conceive of forms of transformation of existent systems of relations among forms 
of living and being. I suggest an expansion of Foucault’s concept of dispositifs (as the 
fundamental structures that articulate the possible field of experience and thus define 
the norm of possible modes of life) with a Spinozist ecology (or ecosystem) of thought 
developed by the authors just mentioned. In the latter, ideas hold a material force that 
is able to modify the surrounding system of relations, not by way of opposing it directly 
but rather by engaging in a process of transformation that can ultimately carve new 
spaces for subjective modes of expression and freedom. This is deemed to carry a 
transformative potential also on established normative systems that structure the 
sphere of life. 
 The chapter is structured as follows: I will first introduce the key aspects of 
Spinoza’s materialist conception of ideas that have been emphasised particularly by 
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Deleuze, frame them in the broader outline of the author’s metaphysics (as far as it is 
necessary to introduce the part of the author’s thought that is relevant for the enquiry) 
and advance the suggestion that conceiving of dispositives as a materialist ecosystem 
of thought can help theorise how practices of resistance and critique become inscribed 
into an “ambient” understanding (Sharp, 2007) of norms and their functioniong - and 
eventually open up the possibility for their modification. Then, the analysis 
demonstrates how, in light of the previous assumptions, ethics comes to play a crucial 
role as a constant practice or mode of living able to modify existent norms and 
revitalise established ways of thinking. This ethics is grounded not on external systems 
of rules or attribution of value, but on the striving for existence that pertains to each 
mode of life in their singularity. I will use this term to qualify the type of relational 
ethics of life here suggested, which remains open and responsive to the contingency 
and specificity of modes of being. This can counter the qualifying and often 
exclusionary outcomes that the analysis of the approaches engaged in Part I brought 
to light. The chapter will conclude with a short analysis of an example to which the 
ethics of singularity here outlined can be applied: I select the case of refugees (with a 
short reference to some events in the latest 2015 European migration crisis), which 
links back to the reflections on the themes introduced in Chapter 1. 
 
Immanent naturalism in the contemporary Spinozist Turn 
 It is often maintained that Spinoza provides a truly singular case in the 
landscape of modern philosophy. His embracing of immanence, combined with the 
idea of the identity of nature and God, have gained him a unique place intellectually 
and in the historical landscape of his time58. This has been recognised by the many 
authors who have built on Spinoza’s thought more recently and who have brought 
Spinozism to a rediscovery in the last decades, so much so that it is possible to speak 
of a Spinozist turn in contemporary political theorising. As a matter of fact, 
contemporary literature has been variously appreciative of the significance of 
Spinoza’s thought, whose legacy has been developed in many trajectories and with 
diverse aims. Toscano (2012), for instance, suggests that, thanks to his immanent 
                                                 
58 For an accurate analysis of how Spinoza’s work can be read in relation to his biographical experience and 
historical context see for instance Deleuze (1988b, 1992a); Hampshire (1956) or, more recently, Kisner and Youpa 
(2014). 
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approach, Spinoza’s political and ethical projects are capable of putting profound 
philosophical questions as to how to address current historical circumstances, from the 
collective construction of a common political space to the sometimes catastrophic 
incursion of worldly events. Others, historically closer to Spinoza like Kant (in Boehm, 
2011; Lord, 2010) and Marion (in Peden, 2014) invite to read Spinoza’s thought more 
as disposition to philosophical thought in general, as a way of life. This is further 
reinforced by Gilles Deleuze, who highlights that “In Spinoza’s thought, life is not an 
idea, a matter of theory. It is a way of being. It is only from this perspective that his 
geometrical method is fully comprehensible” (Deleuze, 1988b: 13). He goes on to say 
that demonstrations, which Spinoza’s uses to organise his Ethics, can be creative and 
inventive, by starting from what is already given, which is, the configuration of ideas 
and experiences present to define a situation.  
An account of all the strands that have generated from re-readings of Spinoza 
falls beyond the scope of this enquiry59. I will here focus especially on the mediation 
that some thinkers have offered of the author’s thought and whose conclusions enable 
a dialogue with the steps accomplished at the previous stages of the research. In the 
range of the authors that can be gathered in the Spinozist turn in theory, I will focus 
primarily on the reading offered by Deleuze (1998b; 1992a), which is helpful to further 
expand on notions that he draws from Spinoza’s metaphysical system (the notion of 
univocity stands out as one of the most meaningful contributions here for the scope of 
my analysis). Moreover, a very fruitful conversation with the arguments previously 
put forth by the thesis seems to be inspired by the work of Hasana Sharp, who, in the 
context of a feminist ethics, deploys the work of Spinoza to postulate a 
“renaturalisation” of politics (Sharp, 2007; 2011). In her work, it is particularly the 
notion of an “ecosystem of ideas” that helps expand the argument developed in regard 
to Foucault around the co-presence of a material and a discursive dimension of life. 
These are the trajectories that I will follow in the contemporary Spinozist turn in 
theory. Before exploring those ideas, it is necessary to provide a short outline of the 
key assumptions of Spinoza’s naturalist system as read through the lenses of the 
literature here presented. 
                                                 
59 The influence and re-readings of Spinoza have in fact been extensive and directed in different and multiple 
theoretical projects. A broad classification could distinguish across neo-Marxian perspectives (Althusser, 2006; 
Macherey, 1992, 1998; Balibar, 1998; Hardt and Negri, 2000, 2005; Negri, 1991, 2013); feminist approaches 
(Braidotti, 1994, 2006, 2013; Grosz, 1994, 2011) but also towards environmental and ecological thinking (Bennett, 
2004, 2010; Sharp, 2007, 2011). All of them borrow from the fundamental assumptions of Spinoza’s metaphysics 
and its ensuing ethico-political implications to address emerging questions in all these different fields of enquiry. 
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 As outlined effectively by Hasana Sharp, in Spinoza, reality is conceived in a 
monistic sense, where everything is understood as part of an indefinitely complex, 
unbounded totality called Nature, substance or God, “which contains all that there is 
and all that could ever be” (Sharp, 2011: 68). Spinoza’s ontology is thus presented as 
a unitary way of thinking, where everything needs to be understood as happening in 
the same (and the only existing) plane of immanence. The idea of a plane, which has 
been particularly popularised by Deleuze (1998b), suggests precisely a dimension that 
absorbs everything within itself, without leaving anything external to it. This coincides 
with the infinite and indefinite substance of nature. Nature, or Substance, then, is itself 
expressed in infinitely many attributes, or “ways of being”, of which two are available 
to human understanding: thought and extension. Attributes are understood as discrete 
forces of existing and acting (Spinoza, 1985). In fact, Spinoza defines an attribute as 
“what the intellect perceives of a substance, as constituting its essence” (Spinoza, 
1985: 25). Each attribute, or way of being, is then itself differentiated into infinitely 
many modes. Modes must be conceived as endowed of a certain physical intensity (be 
their modes of thought, in the form of ideas, or of extension, as bodies). The notion of 
a physical intensity associated with each mode indicates that each of them corresponds 
to a certain specific degree of power, with which they are able to influence (or that is 
itself influenced by) other modes, ideas or bodies. Significantly, this specific degree 
of power that determines relative intensities is different from one to another of these 
modes. The latter passage helps introduce a fundamental notion in the naturalist system 
just outlined: that of singularity. In fact, this idea already appeared in the previous 
chapter in regard to the reading to the subjectivity found in Foucault’s oeuvre. In the 
reading of Spinozist authors, each mode needs to be conceived as a singularity that, 
while being defined by the same substance as all others, also remains unique in its own 
existence and in the kind of relationships that it can establish with other modes, 
depending on its own unique power.  
It is also important to notice that, whereas bodies and ideas remain distinct, 
since they usher from different attributes, thought and matter, yet, they share the same 
ontological status, since they both derive from the same substance of nature. In other 
words, there is no relation of hierarchy or transcendence among the attributes and 
modes that express being, since they all are expression of the same substance operating 
at the immanent dimension. This common ontological status can be best captured by 
Deleuze’s idea of univocity (Deleuze, 1988b). All modes exist and find expression 
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only in immanence. As I suggested in regard to Foucault, “immanence” means that 
both the cause and the effect (of a phenomenon, a status or an entity itself) always 
remain within god or nature60. The idea of univocity that Deleuze provides, therefore, 
establishes a difference between substance and the essence of attributes, since the two 
have nothing in common and yet maintain an equal ontological status. Thus, defining 
them as univocal helps conceive of them as situated within the same sphere of being 
(in immanence), without establishing any form of hierarchy or transcendent principle. 
The concept of univocity helps formulate and capture the concept of difference without 
yet assuming a different degree of value among beings.  
 Within the complex system of a naturalist-material ontology, the specific 
understanding of thought (captured by Spinoza’s theory of the mind) and the 
consequent role assigned to passions and to the affective dimension of experience are 
particularly important for the development of the following steps of the argument. I 
concentrate on these aspects in order to highlight how such a reading has implications 
for the possibilities of thought, existence and action - thus connecting to the thesis aim 
of explaining the productive character of life in its interaction with norms, and 
particularly the ones established by biopolitical regimes.  
 
The naturalist idea of thought and passions 
 In the critical presentation of Spinoza’s thought, in particular in Expressionism 
in Philosophy: Spinoza (1992a), Deleuze outlines Spinoza’s theory of the mind as 
standing in opposition to perspectives on the same issue dominating modern 
philosophy, in particular the idea of Cartesian dualism of mind and extension 
(Descartes et al., 1968; Deleuze, 1992a: 155-168). In Deleuze’s reading, Spinoza 
rejects the thesis that there are different compartments of substance and reads thought 
and extension as two attributes of the unique substance of nature-god. Such a 
conception has implications for the ensuing theory of the mind and modes of 
experience. It implies redefining the relationship existing between thought and affects, 
which can no longer be seen as independent from one another (and with a 
subordination of the latter to the former) but are put on an equivalent ground. As 
                                                 
60 This is reflected also in the very conception of nature. Nature can take the form of either a natura naturata, which 
captures the multiplicity of modes deriving from the infinite mind of god, and a natura naturans, which is instead 
the primordial cause of the expression of nature (Spinoza, 1985, also in Sharp, 2011). It must also be noticed that 
“nature” for Spinoza does not correspond to anything like a natural “environment”, but it is rather synonym of 
everything that exists, which Spinoza dissolves in the notion of the one substance (including the modes of extension 
and thought, the mental and the physical) which are kept separate, but, fundamentally, also united in his system. 
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mentioned, both attributes are constituted by infinite modes. This means that also 
individual human minds are nothing but modes of the unique substance of nature and 
its infinite power of thought (Deleuze, 1992a: 155-168). The ideas present in 
individual minds correspond to states in the body, which pertains to the same 
substance. This is known as Spinoza’s theory of parallelism (Deleuze, 1992a: 99-112). 
Parallelism indicates that neither the mind nor the body have primacy over the other. 
Rather, parallelism between mind and body implies a form of simultaneity: an action 
of the mind is necessarily an action in the body and vice versa, a passion in the body 
is also a passion in the mind (Spinoza, 1985; Hampshire, 1956): neither state plays a 
causal role on the other nor has any causal priority. 
Such conception is important for my argument in two directions. First, the 
emergence and modification of states of the mind happen in dependence of states of 
the body; thus, they influence the formation of ideas and ways of thinking. Therefore, 
the disposition to certain modes of being and behaving depends on monitoring and 
navigating affections and intensities in the body. Such relationship between the mind 
and the body does not imply that the mind is subordinated to passions, but rather that, 
given their fundamental union, the mind needs to be sensitive to the influence of bodily 
affects in order to achieve its realisation. The reconsideration of the role of the body 
and what “it can do” is a central theme in the contemporary Spinozist turn and, among 
the many, both Deleuze (1992a: 217-234) and Sharp (2011) insist on it in order to 
highlight the overcoming of strong dualist positions that have informed philosophical 
approaches since modernity. In the monistic system they engage, the connection 
between thought and affects constitutes the essence of a way of being and existing, 
which is thus entirely ethical. In relation to this, bodies are conceived as modes: they 
are never subjects or substances but are determined primarily by the capacity of 
affecting and being affected (through the medium of relations). Bodies are therefore 
defined primarily in terms of capacities. This can be traced back to what mentioned in 
the previous chapter with regard to Foucault. There, too, the mechanisms of power in 
biopolitics appeared as directed towards the intensities, capacities and vitality of the 
body and the corporeal dimension, which act never as the mere ground of power 
dynamics, but also as capable of a subjective response. Significantly for my argument, 
affective ways of being generate also new ideas and new ways of thinking, by inducing 
an effect in the mind.   
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Secondly, the idea of the unitary substance comprising of extension and 
thought also implies that neither the mind nor the body can ever be conceived as 
isolated entities, but are always already in relation to an environment of other ideas or 
bodies, by which they are necessarily influenced. An awareness of this influence and 
interconnection is thus crucial for defining modes of being. Only when realising a 
unity with nature, that is, being part of an entanglement of different modes, each 
characterised by their own singularity of power, an alternative and complete fulfilment 
of reason is possible. Reason is not considered as a pure cognitive or intellectual 
function fundamentally distinct from the body. Again in Deleuze’s readings, it rather 
points to a form of living thought (Deleuze, 1988b: 17). The latter puts therefore a 
question on ethics, which amounts to the disposition to cultivate and enhance life 
intensity by responding to - and eventually modify – the articulation of being within 
its milieu of existence. This will be further unpacked in the next section.  
 The idea of a broader, living thought is supported by Deleuze also in his 
Spinoza. Practical Philosophy (1988b) and can be given more attention. Deleuze 
points out that, in Spinoza, there is an apparent devaluation of the role and faculty of 
consciousness in favour of a more comprehensive idea of “thought”. Consciousness is 
downplayed by the broader attention to the series of modes, intensities, movements 
and forces that define being, and of which there is no subjective or rational 
understanding or awareness (also in Williams, 2010). There is no complete awareness 
of the phenomena and actions occurring through the body by the conscious part of it. 
Simultaneously, the power of the mind, influenced by the spontaneous affections of 
the body, exceeds consciousness and rationality61. In this analysis, consciousness can 
thus be better understood as the awareness across stages of greater or lesser intensity 
of passions and forces, which produce a transformation in the parallel attribute. 
Depending on the more positive or negative sign of such intensities and forces (defined 
by either a process of augmentation or diminishing of thought’s capacities and 
intensities respectively), passions can be defined as either sad or joyful. Joyful 
passions are those that affirm life and are responsible for one’s navigating a system of 
relations in a way that enhances its intensities and survival. 
                                                 
61 This idea marks a sharp difference from the way in which the body had been conceived in other philosophical 
perspectives. Especially, Spinoza’s thought stands in contrast with either spiritualist or machinic theories of the 
body, which would become dominant in the 18th century (Macherey, 1992). A reference to passions in authors 
contemporary to Spinoza is instead rather rare, with few exceptions (see Hobbes, 1999, 2016; also in Frost, 2010). 
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 The affects that orient one’s living are linked to another central element in 
Spinozist thought, which has already been introduced via Canguilhem: the idea of the 
conatus, understood as the natural tendency of all bodies and ideas to strive for their 
maintenance and survival, and to persevere in their state of being as long as it does not 
run into negative encounters which diminish their vitality and energy (Spinoza, 1985). 
Conatus, again, can be read as a fundamental force, and pertains both to objects 
(animate or inanimate) and, crucially, ideas. The idea of conatus, here inscribed in a 
fully naturalist system, expands and further clarifies the “creative striving” seen in 
Canguilhem, as a urge of being to affirm itself and, in my reading, identified with the 
vital forces that in Foucault generated forms of positive critique and action against the 
existent configurations of (power) relations. 
 Deleuze further points out that a second implication of the analysis just 
addressed concerns the use and understanding of values. Values are commonly 
conceived as defining the attribution of judgments of good and evil. However, in the 
relational and affective approach of Spinoza’s ontology, the ethical values of good and 
evil need to be reformulated and replaced with the notions of “good” and “bad”, that 
is, of judgments that pertain to the kind of experience and the power of action deriving 
from it. Specifically, the judgment of “good” would be given to those relations that 
increase one body’s powers (Deleuze, 1988b).   
 Existence and experience themselves could thus be understood as a practice 
of encounters, by which an entity can ultimately modify its way of being and strive for 
the best that pertains to its nature (Toscano, 2012). Ultimately, in the Spinozist theory 
of affects and naturalist thought, values (in the assessment of good and bad) have a 
relative sign: they depend on how something relates and expresses one’s nature (or, 
contrarily, fails to fulfil it) through various encounters. I suggest that the latter point 
can be put in relation to what highlighted in the previous chapter on Foucault via 
Canguilhem: there are no fixed systems of principles that define what “the good life” 
is. Rather, this depends on the singular experience and positioning of a being and its 
capacity to maximise its forces. 
Crucially, though, this experience is also closely intertwined with and 
dependent on the relations in the surrounding environment, in which beings can thrive, 
but that, also, they continuously contribute to modifying. To put it in Foucault’s 
statement seen at the start of the enquiry, this applies to all “billions of living beings 
that inform their environment and inform themselves on the basis of it” (Foucault, 
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2003: 14-15). In Foucault, this experience and the consequent action generated from 
it took place at the level of bodily experiences and affects effected by power relations. 
Resistance corresponded to the force towards a subjective experience that strives to 
maximise its intensity and power, in response to the attempts of power to hinder it. 
The theory of parallelism and naturalism just outlined formulated particularly by 
Deleuze helps enlarge the production of intensities and forces to the domain of ideas: 
the goodness of the affects is translated into ideas that will have more force and power, 
even to shape and interact with established or fixed ideas of the “norm” and the “good”. 
The latter point thus leads to a discussion of ethics.  
  
The implications for a theory of ethics 
 The devaluation of consciousness and values just seen in the section above and 
pointed out by Deleuze as defining elements of Spinoza’s system leads to the 
discussion of the role of ethics. Ethics can be here described as a catalogue or typology 
of immanent modes of existence (Spinoza, 1985) or, as Deleuze puts it, a vision of the 
world (Deleuze 1992a: 255) in which one necessarily participates. In this, ethics 
replaces morality, conceived as an absolute system of judgments, with a disposition 
and practice to receive affections coming from both body and thought, and to shape 
one’s way of being and acting in response to the variation of such intensities. This 
understanding should by no means be reduced to a lower attitude of mere bodily and 
instinctive responses to the impulses received by the surrounding environment (in 
some form of mechanicism). Rather, ethics should be regarded as ushering precisely 
from a more comprehensive idea of rational life, which does not dominate passions 
from the outside (in the guise of an external agent having control over them) but by 
acknowledging passions and their effects as part and parcel of one’s constitution and 
experience. 
 More specifically, as mentioned in the previous section, ethics can no longer 
be seen as the question of assigning essential values to modes of being (that is, the 
qualifications of good and evil; Deleuze, 1988b: 22). A fixed system of morality is 
replaced by the qualitative assessment of different modes of existence according to 
notions of good or bad. The attribution of value and direction of life are not imposed 
by any external force, but are generated within modes of life in their striving for 
affirmation and survival. “Ethical” (that is, acting towards the good) pertains to any 
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actions or ideas that increase the power of an entity, made up of both body and thought. 
This, however, should not be regarded as a purely self-centred process, since the 
realisation of joy and fulfilment is a fundamentally relational process, which depends 
on the encounters, movements and experiences that provide the context or, in better 
words, the milieu, to one’s existence (Sharp, 2011). The development of thought itself 
therefore can never ignore the surrounding environment in which thought is 
contingently located. Thought, as seen from Deleuze’s reading, in its connection to 
dispositions and, eventually, action, is situated in a structure of relations, entailing 
states of mind, affective intensities and physical conditions.  
If relations determine the experience of intensities in terms of good or bad, 
then, existence is already ethical: ethics is here the selection and ability to navigate 
one’s experiences in order to maximise capacities and power of action, or reject the 
kinds of relationships that instead hinder such power. This can thus be compared to 
the “networks” of relations effected by dispositives in Foucault’s thought. From the 
point of view of responding and acting of the subject, practices of resistance as ethics 
can here be read as an expression of the force to maximise one’s power of action and 
avoid those relationships that deny it.  
The comparison with Foucault helps advance another point. From the analysis 
of a Spinozist system of relations, it is possible to derive an ethics that is entirely 
grounded on assumptions of immanence. As for the mechanisms of power in Foucault 
and the idea of disposifs, both systems share the assumption of an immanent causality, 
whereby the capacities of life are not pre-established as a set of abstract and fixed 
properties nor cannot be attributed as effect of forces extrinsic to life. Rather, they are 
generated in relation to the power dynamics in which they are embedded. 
Simultaneously, however, they contribute to forge and shape these very dynamics, in 
a continuous process whereby both elements work simultaneously as cause and effects 
of one another (Juniper and Jones, 2008).  
It could be argued that the naturalist system just outlined lacks an idea of power 
comparable to that of Foucault. This, however, does not invalidate the reading I 
suggest. The theory of relationality absorbs all forms of relations, regardless of their 
character or sign. Relations of power are part of the same structure of relations of ideas 
and material structuring of the field of experience (as seen from the theory of 
parallelism) that already impact on the singular body. The apparent lack of an open 
engagement with power thus ensues from the broader scope of the naturalist system 
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just outlined (Sharp, 2011): I suggest that this system enlarges what has been 
established in Foucault, by tracing the connection between the subjective experience 
of the self in regard to its relations (like those with power) to the broader environment 
in which experience takes place and constituted by both bodies and ideas. 
The latter claim, then, helps suggest a further reflection that completes the 
passage from Foucault to the theory of ethics drawn from contemporary readings of 
Spinoza and the implications they open. As mentioned in the previous chapter, ethics 
for Foucault was exercised as a form of “positive critique” that capitalises on the vital 
element of life in order to shape responses to the mechanisms of domination of power. 
In the further step introduced by analysing the contemporary Spinozist turn, the kind 
of experience within the system of one’s relations cannot be determined in advance. 
Ethics consists in remaining attuned to the intensities that derive from a specific 
configuration of relations. This specificity can be captured again by the idea of a 
singular configuration. I suggest that the idea of and ethics of vital critique in Foucault 
finds its correspondent in what can be termed as an “ethics of singularity” in regard to 
the naturalism of Spinozist thought. This derives from the fact that ethics captures the 
openness to encounters with modes (bodies and ideas) regardless of the sign that they 
acquire. An ethics of singularity supports a disposition of remaining open to the 
encounters that maximise one’s powers of acting, in response to the concentration and 
augmentation - or diminishing - of intensities. 
 Ultimately, accomplishing higher degrees of power and self-realisation implies 
building on one’s agreement with nature, but simultaneously also modifying the 
surrounding environment (of ideas and thus of bodies) so as to express such a nature62. 
In the reading here, thus, ethics is therefore a correlate to Spinozist naturalistic (or 
“milieu”) idea of thought: thought is part of nature (Deleuze, 1988b). Maximising the 
power of thought means also modifying the surrounding environment in order to 
accomplish one’s self-realisation and striving of one’s life by modifying the relations 
in which one is embedded. The effects and actions on the environment can therefore 
                                                 
62 It is important to remember the specific meaning of “nature” in Spinoza (as natura naturans and natura naturata 
at the same time) to clarify the meaning of Spinozist naturalism. The latter position cannot be identified or equated 
to an abstract and universal law of nature considered in general and detached from its historical contingency: nature 
develops in connection to its surrounding, and not as an abstract and fixed principle or entity. Quoting Macherey, 
“it manifests itself nowhere else than in the totality of its modal relations, in which it is absolutely immanent, it is 
a nature that is itself produced in a history, and under the conditions that the latter necessarily attaches to it” 
(Macherey, 1992: 143). The historical perspective is also what distinguishes the accounts analysed at this stage of 
the enquiry from the approaches discussed in Chapter 2, where nature appeared to be treated as an absolute, 
ahistorical principle.   
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modify existent ideas and, even more crucially for the thesis, also existent norms that 
hinder one’s power and nature.  
In this regard, then, the ethics just outlined expands the dynamics analysed in 
Foucault, when it comes to respond and interact with the existent system of relations 
in which one is situated. It demonstrates how ethics captures the power of interacting 
productively with systems of relations that define one’s being and subjectivity. 
Simultaneously, however, the development observed here seems also to move beyond 
Foucault, who ultimately stopped at the level of resistance to power, and explains 
interactions within the broader milieu, or, to use an expression deployed by Sharp 
(2007, 2011), “ecosystem” of relations, of which power is part.  
This reading also demonstrates how the response to structures of relations 
cannot be isolated from the dimension of the body or affective experience only, since 
the corporeal dimension already produces a modification of thought. Ethics becomes 
the domain for generating and producing new ideas. As mentioned also in regard to 
Foucault, this justifies how thinking, concepts and ideas do not function as a hinder to 
life (something that the “vitalist turn” examined in Chapter 2 would seem to maintain), 
but enable new forms of existence by acting in continuity to the affective dimension. 
Ultimately, the system drawn from Spinoza and further elaborated by contemporary 
authors, and particularly Deleuze’s reading, extends and expands on the vitalist 
element recognised in Foucault and inscribes it in a theory that accounts for the 
modification of one’s surrounding, in terms of both ideas and states of beings. The 
next section further clarifies the latter point. 
 
The materiality of ideas: towards an ecological thought 
 The section above has just focused on the particular reformulation that a living 
or naturalist thought undergoes in Spinoza’s metaphysical system as reread especially 
through the mediation and interpretation of Deleuze. It is now possible to move a step 
further, by engaging with ideas that have been put forth by another author in the 
contemporary Spinozist turn: Hasana Sharp and her attempt to pave the way to a 
politics of renaturalisation shaped after Spinoza’s legacy (Sharp, 2011). An 
implication of the system outlined is that ethics becomes the dimension where 
possibilities and modes of existence can be transformed and modified. In this light, 
another possible way to define Spinoza’s idea of thought could be that of an 
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“ecological thought” or an “ecology” of ideas (Bryant, 2012, also an “ecosystem of 
ideas” by Sharp, 2007, 2011)63. The latter definitions imply that ideas (and any sorts 
of texts or signifiers in general) are not mere vehicles of meaning or content but are 
also endowed of a material reality in their own right. That means, as seen, they possess 
a material power of affecting and modifying compositions of forces, that impacts on 
the articulation of reality (especially in response to existent structures and modes of 
being).  
Moreover, such materiality cannot exist abstractly or separately from the 
concrete context in which ideas are formed and operate. Their inherent power could 
be described as a spatio-temporal materiality that has impact on the specific location 
and environment in which it is situated. Bryant (2012), who also significantly draws 
from Deleuze’s take on Spinoza, suggests that ideas possess their own “geography”, 
meaning that some ideas are more common in some places of the world than others. 
This indicates that some ideas are endowed of a degree of intensity and power that 
change in accord to the environment in which they exist and act. Most crucially, there 
can be places or contexts in which established sets of ideas (of either positive or 
negative sign) can be stronger or more dominant, and thus play a more preeminent role 
in defining modes of being.  
 Merging the latter consideration to what was argued in the previous section 
about ethics and the nature and power of thought, thought can interact with its 
surrounding, affecting and modifying the environment or “milieu” of dominant ideas, 
so as to fulfil its own realisation. This implies that ethics can amount to a practice of 
developing strategies to select among the intensities of specific encounters, by 
weakening certain ideas that are deemed detrimental to or hindering one’s nature and, 
simultaneously, promoting and enabling the existence of those ideas and forces that 
enable and favour one’s being. Ethics becomes therefore a practice that makes one 
able to act on, change or modify existent relations among ideas or bodies. Crucially 
                                                 
63 Deleuze specifically names it as an “ethology” (Deleuze, 1988b): it concerns the capacity (of humans and 
animals) to be affected and thus captures the changes in their powers. This is thus related to the broader theory of 
affects introduced above: joyful and sad passions are described as effects of those encounters that either lower (sad) 
or increase (joy) modal degrees of power, those moments when entities are most separated from or united to their 
power of acting. Consequently, ethics is oriented towards a theory of joy that maximises action (as expression of 
the fundamental conatus that drives entities towards perseverance). Quoting from Deleuze, “The entire Ethics is a 
voyage of immanence. But immanence is to unconscious itself, and the conquest of the unconscious. Ethical joy is 
the correlate of speculative affirmation” (Deleuze, 1988b: 29). The suggestion of reading Spinoza’s thought as an 
ethology has also prompted some authors to formulate a different theory of rights generated by it. This is a theory 
rethought at the level of the bodies themselves. I will not expand this further development here, although this 
possible line of enquiry will be kept in mind for further research. For a rethinking of a theory of rights from a 
vitalist/Spinozian perspective, see for instance Hanafin (2014, 2017).  
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for my analysis and for the following argument around the implications of the thesis 
for politics, it can even enable and enact strategies for cultivating, replicating, and 
defending new ideas that replace or challenge existent ones - especially when seen as 
unproductive and detrimental - in order to generate a new order or ways of thinking. 
Bryant again (2012) describes a similar conception of thought as an ecologist or an 
epidemiologist (more than an interpretive) work on ideas. The latter enhances the 
question of “how to restructure that material system of ideas, that ecology, allowing 
other ideas to show through and become potent. Critique is not enough. There also has 
to be the public work of diminishing ideas, speaking to populations, and enhancing the 
power of other ideas.” (Bryant, 2012)64.  
 Such description captures the fact that ideas are part and operate into a certain 
“milieu” with other ideas. This means that the character that they assume (or their 
relative sign and value) are always dependent on their interactions with the broader 
system of ideas or context in which they are located. It presupposes that ideas and, for 
the sake of the research, any discursive formation generating mechanisms of norms 
and normalisation, have a material import and are endowed of a spatio-temporal power 
that can enact and contribute to inform a certain reality (as opposed to a sole role as 
mediators). This implies that the challenge, or enterprise, to change established sets of 
ideas or norms need to pass through a deep and systemic transformation of ways of 
thinking that interact with, are expressed and simultaneously formed and renewed by 
the very practices that they generate.  
 The argument put forth at this stage of the thesis suggests that the work of 
resistance to and transformation of the discursive shaping of the subject in biopolitics 
already started by Foucault can be continued and fulfilled when taking into account 
not only a semantic/discursive but also the material nature through which ideas (also 
in the form of norms) become realised and enforced. An understanding of the 
materiality of ideas derived from the current Spinozist turn helps complete this move 
                                                 
64 A crucial aspect to discuss at this point would be the problem of the “character” or the “sign” of the ideas that 
are fostered in a certain context. The idea of “speaking to population” in particular seems very ambivalent as to the 
kind of ideas that can be spread, since this could also end up opening the possibility of conditioning or manipulating 
ideas present in the social field. In fact, this risk is possibly less present in Spinoza himself, since in many points 
of his work (2004) he seems to refer to processes of public deliberation as a way of enhancing the formation and 
expression of new ideas. These cannot thus be seen as product of a manipulation or imposition, since emerging 
ideas are more the expression of a people’s way of thinking (understood as a collective thought). This could be an 
interesting and further line to develop regarding the possibilities opened by Spinoza’s thought and critique. The 
scope of the present project does not allow to develop this trajectory of research in its full; however, I do indicate 
it as a possible additional development of a complementary line of enquiry that could be brought ahead in a further 
project. 
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and expands my analysis of Foucault. It capitalises on the power of life that, in 
Foucault, I have identified with practices of resistance and cultivation of the self to 
demonstrate how this can be expanded to produce a transformation in the surrounding 
milieu of relations. This is made possible by a conjunction of affective states of the 
body (the level at which resistance is practiced) with the production of ideas able to 
interact with the existent structures of relations of ideas and norms. In a perspective 
derived from Spinozist thought, possibilities of resistance and critique become 
exercised at the level of changing and acting upon the “ambient”, that is, the 
environment sets of norms (Sharp, 2007) that characterise one’s context and that are 
transformed by the material force of the new ideas inserted in it. This is put as the 
starting condition for opening up possibilities for changing existent normalising 
structures.     
Before moving on, an additional observation can be added to further 
corroborate the argument just advanced and develop a parallel observation about 
critique advanced also in regard to Foucault. Hasana Sharp (2007, 2011) further points 
out the idea of paying more attention to the force of ideas and their capacity to impact 
on the surrounding environment (in her argument, in order to accomplish a 
“renaturalisation” of politics), through the theory of an “ecosystem of ideas” just 
outlined. She argues that this form of challenge to existent power and social relations 
should supplement traditional forms of (ideology) critique (Sharp, 2011: 55-84). It 
represents an attempt to “re-naturalise” ideas from their relegation to their solely 
discursive dimension, which was dominant in the developments of philosophy and 
theory in the 20th century (see also Coole and Frost, 2010; Van der Tuin and Dolphijn, 
2012).  
What is striking, however, is that this move by Sharp seems to recall the 
analysis previously conducted around Blencowe’s notion of “positive critique” (2012) 
and touched on in Chapter 3. Blencowe had also highlighted that forms of resistance 
and critique need to find different and novel modes of articulation in the context of 
biopolitical mechanisms. In her words, traditional and Marxian critiques appear not or 
no longer sufficient to strive for resistance and change in the relational and immanent 
context of the discourses highlighted here. They need to be reconsidered and 
supplemented by other actions and practices able to enhance transformative action. 
This also justifies why, as seen above, Bryant states that “critique is not enough”.  
 143 
Vis-à-vis the conclusions reached, in fact, the question as to whether it is still 
possible to speak about critique could be asked (Andrejevic, 2014; Noys, 2012). I will 
fully develop and address this point in Chapter 5 when connecting the observations 
just performed to an approach of “dispositional ethics” (Beausoleil, 2017). The 
analysis there will more directly address the problem of the meaning of politics implied 
by the argument, and the interaction with forms of critique. For the time being, it can 
be noticed that the practice of fostering ideas and acting at the level of the modification 
of relations seems to problematise other forms of critique, without yet excluding them. 
The system of ideas and affect outlined in Chapter 4 seems to challenge forms of direct 
and confrontational critique, in order to move towards an idea of action and conduct 
where transforming and questioning norms happens by remaining attuned and 
responding to one’s systems of relations. If it is possible to expand Foucault’s idea of 
challenging norms and impositions of ways of living by power, this comes “at the cost” 
of supplementing critique with a work of enhancing new modes of being and thinking 
in a purely immanent and relational dimension. In Chapter 5, I will demonstrate how 
this attempt to develop actions and behaviours able to modify the surrounding 
environment can enter and have an effect on the domain of politics.  
 
Applying an ethics of singularity: the case of refugees 
Before moving on to the concluding step of the enquiry, this section tries to 
exemplify the approach of an ethics of singularity here formulated by looking at a 
context where the idea can be applied. The analysis of the case here by no means 
claims to be exhaustive, and a complete study would possibly require a full 
independent investigation. Nevertheless, it appears useful to show how the idea of the 
ethics of singularity here formulated can be put into practice and indicate a possible 
trajectory of research, before moving on and further elaborating on its political 
implications. To this aim, I would like to return to the debate initiated with the analysis 
of Arendt in Chapter 1 and taken on by Agamben around the figure of refugees. I will 
take this case as an example where a politics of life that deploys the idea of 
qualification and engagement with life as singularity seems to provide a more relevant 
and adequate response in accounting for modes of engagement with forms of life 
beyond qualifications and normalising categories than the approaches offered by either 
the frameworks of biopolitics or of vitalism. While going back to the theoretical 
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discussion as treated in Arendt, I will also shortly make reference to the contemporary 
2015 European migration crises and some of the responses and framing of the issue 
witnessed in that circumstance. 
As shown in Chapter 1, the figure of the refugee has been commonly discussed 
from a biopolitical perspective of analysis. As Agamben notices (2000: 92-93), in fact, 
the very condition of refugees poses the question of the regulation and inscription of 
life in the juridical and biopolitical order of the nation-state. There, I demonstrated 
how Arendt highlighted this problem (1943) by looking at the categories of 
citizen/non-citizen: from a biopolitical perspective, the figure of the refugee remains 
excluded from the normal political order centred on the nation-state as its primary 
organising unit65. In the short essay “We Refugees”, Arendt (1943) advocates a radical 
refashioning of the idea of refugees as symbol of a new historical consciousness, 
defining refugees as the “vanguard” of their peoples (Arendt, 1943: 77), that is, those 
who already point to a different mode of existence, which cannot be grasped by present 
categories66. Agamben, too (2000: 15-28) endorses this call and advocates the 
overcoming of the political categories available in the present.  
As mentioned, the issues regarding the (dis)qualification of the form of life of 
refugees is emblematically reflected in the historical experience following WWII, 
which brought to manifestation the contradictions inherent to the treatment of the case 
of refugees and the tensions existent between notions of citizen rights and the related 
idea of human rights. In fact, in this circumstance, “human rights” proved to be a very 
problematic and paradoxical notion. At the time, the LNHCR was created as a “neutral 
broker” (Orchard, 2014: 109) in order to protect those who could not be recognised as 
entitled to any state-based protection67. However, it is precisely in the enactment and 
                                                 
65 In Arendt’s analysis, the “nation-state” itself suggests that the modern order organised around it is grounded on 
a unit that equates nation, sovereignty and territoriality as inseparable terms of its definition. In such rationale, it is 
particularly birth, or “nativity” (Arendt, 2013; Vatter, 2006) to be erected as criterion that defines identity and 
belonging and the ensuing attribution of protections in the form of rights. In the system of nation-states, therefore, 
the idea of rights is attributed to human beings insofar as they can enjoy the condition of citizenship. Conversely, 
the refugee actually embodies the figure that marks a break with the identification between human and citizen, 
since it already eludes the direct link between nativity and nationality. 
66 In this regard, Agamben also suggest that the refugee should in fact be considered as a limit-concept, which 
manifests the implosion of the notion of the nation-state as a juridico-political principle on which to ground the 
international order, and thus opens up the way to the formulation of utterly new conceptual political categories. In 
relation to the need of formulating new categories, Agamben also makes reference to the figure of “denizens”. The 
latter term has been formulated by Thomas Hammar to identify the (new) condition of noncitizen-residents that, 
although having a nationality of origin, decide not to benefit from the entitlements that the latter offers, and accept 
to live in a different country in a de facto situation of statelessness (Hammar, 1990).  
67 A deeper analysis of the way in which the LNHCR came to existence, its historical function and experience and 
its modes of operation and actual effectiveness is not of specific concern for the analysis here. For a deeper 
discussion on this, including debates around the efficacy, problems and limitations inherent to the body and to its 
grounding assumptions, see Orchard, 2014 or Soguk, 1999 (in particular, Chapter 3, 101-142). 
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the outcomes reached by this organism that the contradictory ethics applied in the 
question of refugees started to appear clear: the juridical measures showed how it was 
impossible for people to enjoy the condition of complete freedom without being fully 
inscribed as members of a national society. Conversely, only the recognition of states’ 
absolute authority of self-determination entitled them to the responsibility of people’s 
protection (thus tracing a clear distinction between citizens or not citizens). In fact, it 
was imposed that all the people who had fled their homes should be repatriated to their 
homelands of birth or alternatively naturalised as citizens of another nation (Hayden, 
2016)68.  
Moreover, there was another contradiction intrinsic to the way the refugee 
policy started to be implemented by the UN. It implied a clash, or at least a mutual 
dependency (and, thus, the ensuing risk of exclusion and reciprocal limitation) 
between the freedom of those who were admitted as refugees and the citizens of the 
states. The intake and freedom of refugees (that is, their being recognised as free 
individuals and thus being admitted in a civic community) came to depend on the 
freedom of citizens themselves to decide between those who were wanted and those 
who were not. The decision over the condition of refugees, thus, in practice, came to 
depend on a relationship with the citizens of a certain state. Refugees occupied 
therefore an ambiguous and rather peculiar position in this framework. They neither 
took part nor were involved in the decision that concerned their condition. In line with 
what has been emblematically expressed by Arendt, although being formally 
considered as entitled to the rights associated with personhood (only as receiver), 
refugees could not exercise the rights and capacities attributed to persons, like free will 
or autonomy of choice. This reveals the very contradiction present at the basis of the 
idea of human rights understood as a biopolitical device of inclusion/exclusion and 
attribution of value to types of life (Arendt, 1943) 69.  
                                                 
68 The situation partly changed after WWII and with the creation of the UN, where the ethics and rationale of the 
refugee problem is shaped more in terms of the relationship among a system of sovereign states (going towards the 
making up of a global society) and were people conceived as free individuals under the protection of the 
(international) law. According to critics (Hayden, 2016), this marks the beginning of humanism in the logics of 
global statecraft and thus the advent of the language of human rights. In fact, the starting plan of intervention by 
the UN (originally deemed to last three years) failed, and the condition of refugees became a more widespread 
phenomenon requiring further change of the criteria and definition by the international jurisdiction. To put it simply, 
the creation of autonomous new states worldwide, and the solution of conflict within and among them, appeared 
as a cause for the further intensification and augmentation of the phenomenon of the refugees. Therefore, the latter 
became an almost common spread reality across Europe and beyond. 
69 It must be specified however that Arendt’s criticism of human rights was particularly attached to the specific 
form in which the human rights discourse was utilised particularly to deal with the historical circumstances 
contemporary to the author. As other thinkers have suggested (Benhabib, 2013), Arendt’s intervention in the debate 
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Significantly for my analysis, the conclusions just reached deploy all the 
categories (those of person, human and citizen) that have been highlighted and 
considered in Chapter 1 and that showed how, from the perspective of biopolitics, such 
qualifications worked as apparatuses of normalisation that classify the types of life that 
should enter into the political order and that define them as “proper”, as opposed to 
improper forms of living. In the analysis above, the device of human rights, through a 
biopolitical lens, further demonstrates this process of qualification: even though 
defined as “human” and therefore attributed a universal validity, these rights cannot 
be equated or enforced in the same way as the rights of citizens. To quote Hayden: 
“The basic international law that pertains to refugees is meant to protect the rights of 
all humans, especially once they are displaced. However, once in the position of 
displacement, the refugee or refugee claimant have far less effective purchase on the 
rights than those remaining free citizens” (Hayden, 2016: 312). In other words, a 
system of nation-states implicitly forces us to confront the question of what rights 
count more, those of citizens or those derived from the freedoms of homeless refugees. 
Therefore, it implicitly establishes and already relies on a hierarchy of (human) beings 
that are not de facto considered (and treated) as equals vis-à-vis a super-state 
international law. 
Even though the analysis so clearly highlighted by Arendt was specifically 
applied to the events of her time, the purchase that an approach of biopolitics have in 
debates around refugees and, more broadly, discourses of security in International 
Relations is still undeniable today, when addressing more contemporary cases in 
refugee studies. The concepts and vocabulary provided by the biopolitical literature on 
exceptionalism and on mechanisms of inclusion/exclusion operating at national and 
sub-national level are pre-eminent in providing the lenses for looking into these 
phenomena. Above all, it is possibly Agamben’s idea around exceptional measures 
(1998, 2005) and “bare life” discussed in Chapter 1 that offers a most common angle 
of interpretation to engage with these debates. The image of the multiple camps that 
have been created along borders and shores proves Agamben’s most compelling 
diagnosis that the pervasiveness of the camp has become the paradigm of the modern 
West (Agamben, 1998; Peters, 2017) and certainly it is most effective in capturing the 
                                                 
has also played a crucial role in fostering a rearticulation and revision of human rights approaches towards a more 
appreciative and sensitive account of the value of human plurality (also in the global community).  
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condition of the subjects involved in the wide variety of today’s exceptional situations. 
In this regard, such readings still have an undeniable purchase in demonstrating how 
the biopolitical treatment of life produces a distinction between human and non-
human, and potentially dehumanises certain forms of life (Aradau et al., 2011; Doty, 
2011). This appears in line with the argument developed in Chapter 1. 
As explored in Chapter 1, moreover, much of the criticism and arguments 
around the abandonment of existent political categories started by Arendt and 
Agamben is still centred around the critique of the function of the nation state and the 
role it plays in managing and orchestrating forms of exceptionalism. The idea of the 
state of exception is preeminent in exemplifying the mechanisms of inclusion and 
exclusion that characterise the qualification of life in biopolitical discourses 
(Humphreys, 2006; Maguire et al., 2014; Neal, 2006). In such understanding, states of 
exception serve to mark the boundaries of a series of constitutive exclusions by which 
the state (precisely by means of excluding certain categories and forms of life) 
legitimises its internal order and constitution. In this regard, refugees can be seen as 
subject to the logic of reproducing an “inclusive exclusion” which allows the state to 
establish the criteria of “normality” and “order” (Agamben, 2000, 2005), since they 
continue to be included in this discourse precisely by virtue of their exclusion from 
established identities and ordered spaces of the sovereign state and biopolitical 
apparatuses.  
A similar account of such function of the state is the one on which Deleuze and 
Guattari have commented on. They define the sovereign relation as one that “only 
reigns over what is capable of internalising, of appropriating locally” (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1988: 360) and thus a relation which exercises an extractive power of 
appropriation, or, as they call it, an “apparatus of capture”. Interpretations from a 
biopolitical perspective, endorsed by the current language of securitization (Aradau, 
2011; Huysmans, 2000, 2006) remain bounded by the classification of forms of life 
provided above. While providing a most necessary and helpful critical insight, yet, 
they are hardly able to capture initiatives or instances that challenge the order enforced 
under biopolitical and exceptional apparatuses, which thus remain excluded from their 
account. Biopolitical approaches, thus, while offering a most timing diagnosis of some 
contemporary discussions around refugee studies, can only detect certain types of 
phenomena and examples to deal with this complex problematic. 
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I would like to go back to the schematic traced in Part I of the thesis and 
demonstrate that, in an analogous way, theories of vitalism seem equally unable to 
provide an account that challenges the assumption of biopolitics when applied to the 
case of refugees. In fact, vitalism has also attempted an engagement with this debate. 
In response to approaches of biopolitics, they try to rehabilitate an idea of freedom and 
value of life which is grounded on the ontological dimension of existence, as the 
domain where the freedom, liveliness and vitality of life can affirm itself beyond 
constraints. The starting point from a purely affirmative idea of life tends to be 
captured and celebrated in these domains by the attention for movement, of vitality 
and freedom (Franke, 2009, 2011; Neil, 2015; Nyers, 2013), that is inherent to any 
mode of existence prior to and independent from any juridical qualification or 
inscription in a political domain. Interpretations of the problem of refugees from a 
vitalist standpoint, or of forms of life that are diminished and annihilated within the 
(bio)political account, offer a solution that shifts power and agency to the side of those 
“diminished” lives excluded by the political order. Although very sympathetic to the 
intentions of these solutions and readings, I argue that also these perspectives seem to 
show the problem of simply reinstating the same qualification and categories of modes 
of life used in biopolitics, without fundamentally challenge the framing of the 
discourse. This is the argument that I have advanced in the theoretical analysis in 
Chapter 2 and that I now proceed to exemplify with the case here discussed. 
I can provide some examples of vitalist interpretations to the problem of 
refugees in order to demonstrate my last point. Elizabeth Grosz (1994), for instance, 
who offers a version of a vitalist perspective, maintains that under the perspective of 
global migration, the figures of the refugees or migrants become regarded not as 
merely passive or neutral to the experiences of exceptionalisms and exclusions 
highlighted above. Rather, refugees themselves actively contribute to reconfigure, 
reinscribe and resist existent patterns and orders as they move across political spaces. 
This perspective thus emphasises the value of life that is found in a condition of 
movement, affirmation and freedom as an ontological condition (Grosz, 1994).  
In a different piece (2010), however, Grosz makes another controversial point 
regarding the qualification of life and freedom attached to figures that are left at the 
margin or excluded from the political order. She acknowledges that the potentials for 
creation, expression and experimentation ascribed to life in vital terms do require a 
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certain level of material freedom from constraints and wellbeing in order to be able to 
produce different forms of life. Nevertheless, she also adds that  
even in the most extreme cases of slavery and in situations of political or natural 
catastrophe of the kinds globally experienced in recent years, there is always a 
small space for innovation and not simply reaction. What remains remarkable 
about genocidal struggles, the horrors of long term incarceration, concentration 
camps, prisoner of war camps, and the prospects of long-term social coexistence 
in situations of natural and social catastrophe is the inventiveness of the 
activities of the constrained […]. What is most striking about the extreme 
situations of constraint, those which require a ‘freedom from’ is that they do not 
eliminate a ‘freedom to’ but only complicate it (Grosz, 2010: 157).  
I do appreciate the attempt of this reading to move beyond any reductionist or 
annihilating interpretation provided by biopolitics, and the broader aim to elaborate an 
idea of freedom unhinged from formal political recognitions and structures (that, along 
with the premises of vitalism, she rather envisions as belonging to the ontological 
dimension of being). However, I also maintain that such a claim seems to decrease or 
to downplay the urgency and gravity of the situations listed above, even ending up 
justifying them and reaffirming the status quo of the existent political reality that 
generates these circumstances of inequality, degraded treatment and annihilation of 
life in the first place. Most importantly, for the sake of my argument and question 
around the classification of life in the debates set out in the first part of the enquiry, 
this approach seems to maintain an equal classification and categorisation to the one 
offered by biopolitics, this time simply reversing the emphasis and the priority on the 
natural or excluded form of life.  
Another example, moreover, can be drawn from the analysis conducted by 
Viriasova (2013). Although not explicitly endorsing the language of vitalism, many of 
her conclusions seem to resonate with the latter perspective introduced above. She 
develops a larger project to elaborate an idea of life that escapes any reference to 
political categories altogether, defined as “unpolitical”70. This aim sounds in line with 
the similar invitation expressed by Arendt and Agamben highlighted at the beginning 
of the section. She explores this possibility by elaborating a perspective based on an 
account of life as pure affectivity and acosmic becoming. The application of this theory 
to the study of refugees brings her to further radicalise the philosophy of movement 
                                                 
70 Although, Viriasova is very careful to distinguish her use of this term from the similar one deployed by Cacciari 
(2009). Moreover, her analysis is a most interesting survey and investigation of current critical refugee studies, of 
which she offers an interesting a compelling catalogue (Viriasova, 2013: 239-257). 
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found in vitalist understandings and celebrate a pure phronomic idea of being and 
“displaced lives” (Viriasova, 2013: 257). This is translated into the absolute 
affirmation and celebration of the “bare life” that is found beyond any politics and of 
which the figure of the refugee should become the new emblem and “vanguard”. She 
comes to the conclusion that  
The question of where to begin becomes very important once we consider the 
“practical” issues of living outside of the political system of states today. In the 
absence of a political community, it becomes of the utmost importance to assert 
that life is not a right, nor a quality that manifests itself in the world, but is an 
invisible experience of self-affection that is full of itself and rejoices in itself 
even in the most unhappy 'forms' of life. To do so means to redeem “bare life” 
in a positive, unpolitical way, that allows it to persist as such, without an 
immediate incitement to politicization, to salvation through politics (that 
produced its apparent misery in the first place). (Viriasova, 2013: 258). 
 Once again, although acknowledging the importance and broader scope of the 
philosophical enterprise that the author sets out, I maintain that similar conclusions 
remain deeply problematic when it comes to facing concrete problems and instances 
in today’s political practice, since they risk to merely reinforce the many instances of 
exclusions and normalisation without the capacity to provide any response to the issue 
of refugee and movement at the ontic level. In this regard, Viriasova and similar 
approaches that start from the pure celebration of the affectivity or vitality of life also 
lose any purchase against the problems highlighted by biopolitical analysis that, yet, 
they try to counter.  
Therefore, the debate seems to fall back into a binary that resonates with the 
ontopolitical matrix provided in the introduction. The theoretical and philosophical 
premises underpinning either the debates of biopolitics and of vitalism seem not to be 
able to provide a response to the question of looking for an alternative engagement 
with forms of life here investigated. It is here argued that, in fact, modes of engagement 
with life at the level of the contingent and situated everyday relations and practices are 
more plural and complex than the one portrayed by these approaches; however, these 
are instances that the perspectives analysed here are unable to grasp. More specifically, 
they remain framed into rigid and often binary categories in explaining how forms of 
life should and can be accounted for. Vis-à-vis this inability, one could thus be left 
asking: is it possible to conceive an alternative way to explain and justify the 
engagement with modes of life beyond the inability ascribed to these perspectives? 
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Can an ethics of singularity elaborated by the thesis help in this enterprise? I intimate 
that a positive answer to these questions is possible. An example in this direction can 
come from a short analysis of some instances related to the latest EU 2015 refugee and 
migration crisis, to which I briefly turn. 
 
The case of the EU 2015 migration crisis 
 Since 2015, Europe has been invested by a large-scale migration emergency in 
consequence of the conflicts taking place primarily in Syria. The arrival of an 
unprecedent number of refugees on the European soil and the ensuing debates 
regarding refugee intake, policy responses at domestic and European level and the 
impact on the political life of single countries, has been object of both academic and 
media attention. Offering a thorough account of the phenomenon and of the still 
emerging literature produced around the subject falls beyond the scope of this project. 
Nevertheless, I would like to engage with it just as far as it appears useful to exemplify 
some arguments developed in the previous enquiry.  
 In the section above, I demonstrated how analyses from a biopolitical 
perspective continue to have an appeal and relevance for studies around issues of 
exceptionalism, refuge and migration. The treatment of the question of refugees also 
in the case of 2015 has not been excluded by this trend and studies on the subject have 
largely borrowed from the framework of biopolitics (Kmark, 2015; Vaughan-
Williams, 2015; Whitham, 2017). Agamben’s idea of the camp as a defining paradigm 
of the present and the disqualification of life in the form of bare life that comes with 
the establishment of modern forms of camps have a deep relevance in approaches to 
the subject. The language of exceptionalism itself declared in many circumstances has 
well captured trends and features that describe the situation (Kmar, 2015). In this 
regard, biopolitics offers a most compelling and valid analysis of the dehumanising 
face of the crisis and particularly of its subjects.  
I argue that, following the steps of the enquiry here conducted, the purchase 
and relevance of an analysis from a biopolitical angle can be further expanded by 
deploying the concept of dispositif that I have introduced in Chapter 3 of the analysis, 
and that can be applied to the case here. Defined as the configuration of both practices 
and discourses that define the possibility of existence and experience in a certain 
context, the idea of the dispositif seems to well capture the dynamics that have enacted 
the language of securitisation and the often negative representation of the situation in 
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the case of the 2015 EU migration crisis. Policies discussing the problem in terms of 
open or closed borers, the rhetoric of political leaders around acceptance of refugees 
within national territories, the political propaganda (often from a far-right perspective) 
that has ignited the debate, and the representation and coverage by national media and 
press are all elements of the dispositif through which the situation of the “crisis” has 
been produced, portrayed, represented and handled. In agreement with the analysis of 
the term, the dispositif of power structures both the discursive representation and the 
experience of the crisis and organises the responses that can be developed from it 
(Bussolini, 2010).  
Yet, to substantiate the argument I developed in Chapter 3, I claim that already 
in the biopolitical structuring of relations and experiences through the dispositif, it is 
possible to witness the carving of a space for resistance to the discursive normalisation 
operated by power in the representation of the crisis as well as in the engagement with 
the lives that are involved in the situation. I read episodes of resistance as the staging 
of modes of engagement with life different from the ones envisioned by power 
rationales. I argue that, in line with the analysis above, the mobilisation of the affective 
disposition in which subjects are produced and normalised within the discourse of 
biopolitics itself creates space for an action that counters normalising logics and that 
is played at the level of the ethical.  
I would like to demonstrate this claim by bringing attention to a series of events 
and conducts witnessed in the context of the response to the refugee crisis. As an 
alternative response to the often restrictive policies (and equally negative narratives) 
surrounding and shaping the reception of the crisis, many individuals and families 
across Europe have given their own response by accepting to host refugees in their 
households. This phenomenon has had examples in many countries and has been 
supported by organisations operating internationally to promote the initiative. Among 
these, Refugee Welcome International (2015) has been active across 12 countries in 
and beyond Europe (from Japan to Canada, to Australia and several countries in 
Europe) to support cases where migrants and asylum seekers have been matched and 
then integrated with families volunteering to host them and supporting them during 
their process of integration in the community of arrival. The organisation has provided 
support in selecting and then helping with the integration of refugees in the families 
that volunteered to act as hosts.  
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The aims and goals of the organisation are collected in their founding chart and 
defined as follows71: 
1. Increasing the awareness of the living conditions experienced by many 
categories of people (migrants, refugees, homeless people…) within the 
community; 
2. Improving the living conditions of people experiencing struggle and 
making a positive contribution to their long-term wellbeing; 
3. Bringing people together and enhancing initiatives of mutual help; 
4. Contributing to social growth and to solidarity among people; 
5. Encouraging communication and exchange among people with different 
cultural and social backgrounds; 
6. Fighting any form of prejudice and promoting social inclusion of 
disadvantaged categories (Refugee Welcome Italia, 2016). 
 
Although the number of cases that have been addressed with this initiative 
remains still incomparably narrow with regard of the numbers that the crisis required 
to handle, I argue that this initiative can represent an example of a case of engagement 
with life that can be captured by the idea of singularity as outlined in the analysis 
performed thus far. The decision of hosting a refugee demonstrates the relating to ways 
of being that moves beyond the discursive representation provided by power and the 
power structuring of relations through the dispositif of crisis management. Rather, the 
response is instead reimagined and reconfigured beyond any pre-given qualifications 
and categories and takes place in the situated, contingent and affective relational 
encounter with modes of living. This pertains to the practice of an ethics as the one 
outlined above, that looks at life not as a diminished and already qualified instance, 
nor one that simply affirms life as an a priori, which is seen as collapsing in the same 
inactivity and inability to result in concrete action. Rather, it capitalises on the response 
of people who reject and resist the dominant language and rhetoric with which the 
situation of the crisis has been portrayed by dominant discourses.  
The framing of the analysis in terms of an ethics of singularity suggests a 
possible way out and a tentative explanation vis-a-vis the insufficiency of the 
frameworks provided by either biopolitics or vitalism. In fact, the perspective 
suggested here envisions an ethical approach that does not start from the attribution of 
                                                 
71 The network is divided into 14 units corresponding to the different country members and each of them has 
developed their own founding documents and regulations to respond to the specific needs and situations 
characterising each country. The example provided above has been taken from the “Statuto” (2016) of the Italian 
unit of the network. Italy has been one of the countries that has witnessed the arrival of a large number of refugees 
and in which the initiative has had a strong response. Translation is my own. 
 154 
given categories, but looks at the engagement with life in the moment of the very 
establishment of relationships. As a consequence, an ethics of singularity does not 
hinge on abstract principles but takes into account the situatedness of the relations, the 
context as well as the forms of being among which such relationships are established. 
This seems to evade the question of content and classification of modes of life and 
looks rather at the practical response and terms of betterment within which individuals 
establish such relationships. The treatment of the “other” of the refugee under the 
assumption of singularity therefore eludes the problem of passing through the need for 
categorisation altogether and takes relationality as its point of departure72. 
There are two further aspects that I would like to highlight in order to support 
the analysis and application of the case. First, crucially, the language with which this 
initiative has been framed has invited families to host a refugee as a “deep experience 
of exchange and sharing” that improves the lives of all those involved (Refugees 
Welcome, 2016). The invitation to participate in the initiative invokes the language of 
personal improvement and happiness, of increasing the intensities and power of life of 
those involved, that seems to recall the account of experience and ethics highlighted 
above in tracing a trajectory from Foucault to Spinozian ethics. I maintain that the 
force underpinning these actions and supporting them can be explained as an element 
of productive life that escapes the normalisation of conducts, behaviours and actions 
by power and carves out a space for spontaneous relations and modes of engagement 
with life to strive and emerge beyond the constraints imposed by discursive logics 
managing and representing the crisis. It is also significant that the language of this 
ethics does not deploy fixed core values of any written or established ethics (like 
responsibility, commitment, duty). Rather, it is played at the level of the affective 
encounters and concrete engagement experienced in the everyday conduct, gestures 
and practices of life. An ethics understood in terms of singularity seems to address this 
explanation and takes the encounter of other beings and forms of life as the 
fundamental condition that enables the experience of relationality, from which the 
further account of new or different modes of existence appears possible.  
                                                 
72 Nevertheless, it needs to be noticed that, if it is true that it departs from the traditional universalising assumptions 
on which the ethics of human rights is built, the preliminary attitude and assumptions on which an ethics of 
singularity is grounded cannot either be equated to the radical commitment to the alterity of the other as it would 
appear in a Levinasian sense. In particular, the main difference between the account of ethics offered here and the 
one deriving from Levinas (1979) is the impossibility for the latter to escape a starting point of transcendence, that 
takes the other’s alterity not as the experience and the very grounding of relationality but as an absolute principle 
from which relations and practices would follow.  
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This means not putting any a priori label or qualification of what modes of life 
should (or should not) count as legitimate, and thus reframes the problematic in 
radically different terms from a logic of inclusion and exclusion in which it inevitably 
remains prey when engaged in (bio)political or vitalist terms. The ethics of singularity 
allows to accommodate the idea that forms of being emerge primarily in a condition 
of relations and engagement, not as abstract principles, but as lived and situated 
experience taking place on the plane where the meaning attributed to life is established 
beyond the one imposed by normalising logics.  
From the analysis performed above, it is thus possible to observe that the 
current treatment of the question of refugees by biopolitical or vitalist readings does 
leave room for the adoption of a different kind of ethics to deal with the engagement 
with life demonstrated by the empirical case discussed. This was particularly evident 
from the analysis of the shortcomings of existent literatures and approaches, which 
leads towards the rethinking and development of a critical perspective that can 
effectively open up the citizen-refugee relationship as an ethical problem for the 
purpose of a shift in ethical practice. The idea of an ethics of singularity works in such 
direction and provides an alternative and, in my reading, more suitable formulation for 
addressing the gaps left open in the previous approaches73. 
Secondly, I would maintain that the action of alternative conducts generated 
by the active response to life can also be read along the lines of the Spinozian 
materialist theory of ideas (elaborated via Sharp, 2014) explored above in the chapter. 
New and alternative ways of engaging with life at the level of specific situations and 
experiences generate new ideas that can be spread and modify the dominant and 
normalising practices and narratives constructed and produced by power. Ideas, 
therefore, can have a material force on reality and be able to modify the surrounding 
environment of relations and practices, thus introducing new ways of thinking and 
engaging with life. I argue that an ethics of singularity elaborated along the lines of 
the analysis above can offer a fruitful framework to explain the contingent modes of 
                                                 
73 There may be suggestions that such different opening may found analogies with what is attempted by the idea of 
the politics of hospitality shaped after Derrida (2000, 2002), and, more broadly, of Kant’s idea of hospitality (Kant, 
1990; see also Nursoo, 2007), seen as giving a foundation of what establishes an ethical relationship between the 
citizen and the refugee in the first place (see also Baker, 2011 on the idea of hospitality as the ground for a new 
cosmopolitan political ethics). In my own account of ethics, however, there is more at stake. In fact, this alternative 
approach allows to speak of an ethics that is built beyond any possible category, any distinction between an inside 
and outside, since in an immanent definition of life there is no such distinction, but everything - and identities in 
particular - are rather seen in terms of continuum. This may thus open a further way that is still unexplored even in 
critical refugee studies as a problem common to question of ethics in IR.  
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practices and engagement with life that neither the perspectives of biopolitics nor those 
of vitalism are able to account for. Even if tentative, this example and application 
wants to suggest a context in which an idea of ethics of singularity can be applied and 
put into practice74. 
There remain several objections that could be made against this interpretation. 
I single out two as the most immediate and relevant for the consideration of the 
political application of such ethics. First, it could be asked what the political 
significance of such an ethics is and what, or whether, it can have an impact on the 
practice of politics at the formal and institutional level. Secondly, it could be argued 
that this type of solution does itself provide an uncritical response that preserves the 
status quo and shifts the responsibility from similar issue away from the political and 
governmental sphere. I will try to anticipate this possible criticism and bring the 
analysis to conclusion in the next chapter, by addressing more specifically the political 
implications of the framework of ethics of life here suggested.  
 
Conclusion 
After recalling the opening present in the biopolitical literature through 
Foucault and particularly the claim that a certain account of a vital dimension of life 
is seen by Foucault as part of the working of biopolitical mechanisms, Chapter 4 has 
looked at an alternative approach that can be seen to supplement Foucault’s claims 
around the body and the affective dimension as the locus for resistance and critique. 
This has been identified with an ethics inspired by Spinoza’s naturalist system of 
thought and emerging from current takes in contemporary Spinozism, like in Deleuze 
and further minor authors. In Chapter 3, I focused particularly on Foucault’s theory of 
ethics and resistance to norms by looking at the specific concept of the dispositif. I 
                                                 
74 It should be stressed out that, as mentioned, the analysis of the case does not mean to be comprehensive or 
exhaustive. I also acknowledge that the analysis could have been performed by using a different research design. I 
suggest that, more than a proper case study, the discussion above should be considered just as an exemplification 
of the conclusions that had been accomplished in the theoretical part of the enquiry. I shall also highlight that the 
interpretation offered from the lens of an ethics of singularity does not seek to invalidate other possible frameworks 
that have engaged with the topics beyond the scope of this enquiry (for instance, theories around the ideas of 
“hospitality”, “responsibility” or “otherness”). More narrowly, it wanted to show how, in this area, ethics of 
singularity can provide an alternative to the weaknesses found in the conclusions of biopolitics and vitalism, which 
are the approaches that I have directly engaged from the beginning. To support the point that the explanation 
provided does not claim to replace or invalidate alternative approaches beyond the ones discussed here, I send back 
to the note regarding methodology in the introduction when, through Lemke (2011) and the notion of ontopolitics 
I noticed that each new definition or attempt at a new explanation (within the debate of the politics of life) should 
be aimed at sharpening its analytical role to address the blind spots and weak points of competing suggestions, and 
suggesting possible alternatives. This is the aim that the argument here has set out for the analysis. 
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argued that the idea of dispositives crucially helps conceptualise a space for an 
intervention of subjective freedom in opposition to norms - and thus the 
acknowledgment of the existence of a force intrinsic to life, which is seen co-extensive 
to biopolitical logics. This has been captured by the Foucauldian idea of critique. 
In Chapter 4, I attempted a step towards a materialist treatment of the question 
of life and norms by looking at a Spinozist naturalist-materialist philosophy, and 
specifically at the system of immanent monism and materialist theory of ideas 
emerging from trends in the contemporary Spinozist turn. I have demonstrated how 
the conclusions that authors like Deleuze and Sharp read after Spinoza with regard to 
ethics are necessitated by and follow from the grounding metaphysical assumptions 
about the relation of thought and nature. I have insisted that recognising the power of 
thought that conceives itself as part of nature becomes crucial to open up alternative 
possibilities for living and acting. Far from being a move that subordinates or enslaves 
thought to the external forces of nature, the theories analysed see the expression and 
realisation of this enterprise as the way to realise the full freedom of one’s being, as in 
Deleuze’s reading. Within this complex conceptual system, I particularly emphasised 
the notion of an ecosystem of ideas, provided by Sharp, as a fruitful way to conceive 
of how one’s existence and action can engage with, and eventually modify, the 
surrounding environment of dominant ideas or norms that characterise the status of 
being and acting in a particular context, thus challenging established qualifications of 
life. In particular, and in connection to the debate established in Part I, in this 
understanding, there is no need to distinguish between a natural or a social/human 
dimension of life, since forms of being in their deep relationality already participate in 
both. The interaction and possible modification of existent ideas and norms and the 
assessment of their intensities has been described as an ethical endeavour.  
I tried to fulfil and summarise the account of ethics derived from Spinozian 
thought and its relational assumptions by deploying the term of singularity. This term 
helps conceive of forms of life beyond the divide of the discursive and the material, 
beyond the social and the natural that still seemed to structure the debate on the politics 
of life outlined in the schematics in Part I. The account of life that derives from it is 
more open and receptive, since it does not prescribe a value or meaning to life 
according to external and qualifying categories (as either those effected by power in 
biopolitics or still reproduced in an inverted sign in vitalism). Rather, it remains open 
and appreciative of the contingency and situatedness in which the shaping of modes 
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of life take place. This conclusion seems to provide a step beyond the schematic of the 
politics of life outlined in the first part of the thesis and the normalising (and 
normative) idea of life that the perspectives engaged developed. Finally, I tried to 
exemplify the formulation of an ethics of singularity here suggested by looking at the 
case of refugees. Even though tentative and certainly incomplete, I argued that the 
latter can provide a useful case to show, first, the inadequacy of the frameworks of 
biopolitics and vitalism explored in the schematic of the politics of life seen in Part I. 
Secondly, I argued that the framework developed along the lines of an ethics of 
singularity seems better equipped to explain and justify cases that reveal more 
receptive and less rigid modes of engagement with life and with the value attributed 
to it, and which the former approaches leave outside of their discussion. I also 
acknowledged the criticism that could be moved against the reading here proposed. 
The following and final part of the thesis, then, will need to ask how it is 
possible to make this more open account to life accomplished through an ethics of 
singularity productive for the rethinking of life in contemporary political practices. 
That means, how it is possible to incorporate an ethics of singularity in the shaping of 
political relations and to influence contemporary politics. The final chapter sets out to 
address this last question.  
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Part III | The Political Life of Norms: A Practice 
 
Chapter 5 
Ethics of Singularity in Practice 
 
Introduction 
The analysis in Part II opened up an alternative trajectory in the debate around 
the politics of life mapped out at the beginning of this thesis. The latter was structured 
around a qualification of life between natural and political that, presented by 
biopolitics, seemed not to be fully overcome by perspectives of vitalism either. The 
enquiry I developed by returning to Foucault and expanding his work through the 
naturalist thought derived by Spinozist approaches tried to move beyond the divide 
and enquire into other possibilities for a qualification of life beyond normalising 
processes of power. The previous chapter explored the route of an ethics that ascribes 
value to life starting from the affective and contingent experience in which life is 
encountered and not reducible either to the object of a power exercised over it nor to 
the agent of a pure power of life. 
The final chapter aims at anticipating and addressing possible criticisms and 
clarifying some limits that could be advanced against the argument that has been made. 
In this aim, the analysis will first try to further situate the idea of an ethics of singularity 
elaborated here in a broader category, which will be qualified as a “dispositional 
ethics” and which appears to emerge in debates in political theory. This step has two 
objectives: first, it contextualises the enquiry performed and argues for its relevance 
for current debates in the field. Secondly, it helps point out some problems that may 
appear unresolved in the account of ethics elaborated in Part II: namely, the lack of a 
thorough and systematic engagement with the question of power; the apparent 
individualistic drift that an ethics so understood could appear to enhance, and, finally, 
the possible connections and impact of such ethics on macro-scale socio-political 
conditions and events.  
In the chapter, I will try to provide an answer to these problems by referring 
primarily to the work of William Connolly. In fact, Connolly, with his development of 
an ethics of critical responsiveness that informs political and democratic relationships, 
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helps show how the ethics of life above outlined can be productively integrated into 
politics. This is enabled by his reflections around the formulation and practice of an 
ethos aimed at renegotiating modes of existence (with one another and with one self), 
while simultaneously not neglecting the question of the role that power plays in this 
enterprise. In this way, the study also brings to conclusion the problem around the 
exercise of (bio)political power (and its exclusionary and classificatory effects upon 
forms of life) that was set up at the very beginning of the enquiry in Chapter 1. Looking 
at Connolly’s work, thus, helps me accomplish the integration of the ethics of life 
outlined above into the practice of politics and to show how it can potentially influence 
and affect also macro-scale, institutional dynamics.  
To this aim, the chapter is structured as follow: first, I will position the account 
of the ethics of singularity elaborated here in a broader category of forms of 
“dispositional ethics”, which has been given attention in political theory and political 
studies. This part of the analysis helps identify some of the limits that still remain 
attached to such approaches, especially when compared to alternative perspectives on 
ethics. The analysis will also clarify what is meant here by politics and how the 
analysis outlined above can be made productive in informing political action. Then, 
the following sections will engage with the work of William Connolly as a position 
that helps further develop the conclusions of the enquiry previously conducted. After 
discussing some general premises to Connolly’s work (especially in regard to his 
philosophy of abundance; his ethics of cultivation and the vision of micropolitical 
action that he advocates), I will discuss how he deals with and potentially provides an 
answer to some of the limits unresolved in the conclusions previously reached. I will 
look at his engagement with the question of power; the defence from claims of drifting 
into a merely individualistic ethical gesture, and the possibility for his ethico-politics 
to play a concrete influence on macro-political structures. Through the support of 
Connolly’s analysis, I will try to demonstrate how the approach to a politics of life 
outlined in the previous part of the analysis can be made politically productive.  
 
Ethics of singularity as dispositional ethics 
 The previous steps of the analysis have highlighted the role that ethics plays in 
enhancing an engagement with forms of existence beyond the qualifications ascribed 
to them by biopolitical mechanisms. Such ethics goes beyond traditional ethical 
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conceptions grounded on a set of norms or rules derived from fixed or pre-given 
standards, or ensuing from established and solid systems of morality (see Bennett, 
2001; McCormack, 2003; Connolly, 1999 in this regard). Jane Bennett grasps this 
point by noticing that: 
What seems to cause the most alarm [in rising perspectives of ethics, my addition] 
is the refusal to define ethics primarily in terms of a code or ‘prescriptive 
ensemble’ of values, rules of action, and criterion of judgment. Many models of 
ethics are based on the undemonstrated presumption that if one does not endorse 
a command ethics one can have no ethics at all, that only a code-centered model 
can ensure a care for others. (Bennett, 2001: 152). 
In this regard, Chapter 4 has repeatedly pointed out that, in a Spinozist fashion, 
an ethics rejecting solidified systems of morality tends to be understood as an attitude, 
a disposition, a cultivation that derives from one’s being situated in a certain 
configuration of relations, and thus breaking with any link to codified systems of 
norms or principles. This can be explained by the fact that, as seen, in a biopolitical 
reading, an ethics or moral system that hinges solely on defined and fixed principles 
can itself be identified with a mechanism of control by power. In order to grasp such 
approach to ethics (which could also be defined as “non-foundational” or a “weak” 
ethics, see Pin-Fat, 2010; White, 2002; Barad, 2010), Beausoleil has put forth the 
concept of a “dispositional” ethics (2017). As I demonstrate in what follows, this 
seems to provide a useful term to categorise emergent understandings of ethics that 
capture the following alternative conception: an ethics understood as a way of being 
and acting and ushering from the affective-cognitive bond with other beings and with 
the world.  
I will now comment briefly on the account of a dispositional ethics in order to 
argue that the ethics of singularity outlined above can be subsumed under this broader 
category of analysis. The aim of this move is to show that an ethics of singularity 
formulated by the thesis so far seems to find room in this broader characterisation 
present in contemporary theorising. More importantly, for the sake of the last step of 
the analysis here, such formulation also helps conceptualise some of the problems that 
may remain unaddressed in the type of ethics described by the thesis. In the rest of the 
chapter, I will then turn to the work of William Connolly to show how his thought can 
help provide an answer to the impasses that still remain open in the account of ethics 
discussed. 
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 In a recent article titled “Responsibility as Responsiveness: Enacting a 
Dispositional Ethics of Encounter”, Emily Beausoleil (2017) argues for the emergence 
of the idea of a dispositional ethics as a trend retraceable in diverse and recent 
approaches in political theory. To quote the author:  
A dispositional ethics offers a mean to prepare oneself for what is currently 
beyond one’s grasp, or maybe, that is not there yet; to renegotiate the ever-
shifting balance between reliance on established terms with which to make sense 
and evaluate the world, and the need to call these frames into question to truly 
encounter what is “other”; to perceive and respond with care within even the 
most difficult moments of encounter that result too often in disavowal, 
defensiveness or revenge (Beausoleil, 2017: 298).  
The ethical approach presented here seems to show connections with the 
elaboration of the thesis. Here, the key problem presented is the engagement with 
otherness and with alterity, in a way that goes beyond an immediate attitude of defence, 
shielding or opposition, as it would derive from a starting point of a defined identities 
or system of values. In fact, many of the terms and concepts that are pointed out here: 
the contingency and uncertainty experienced in the encounter of the “other”, the ideas 
of responsiveness and the apparently immediate attachment to fixed forms of identity 
and being that can cause reactionary responses seem to recall the characteristics of an 
ethics of singularity. 
Going deeper, I have argued that the problematic set out at the beginning of 
my enquiry in regard to the biopolitical qualification of “worthy” lives started from a 
concern seen even as prior to the moment of encounter with a fully-forged otherness. 
The argument wanted to express the necessity of an attitude and an action which is 
prior even to the very moment in which practices of othering, exclusions, and often 
de-humanisations are established in the first place. In my argument, putting oneself in 
a dispositional ethics open to the appreciation of the singularity of worth of one’s (and 
other’s) life means primarily exiting that circle by which forms of life can be 
approached in classificatory terms. The latter move, in fact, was seen as inevitably 
leading either to an inclusion of certain forms of life, and, therefore, a normalisation 
within the logics of the biopolitical regime, or to their exclusion, and thus their utter 
degradation from any political significance or meaning.  
In order to contrast such exclusionary outcomes, the notion of singularity tries 
to capture an engagement with each form of life before any definition or classification 
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(in the name of its infinite diversity and uniqueness)75. Life is neither conceived as a 
form of power over only, nor as the pure expression of a power of. Rather, singularity 
captures that the engagement with forms of life and their formation depends on the 
situated systems of relations in which one finds oneself embedded. By so doing, I 
suggest reformulating and addressing the problematic in a new fashion, by escaping 
the circle that inevitably repeats binary qualifications as the first response to the 
encounter with life. In this regard, the formulation of an ethics of this kind pursues the 
aim of refocusing the ethical project of engagement with forms of life beyond the ones 
that are normalised (and thus made legitimate) by biopolitical apparatuses. This ethics 
sees the engagement with life in a more open and appreciative sense, in a way that the 
biopolitical perspectives analysed at the beginning were seen to have neither the space 
nor the capacity to acknowledge or conceptualise.  
Moreover, another characteristic shared with the broader category of 
dispositional ethics (Beausoleil, 2017) is the attention put on the dimension of 
practices, or praxis, in which such ethics becomes enacted. By advocating an attitude 
which is able to affect, act upon, and change one’s surrounding, a dispositional ethics 
is primarily enacted and performed at the level of concrete practices and behaviours 
that can be decided solely within the specific situation or circumstance. For this reason, 
the broader understanding of such an ethics is that of a concrete and punctual 
engagement as a disposition vis-a-vis all circumstances of life, in order to realise such 
                                                 
75 It could be argued that the term singularity has already been used by other authors. For Derrida (2000, 2002), 
“singularity” also captures the absolute uniqueness of every entity and its equality of being before any 
determination. It expresses everyone’s status “before any ‘subject’, […] beyond all citizenship, beyond every 
‘state’, every ‘people’, indeed, even beyond the current state of definition of a living being as a living “human” 
being” (Derrida, 2003:120). Even though similar in its outcomes, I argue that my analysis differs from Derrida’s 
use of the term, for which the idea remains linked to his discussions on friendship, hospitality and “the other” (2000, 
2002). Therefore, even though with similar outcomes, the trajectory from which I derive the term remains 
profoundly different from Derrida’s, by looking at Foucault and contemporary Spinozism to define an engagement 
with life in a condition of immanence. In my analysis, I emphasise in particular the condition of relationality from 
which forms of being acquire meaning. Therefore, there is no being that can be directly defined as a “citizen”, a 
“people” or even “human” and, crucially for the example I analysed, as foreigner, migrant, exiled, deported or 
state-less (connecting this also to the biopolitical categories seen in Chapter 1). The attention on relationality helps 
solve another possible objection to an apparent paradox inherent to the notion itself: if every mode of life is seen 
as absolutely singular, then, it may be questioned how it is possible to grasp it at all. The answer to such apparent 
contradiction comes again from the condition in which singularities are conceived: even though fundamentally 
unique, singularities are never entirely isolated but, as said, they are always linked and in relation to others. Their 
existence depends on the contextual dimension. Borrowing a clarification from Nancy (2000), singularity can be 
called as such only if already immersed in the plural, only when it exists with and among others, as it appeared 
clear in a Spinozist environment of modes and ideas. Singularity, thus, presupposes already a way of “being-with”, 
where the form of being of one strongly depends on the relationships it establishes with others and with the 
surrounding environment of relations. Moreover, such being must be conceived in its concrete, material, corporeal 
terms, which enter into an affective relation with the surroundings. There is therefore an open-ended idea of 
relationality that underpins such approach. My analysis, therefore, differs from the authors mentioned since it is 
not framed as a problem of “otherness”, but as a question of defining an ethics of life in immanence, which is the 
dimension that the analysis above has opened. 
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shaping of conducts. This has been described as the action through Sharp’s notion of 
an “ecosystems of ideas” developed after Spinoza, that comes to complete and reread 
a biopolitical structuring of life by means of dispositifs regulating and normalising life 
through processes from within. The aim of an ethics understood as a disposition that 
influences practices (as seen also when put in relation with previous conceptions of 
ethical and moral systems) is the turning of fixed moral codes into a situated ethics 
which is able to build into, but also, to challenge, counteract and resist such established 
systems of norms.  
 In relation to this point, another important dimension I emphasised is the 
attention put on the re-evaluation of the dimension of the body and corporeal 
experience as a vehicle and locus for affective existence. The source of such 
reconsideration was drawn from a Spinozist ethics and an understanding of human 
beings and the role of reason addressed in the previous chapter. As argued, more than 
a reduction or a downplaying of the idea of reason, what Spinozian thought (especially 
through Deleuze) achieves is an integration of the mental and the corporeal part of the 
individual, an understanding of being in a more holistic and integral sense, which 
conceives of mind and body as two different attributes of the same substance. The 
affective dimension of (human) beings becomes thus re-evaluated and reconsidered in 
line of such account. Reconnecting to what was said above in regard to the capacity of 
an ethics shaped after Spinoza to modify the surrounding environment, “affects might 
be worked upon until they soften calcified responses and yield previously foreclosed 
alternatives” (Beausoleil, 2017: 308). What is at stake is a deep questioning of 
positions advocating a strong account of the self (drawn from a Cartesian 
understanding) seen as bounded and therefore threatened by difference. Rather, an 
ethical approach defined as singularity and here definable in terms of a dispositional 
ethics portrays the self as “multidimensional and in continual formation” (Beausoleil, 
2017: 300), and ultimately open to the appreciation of singularity76.  
What is left to investigate, however, is the position and role that a dispositional 
ethics, in which an ethics of singularity is gathered, can play in regard to political 
practices. In fact, a dispositional ethics as the one defined here appears not to be 
systematically transposable into the political field, since the commitment to receptivity 
                                                 
76 It is important to notice, however, that such a different approach to modes of being does not exclude an agonistic 
attitude, which remains open to contestation and change. This will be the point expanded particularly via the 
reference to Connolly’s work in the following part of the chapter.  
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and responsiveness (as also necessary ways of being) cannot be just endorsed and 
accepted willingly. By presenting itself as mainly a disposition and attitude, it could 
be argued that such an ethics seems to neglect any deeper reflection on the effect that 
power and historical conditions play in structuring relations, and generating instances 
of injustice. In other words, the reconsideration of the self in broader terms that attend 
a materialist rethinking of the body and affects needs to go hand in hand with a 
“rigorous interrogation of other contextual factors that structure encounters and 
parties’ habitual responses within them, if they are to be usefully – and ethically 
employed in political life” (Beausoleil, 2017:313). In this regard, it appears necessary 
to finally spell out what is understood here by “politics”. I addressed this point in the 
Introduction already and argued that, with the biopolitical shift from the law to the 
norm – and of the administering of social processes not in a separate artificial sphere 
of politics but through the relations operating in society – any response of biopolitics 
already entails an action at the level of the relations and practices that regulate living.  
This seems now supported by Beausoleil, who argues that:  
politics exists, is reinforced and challenged, in the capillaries of the everyday 
and at the level of gestures, practices and bodies. Acknowledgment of such 
micro-politics is arguably one reason an ethical approach to politics, and a 
dispositional ethics in particular, has grown as field of enquiry in recent years 
(given the role of the impersonal and, more specifically, the body in structuring 
relations of difference) (Beausoleil, 2017: 314, my emphasis).  
A dispositional ethics is here advocated as a counterpart (and, possibly, 
necessary complement) to structural and collective approaches to politics, by 
cultivating the sensibilities that precede and support such relations, law and 
institutions, as well as providing the terms with which to hold this ideal and practices 
to greater account. 
 This latter point, finally, adds another consideration also about the positioning 
of such an ethics in regard to the task of critique, which has been touched on already 
in Chapter 3 and 4. A dispositional type of ethics is not disengaged from political 
problems. Rather, it could be conceived as additional to standard methods and 
moments of critique. To put it in the author’s words: the emphasis and re-evaluation 
of the body and of the material/affective dimension of life (which ultimately prioritises 
the embodiment of political encounters, along with their intellectual and cognitive 
character) could and should “work in tandem with more conventional lines of political 
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critique77, hence to see critique in novel and promising ways”. This means “cultivating 
strategies […] that might be applied or adopted to more politicised and conflictual 
contexts” (Beausoleil, 2017: 313). Ultimately, according to the author, this attitude 
should derive from the awareness and commitment to an ethos that remains open to 
encounters. Beausoleil, however, does not expand or substantiate what this would 
mean in terms of concrete attitudes and actions and, ultimately, how it could be put 
into practice. In what follows, I will try to develop the argument of how to incorporate 
this idea of ethics into political dynamics by drawing from the work of William 
Connolly. 
To summarise, although I do not disagree with the conclusions reached by 
Beausoleil in characterising emergent alternative understandings of ethics under the 
label of “dispositional”, I maintain that further analysis and development is required 
in order to make this understanding politically productive, that means, to ask how they 
can effectively interact with formal and institutional politics, by supplementing and 
reinforcing them. In order to address the aspects that the discussion of a dispositional 
ethics brings to light, I finally look at the work of William Connolly. A reference to 
the position of William Connolly helps address the problematic aspects still open in 
the perspective mentioned above. More specifically, through the analysis of Connolly, 
I try to demonstrate how the ethical disposition outlined can productively feed into a 
kind of action able to affect current socio-political phenomena. In this regard, his work 
is particularly significant because it inserts the practices of ethics and micropolitical 
forms of action ushering from an ethos of critical engagement and responsiveness into 
macropolitical structures and dynamics.  
 
Politicising ethics: William Connolly 
 Connolly’s name is primarily known in political theory for his contribution to 
the democratic tradition and for his works on agonistic democracy and pluralism 
(Connolly, 1991, 1995, 1999). More recently, however, he has also shown an openness 
to themes and approaches that to a certain extent overlap with the questions addressed 
by natural vitalisms and that he sometimes defines as an “immanent naturalism”, 
                                                 
77 This claim seems to be further substantiated and reinforced by the statement that “critique (as conventionally 
understood) is not enough” (Bryant, 2016) as well as to the idea of “positive critique” that has been attached to 
Foucault’s idea of experience (Blencowe, 2012), as I have previously pointed out. 
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elaborated mainly in A World of Becoming (2010), The Fragility of Things (2013) and 
his most recent Facing the Planetary (2016).  
 As a guide to the analysis carried here, I maintain that it is not entirely 
appropriate to neatly distinguish between two phases of the author’s work and that, to 
a large extent, the conclusions reached in his latest works are consistent with the theses 
developed at the earlier stages of his theory (and particularly in the works 
Identity/Difference, 1991; The Ethos of Pluralisation, 1995 and Why I Am Not a 
Secularist, 1999). I therefore read his work in an integrated fashion and establish a 
close connection between what could appear as two separate phases.  
Stephen White has suggested treating Connolly’s theory as an example of 
“weak ontology” (White, 2010: 106) whereby the author refuses universalising and 
essentialising assertions about “being”. However, certain underlying assumptions 
about the ideas of the self, the other and the world are not totally absent, and the author 
postulates a form of richness and abundance that infuses his idea of the world and 
being (Connolly,1991). Connolly’s starting field of interest is the realm of social 
relations, where intersubjective and, specifically, democratic forms of interactions 
take place. In his latest works, then, this abundance is expanded to the whole 
dimension of the world itself as infused by multiple degrees of complexity (Connolly, 
2010). He defines reality as “a protean vitality of being” (Connolly, 2005a: 244-245), 
according to which the world is neither a container of “matter to be used” nor the 
manifestation of some intrinsic purpose (as it could be in forms of transcendence or 
teleology), but rather an unmanageable “presencing of diverse energies and strange 
vitalities” that at times cross subjective experience (Connolly, 1995:16). Abundance, 
thus, marks an appreciation of the richness of things and of worldly phenomena that 
goes beyond the limits and boundaries of the self and its sphere of existence (Connolly, 
in Tonder and Thomassen, 2005). This is translated in an attitude of generosity to 
others and in an appreciation, openness and engagement with other’s differences 
(understood as ways of existence, choices, systems of beliefs…)78.  In this regard, 
Connolly’s philosophy has been also labelled as a “materialist pluralism” (Khan, 2009; 
Cudworth and Hobden, 2017). This is defined as a multidimensional pluralism 
understood as an excess or abundance of energies and “protean material forces” of life 
                                                 
78 In fact, Nietzsche is the source of Connolly’s take on immanence here (Nietzsche, 1966, 1967a, 1967b). In his 
reading of Nietzsche, the call for a life of joy derives from the acceptance of the contingency and uncertainty that 
pertain to immanence, precisely in virtue of the lack of a superior transcendent design that would shape an absolute 
meaning of human life. This inspires a generosity and gratitude for being, amongst the sufferings that life can bring. 
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that exist without an intrinsic finality or end and that, particularly, are not amenable to 
any human control or capture by any social organisation of human and things alike.  
Nevertheless, abundance is also associated with the sense of fragility and 
vulnerability produced by what the (individual) subject can master and comprehend. 
Abundance also entails contingency, which invites to remain open to emergent and 
ever-changing dynamics (in the natural-and-social worlds as necessarily intertwined, 
Connolly, 2005: 144). Crucially for my analysis, though, a philosophy of abundance 
does not need to be linked to a mood of positivity or general “optimism” – a definition 
that could be attributed to the perspectives of vitalism. Rather, the contingency that 
accompanies a sense of abundances entails also the possibility of conflictual, 
uncertain, and often even damaging outcomes79. This latter point seems to resonate 
more with Canguilhem understanding of the “error” of life, that is, a life that escapes 
representations and is not assigned any pre-determined sign.  
The premises just outlined in regard to Connolly’s ontology are important for 
my analysis in two directions. First, they pave the way to Connolly’s ensuing claims 
in regard to the shaping of his ethics and politics. The same experience of generativity 
and abundance, in fact, is applied to political encounters, as fundamental condition to 
start performing political relations80. This leads him to formulate the idea of an ethics 
of “critical responsiveness” as the way in which the openness to encounter, differences 
and uncertainty can be embraced and performed in daily relationships (both at an 
individual and a collective level). Secondly, such grounding view situates the 
connection between the self and the world at the level of “micro” dynamics, which 
disclose the self’s interconnection with reality. At the very basis of Connolly’s theory, 
there is a key notion of “micro-politics”, which is attentive to the micro-scale dynamics 
taking place below the level of individual beings. The experience and performance of 
micro-processes and dynamics starts well before, in the visceral, inner level of the 
affective existence. The primary response can coincide only with an equally intimate 
process of “work on the self” that involves a variety of complex activities.  
                                                 
79 This is the criticism considered against the types of vitalism discussed in Chapter 2. Moreover, in this regard, it 
is significant that Nietzsche, who Connolly considers the philosopher of abundance per excellence, attributes to the 
kind of life derived from his own philosophical outlook the character of “tragedy” (Nietzsche, 1966), meaning that 
sad passions and experiences may not be absent from it. 
80 In this regard, Connolly takes issue in particular with a liberal understanding of the subject (Connolly, 1999). 
Relying on the image of the self as autonomous individual, political liberalism portrays an idea of the agent as 
disengaged and self-fulfilled, thus neglecting to clarify its ontological premises (expressed particularly by his 
concept of “ontopolitics”, 1992). I showed how the concept can be brought beyond its original context of 
application and used as analytical and critical tool to discuss any political statement or position and the relevance 
of their ontological premises. 
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Connolly’s aim in elaborating a concrete ethico-political project starts from the 
development of an ethos, or sensitivity, that makes the subject open to the experience 
of the uncanny and to seeing it as a (self-)generative performative moment (Connolly, 
1991). A possible responsive action therefore needs to start at the smallest level of 
these interconnections, in the micro-sphere of the self: dynamics and intensities 
operate partially beyond the direct reach of consciousness, although they can also 
influence conduct and thought.  
 
Critical responsiveness and ethics of cultivation     
As I have just outlined, the embracing of an ontology of abundance leads to 
the discussion of ethics in Connolly’s project. The author tries to systematically build 
an affirmative stance and advocates an attitude of generosity and openness to the 
emergent and uncanny of life. Far from remaining disengaged or prey to feelings of 
anxiety, Connolly’s subject is rather moved by a sense of “gratitude for the rich 
abundance of life” (Connolly, 1995: 28).  
At this point, the author turns to the implications that abundance entails for 
subjects’ ethical approach: such gratitude constitutes a “source of ethical aspiration 
(towards a) protean care for the world” (Connolly, 2010: 82) and towards further 
efforts to deeper and multiple forms of engagement. The leap to the ethical dimension 
positions the subject in the broader order of things. Ethics derives from the relationality 
that links one to others and to the world. The medium that enables this connection is 
the sensibility or spirit that puts the individual in a mode of “receptivity” towards 
oneself (of her own internal affective-cognitive processes) as well as towards others. 
These elements seem thus to confirm the outcomes reached by the analysis I performed 
in the previous stages of the research. 
 Importantly, the initial dimension of the self becomes central to define 
(micro)political action. In the author’s thought, the subject is encouraged “to work 
demurely on a relational self that has already been formed” (Connolly, 1999:146). The 
self is not invented anew nor determined merely by external phenomena, being them 
cultural practices or institutional principles and habits. Rather, it constantly responds, 
and reacts critically to processes and phenomena that are already taking place and that 
at some point cross the level of awareness; this reveals its being attuned to a broader 
set of relations. The specific feeling introduced by Connolly to name this sentiment is 
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that of a “critical responsiveness” to the prefiguration of a generosity, initially towards 
emergent political identities and movements and then to any beings and entities found 
in reality as such (Connolly, 2010; 2013a; 2013b). 
 The attribute of “critical responsiveness” is a necessary element for the 
conceptualisation of Connolly’s idea of political subjectivity. As I have highlighted, 
its first formulation and deployment occur in the author’s democratic theory, where 
this attitude is seen as a fundamental means for conceiving of intersubjective relations 
and political differences (Connolly, 1991). The same conclusions derived from the 
ontological premises, however, can be extended to support the kind of action (and, 
eventually, politics) that the author rearticulates in regard to the global dimension. 
The idea of critical responsiveness is useful for my reading because it well 
captures the attitude in which the individual finds itself positioned in the broader 
milieu and environment. In Chapter 4, I presented the notion of an ecology of ideas 
(developed after Sharp’s formulation, 2011) to express the way in which one relates 
to and acts in regard to its surrounding environment – with the possibility of 
transforming it. An attitude of openness and responsiveness was there necessary to 
capture this interconnectedness and the response to sets of norms, understood as the 
established and dominant organisation of relations and identities produced by 
biopolitical discourses and dispositifs. Continuing on this, in Connolly, responsiveness 
is thus a necessary element to engage with one’s environment. Most importantly for 
my argument, it paves the way to that openness and receptivity that allows one first to 
recognise and then, eventually, to expose and to challenge the constructed, contingent 
and often totalising ways in which certain classifications and qualifications of forms 
of life are established and reproduced.  
The complementary element with which Connolly completes his ethical 
project is that of “cultivation”, with which to enhance and develop an attitude of 
openness towards plurality and multiplicity. This involves an attention to the multiple 
and intertwined registers of being through which the world is experienced. The attitude 
of the political subject is a continuous cultivation of one’s own life, in order to make 
oneself sensitive and open to new forms of engagement. I maintain that the idea of 
“cultivation”, which Connolly defines as his specific mode of ethics, can capture the 
attitude to enhance ways of being that are not (yet) accounted for and - to put it in the 
words in which I formulated the enquiry here - recognised into established norms and 
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practices. To quote the author, what is cultivated are “possibilities of being imperfectly 
installed in established institutional practices” (Connolly, 1993: 371).  
Yet, I distinguish my analysis from Connolly’s conclusions in this regard in 
two ways: first, his analysis still identifies “possibilities of being” specifically in the 
forms of identity – even though this focus is possibly partially loosened and expanded 
in his latest works. Rather, the argument around an ethics of singularity captures forms 
of life more broadly, before they can even be crystalised and defined by specific 
identities. In fact, one of the problems that was set up in the opening debate about 
biopolitics was precisely that of a qualification of forms of life leading often to 
exclusionary outcomes. The concern there was that certain ways of existence are not 
even recognised as forms of life in the first place. This was put as the starting problem 
to be addressed, as the need for a more open way to conceptualise and engage with 
forms of being – before their definition in specific identities. It has been suggested that 
the concept of singularity can help escape this pending problem and address it at a 
prior level. Entering into relations with other beings cannot be seen as a problem of 
identity only but of recognising and engaging with them in their striving for existence 
and survival. This was emphasised through the theses borrowed from Canguilhem and 
Spinozist theories in particular. 
Secondly and related to this, the level at which an ethics of singularity wishes 
to act is not that of “institutional practices” only, as it appears in Connolly’s quote 
above. Rather, it tackles a broader understanding of “norms” and normalising systems 
resulting from regimes of biopolitical domination that are active at a much more 
diverse and multi-layered set of practices, comprising of habits, ways of thinking and, 
ultimately, everyday life.  
“Cultivation” is therefore the preliminary step to recognise the contingency and 
constructed character of certain practices of normalisation and acknowledge the rich 
abundance of life-forms that always exceed the particular classification and 
configuration which is imposed by the biopolitical structuring of society. To put this 
in the words of Connolly: “The excess of life over identity provides the fugitive source 
from which one comes to appreciate, and perhaps love, the anarchy of being amidst 
the organisation of identity/difference” (Connolly, 1993: 372). As said, in my reading, 
the problem is not circumscribed to that of identity-and-difference only but is rather 
the prior one of being recognised the status of a form of life (not as improper, or 
“threshold figure”) in the first place. An ethics of singularity acquires a political 
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valence since it is able to challenge at the very roots the way in which biopolitical 
rationales function. 
Also in an ethics of singularity, therefore, there remains an element of 
cultivation as a stage and dimension that enables the practice of this attitude. This 
element leads to the idea of a work or “micro-politics” of the self to develop the 
sensitivity and openness which enable to remain attentive and responsive to the 
plurality and vitality or forms of being (and, simultaneously, to existent apparatuses of 
exclusion) to which one has access to, starting from its own network of relations and 
interconnections. Because of the analysis outlined, thus, Connolly’s theory of critical 
responsiveness and cultivation proves particularly useful to support the point of the 
rethinking of the qualification and engagement with modes of life explored by the 
thesis.    
 
The two dimensions of micropolitics 
As just mentioned, cultivation and critical responsiveness are the key pillars on 
which Connolly develops his idea of ethics. This opens to how this ethics can be then 
politicised, that means, be applied in renegotiating forms of engagement, identities, 
and practices – which can be scaled up to produce changes at the macro/institutional 
level. The natural continuation and enactment of an ethics of cultivation and care lead 
therefore to the practice of a micropolitics. I proceed with outlining the relevance and 
meaning of micropolitics and the two main directions in which, in my argument, it 
should be understood. These correspond to the micropolitical engagement of one with 
oneself (as a cultivation of the connections and mutual influences among one’s 
registers of being) and, secondly, micropolitics in relations to others – and yet still 
before the level of institutional and macro-scale structures. I will discuss these two 
meanings in the following.  
First, the application and practice of micropolitics concerns the sphere of the 
self. Internal processes and phenomena are characterised by the same contingency that 
pertains to the external world and that applies also to one’s own way of being through 
its different levels (intellectual/cognitive and affective emotional primarily). Here in 
particular, it alludes to the non-voluntary character of one’s identity, something that 
cannot be controlled by the will. To quote the author: 
 173 
A branded contingency is a formation that has become instinctive, even though 
it might not be reducible to instinct as a biological drive. Indeed, the term 
“contingency” as it is used here in no ways implies that a contingency is always 
something that can be changed through will or decision (Connolly, 1991:176). 
Significantly for my analysis, this applies also to the dynamics inherent to the 
formation of the self. In Neuropolitics (2002a), Connolly lays the ground to his idea 
of micropolitics in relation to oneself and one’s faculties. The work aims at enquiring 
the role that techniques and disciplines of one’s own dispositions play in producing 
certain attitudes and habits of thinking, ethics and politics. The practice and cultivation 
of such attitudes start at the level of the individual self. The broader problem addressed 
by the book, thus, is how the response to broader cultural practices and especially 
techniques of self-cultivation infiltrate into and eventually stimulate patterns of 
thinking, identity and ethical dispositions that redefine also how one relates to the 
external world and to others (Connolly, 2002a). 
In fact, the micropolitics of the cultivation of the self feeds into and renews the 
same disposition towards higher degrees of openness and engagement with certain 
situations and with others. A micropolitics as a work on techniques of the self (in fact, 
an element that Connolly here closely borrows from and develops after Foucault, 1978, 
1990) is therefore the first and necessary stage through which a genuine ethics of 
engagement can be developed and enacted. The outcome is to work and problematise 
the fixed and often taken-for-granted, “consecrated” character attributed to one’s 
identity, which prevents and closes down the appreciation of the contingency and 
multiplicity of modes of being. 
Significant for my analysis, however, is also the idea of the self and the 
individual that emerges from such a conception. In fact, the practice of composing 
ways of feeling and thinking in order to enhance new and more open ways to engage 
with one’s milieu aims at bridging the rational/intellectual and affective/natural 
dimension of human beings. This attempt, therefore, sounds very much in line with 
the unified and holistic account of the individual and being that I have emphasised 
particularly when analysing the ethics offered by Spinozist accounts in Chapter 4 in 
unitary and monistic account of mind and body. 
Connolly’s conclusions in this regard support the idea of human nature that 
was highlighted as a corollary of an ethics of singularity and that here I return to 
emphasise. To quote Connolly, these insights into a new awareness on techniques and 
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connections that are discovered and enhanced by means of cultivation, “can inform the 
reflective techniques we apply to ourselves to stimulate thought, to complicate 
judgment, to refine ethical sensibility” (Connolly, 2002: 13). 
The definition of the self can thus be seen as relational and deeply embedded 
in the modes of affective-physical existence. The overall formation of one’s identity 
could even be conceived as “biocultural”: it mixes nature and culture into corporeal 
sensitivities that belong to the physical dimension of the self. Therefore, Connolly 
consequently suggests that an “ethic of cultivation” is “an orientation in which 
relational arts of the self are crafted to work on particular aspects of one’s biocultural 
identity” (Connolly, 1999:173). This helps account for those processes, like feelings 
of attachment, that take place at the visceral level of identity and influence action and 
judgments, but fall beyond direct intellectual regulation81. 
Using this to corroborate the thesis of an ethics of singularity supported here, 
such disposition (achieved through a more unitary understanding of the working of 
one’s registers and faculties) becomes necessary to modify the attitude towards one’s 
environment and thus making it more open, sensitive and appreciative of the existence 
of ways of life (or, conversely, their exclusions) and thus ultimately attempting to 
modify it.  
The idea of micropolitics derives therefore from the emphasis on the embodied 
character of Connolly’s politics. By analysing his work on neuropolitics (see also 
Khan, 2009) it emerges how the author does not exclude any dimension and register 
of being and derives his conclusions from the combination of both affective and 
cognitive processes as well as physiological dynamics of the brain in generating new 
ways of thinking, without yet ever reducing them only to the latter. In this regard, 
Connolly’s position can be traced back again to the definition of a materialist pluralism 
that was introduced earlier in the analysis and that can be here read in the functioning 
of material processes of the brain, the body and ultimately, in the ensuing idea of the 
                                                 
81 This portrays a conception which is very far from an attitude derived only in specific sites as the higher intellect 
or the rational-moral will as in post-Kantian theories of ethics. Moreover, also in this case, this characterisation of 
ethics and the self distinguishes the author’s account of ethics from the notion of morality. Ethics manifests the 
disposition of questioning one’s own identity and the consequent willingness to further negotiate it through the 
series of multiple encounters with other beings and entities. Morality, on the contrary, seems rather associated with 
a code of standard rules that shapes the judgments upon good and bad as given and intrinsic absolute values. 
Morality is derived strictly by a supposed transcendent moral nature of the subject (in a Kantian sense) and therefore 
taken as universal and immutable. In contrast to this, ethics emerges as immanent, coherently with the contingent 
character which is associated with identity. The mismatch between ethics and morality becomes even more evident 
when shifting to the political ground. Ethics translates into the disposition of problematising and questioning moral 
givens, in order to reach the “real” and always contingent mode of being of a society (resulting from the 
combination of its particular contingent mutual relations).  
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self. In this first acceptation, then, micropolitics refers to the visceral, internal level of 
the individual work on the self, produced by the connection of all emotional, affective 
and cognitive level.  
In addition, there is a second meaning in which the idea of micropolitics in 
Connolly should be understood. The modes experienced internally across the several 
registers of being need to be enhanced and transformed into a permanent disposition, 
which allows one to work on, form and remain open to the formation and trans-
formation of one’s surrounding milieu. This for Connolly passes through the use of 
“tactics of the self” to realise an action understood as a “micropolitics”. Again quoting 
the author:  
It is also to set up the possibility that these entrenchments might be recomposed 
modestly through artfully devised tactics of the self and its collective sibling, 
micropolitics […]. Relational tactics of the self are applied to affective 
dispositions below the reach of direct intellectual self-regulation. So is their 
collective partner, micropolitics (Connolly, 1991: xvii). 
The idea of micropolitics must thus be understood also more broadly as the 
action taken at the level of the relations below the state and formal institutions. As a 
necessary continuation of the cultivated disposition towards the self, the emergence of 
new ways of thinking and ethics that derive from it are transposed, translated and 
infused into the way in which one relates to others and to the world. In this regard, 
Connolly himself defines micropolitics as the way in which “certain professional 
practices and institutions display certain (disciplinary) techniques to individually and 
collectively organize attachments that inscribe particular relations within individuals 
and between others” (Connolly, 2002: 21). Tracing back this analysis to the 
introduction of the ways of operating and functioning of biopolitical logics, it appears 
clear how the latter work by means of the capillary structuring and qualifying of the 
social sphere, and thus deciding on and producing the modes of life that can 
legitimately take part in it. 
Borrowing from the work initiated in this regard by Foucault (1977, 1998), the 
response to those dynamics cannot but be worked at the same capillary and micro-
level. Micropolitics amounts therefore to the critical engagement with the pressures 
and forces of normalisation which aim at enforcing “standards of normality into the 
self, the group and the nation” (Connolly, 1995: 190) and challenges them also at the 
level that precedes their institutionalisation into stable and fixed modes of account and 
 176 
recognition. Connolly and other commentators (see Kahn, 2009) even consider this 
attitude and practice of micropolitics as the source for a revolutionary action, which 
passes through the level of the practices and relations of the everyday life and aims at 
opposing, resisting and ultimately modifying those structures and norms that are toxic 
and detrimental in their exclusionary and totalising outcomes. 
This double reading of the idea of micropolitics is therefore meaningful for my 
argument around an ethics of singularity in a two-fold sense. First, it supports an idea 
of the self as being whose capacity of thinking and reason is not limited to the cognitive 
sphere only, but embraces a broader and more dynamic understanding and account of 
the affective, visceral and experiential dimension of existence. This appears in line 
with the idea of the individual emerged in particular from the analysis of Spinozist 
thought and the ethics ushering from a monistic ontological outlook. Secondly, it 
makes explicit how practices of counter-actions and ethics of care and singularity are 
aimed primarily at challenging outcomes of normalisation of identities, being and 
forms of existence that, has seen, biopolitical logics contribute to establish – thus 
hindering a richer and more receptive account of life.  
Through the reading of Connolly’s micropolitics (2005), the self is able to 
unleash and develop certain energies and impulses that, in my reading, can counter 
tendencies to normalisation. The latter are eventually further channelled and expressed 
to liberate the same energies that can derive from the encounter and dynamics 
generated by relations with other beings or situations, and elaborate on the disposition 
and practices that can attend more genuinely the kinds of life that escape, are 
overlooked or even suppressed by biopolitical structures of governing. 
 
Ethics in practice: the response to vitalism and biopolitics  
After providing the overview of Connolly’s theory and the way in which it 
relates to the analysis I performed, it is now possible to clarify the further impasses 
and unresolved questions that an approach of singularity may appear to leave 
unaddressed. These are identified with the following: the drifting to an ethical 
enterprise that applies only at the individual level; the alleged neglect of power and its 
relation to life and, finally the impact of an ethics of singularity on political practices 
(for Connolly, scaling up potentially to the global level). The final part of the enquiry 
will proceed by addressing these objections, that could be advanced against the ethics 
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elaborated here as a response to the treatment of life that was found in biopolitics and 
vitalism. The following and conclusive sections aim thus at re-engaging and 
demonstrating how the analysis just performed addresses the initial problem set out by 
the study.  
 
Taking distance from a mere individualistic/aestheticising ethics 
The analysis just performed in regard to the idea of micropolitics in Connolly 
could lead to the conclusion that such approach relies heavily on the individual and 
might represent a highly individualising and even aestheticising enterprise, which does 
not have any appeal for collective change or action82. As briefly mentioned, 
Connolly’s democratic theory is built on the central notion of “identity” of the subject 
that enters and establishes political relationships with others and other constituencies. 
Connolly understands identities always as collective and relational, since they derive 
from the emergence and encounter with intrasubjective (as seen, at the level of the 
micropolitics of the self) and intersubjective (at the social and cultural level) 
differences and, eventually, forms of life. Also in the last development of his theory, 
moreover, he seems to increasingly think in terms of assemblages of beings and 
entities, which immediately points to a dimension that is necessarily plural (Connolly, 
2010; 2013). 
There is therefore a cut with, and even a rejection of, those positions which had 
strictly derived the ethical nature of the subject either from any transcendent position 
of an ethical human nature (like in Kantian or Augustinian perspectives, both 
implying, even if differently, an understanding of the subject as “homo duplex”, 
partaking simultaneously to an empirical/physical condition - judged negatively - and 
a spiritual/transcendent one - deemed to capture the very essence of human beings, see 
Connolly, 2002b).  
On the contrary, Connolly’s source of ethics is drawn from an attitude of care 
for life and the earth that is located in a completely immanent dimension (White, 
2010). It derives from the sense of fascination and gratitude towards the “fugitive 
abundance” of life that puts in a position of constant openness and wonder. The very 
source of an ethical attitude remains therefore internal to the subject, and strictly 
                                                 
82 See for instance the debate generated after Foucault’s notion of “aesthetics of the self” as in Seppa (2004); Peters 
(2005); Milchman and Rosenberg (2007); Iftode (2013). Smith (2015); but also more specifically in relation to 
Connolly, Ferguson (2007); Leet (2004).  
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connected to the interactions of its multiple registers of being. Connolly, therefore, 
does not discard the notions of relationality and collectivity, equally central in the 
formation of such ethics:  
One is implicated ethically with others, first, through sharing an identity with 
some of them, second, through the stirring of unpursued possibilities in oneself 
that exceeds one’s identity, and third, through the engagement with pressures to 
resent obdurate features of the human condition (Connolly, 1999:166).  
It should also be noticed that Connolly does not rule out the possibility of 
experiencing also conflict and agonism in relationships with others. Again quoting 
from him just after, he specifies that it is “an ethics in which adversaries are respected 
and maintained in a mode of agonistic mutuality, an ethic in which alter-identities 
foster agonistic respect for the difference that constitute them, an ethic of care for life” 
(Connolly, 1999:166). Care for life is here taken as a necessary disposition to 
appreciate the productive element present in life, in order to open up and pluralise the 
ways of interacting with it. As primary implication of this approach, thus, his ethics 
helps make a jump outside the limiting logics of inclusions and exclusions in which 
the biopolitical qualification of life was still seen to operate and, by so doing, prodicing 
a sharp distinction between qualified modes of life and life excluded from the socio-
political order. The ethics offered by Connolly cuts across the process of normalisation 
operating such distinctions and pluralises the modes of life that can cross the threshold 
of existence and find expression in the socio-political world83. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that such an account of ethics is taken as a 
universal and uniform value already given or owned by individuals (as either any 
transcendent source or transcendental assumption might imply). It rather relies on 
every candidate’s singular participating to the relations that give it its meaning. The 
notion of singularity that has been introduced and used in the analysis so far thus seems 
to support also Connolly’s idea of a non-individualistic (but also non-universal) 
relational ethics. It is grounded on an idea of singularity as the qualification of subjects 
that continuously take part in the interplay of multiple identities and differences. 
“Singularity” provides an adequate analytical tool to bridge the individual ethical 
                                                 
83 Moreover, it is also possible to observe how this call for a pluralisation towards other modes of being (and other 
identities) can be easily expanded also to the nonhuman world, embracing possibly all forms of life, through the 
call for an equal “ethics of care” for life and the world. “Singularity” appears therefore as the suitable term to 
express and capture an ethics of care for life which does not discriminate a priori on what counts as life and how 
the latter can be engaged. 
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mode of being with the multiplicity of identities and beings encountered in the social 
sphere.  
The outcome of an ethics of singularity is to generate an action at the level of 
multiplicities. In fact, Connolly’s view is very much the continuation and practice of 
micropolitics in an “action in concert” or in the creative formation of “assemblages” 
of multilayered and spread action (Connolly, 1995: xx; something that I will touch on 
further in the coming sections). Far for producing an individualistic drift and outcome, 
the focus on the individual self is only the starting point to develop those attitudes that 
can be then used and scaled up first in the engagement with other modes of life at 
levels below institutions and the state, and then, ultimately, that can also impact on the 
institutional and state dimension of politics.  
In this regard, Connolly’s attempt, which I here follow, is far from reaching 
the point of a hyper-individualisation, which closes down possibilities of engagement 
with other modes of being. Almost the opposite, I argue that the association of the idea 
of singularity to a form of ethical attitude precisely excludes this risk, since it already 
implies the repositioning and putting into question of one’s own modes of identity and 
norms in relation to the experience and the encounter with the other (regardless of 
whether this alterity consists in other human beings or a broader range of forms of 
life)84.  
I would go as far as to suggest that, in fact, such an ethical approach and its 
expansion into an ethics of singularity can be read as a process of de-subjectification. 
It always entails the engagement with and recognition of other forms of life as its main 
objective and purpose. It is not the affirmation of one’s own existence (as an 
exasperation of a capillary and hyper-individualistic assertion of one’s identity), but a 
much more complex relational process of seeing oneself as both subject to but also at 
the same time contributing to defining norms or standard of qualification of types of 
life. Singularity as ethical approach helps maintain the possibility for disposition and 
action while disjoining it from any fixed, finite or strong understanding of identity and 
being. For this reason, the outcome of this approach cannot be equated to any 
individualistic enterprise.   
                                                 
84 In my argument, ethics of singularity aims precisely at a de-individualisation and decentering of the self in 
entering into relations. This departs from both universalising systems of ethics or morality and from ethical systems 
that express a commitment to alterity as their point of departure, but still formulate it in terms of an absolute 
transcendence (the kind of ethics developed after Levinas and Derrida are particularly significant here, see Levinas, 
1979, 1985; Derrida, 2000, 2002; but also in Tonder and Thomassen, 2005). 
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Ethics and the relation with power 
A further clarification of the analysis just run requires looking more closely to 
the concept of power and how this argument can be resolved. The literature on 
biopolitics highlighted how life is defined as a product of power dynamics that 
contribute to subjective formation. In this, through Foucault, I have suggested that 
power is changeable and fluid. Foucault’s analysis of resistance has demonstrated the 
possibility of opening up spaces, gaps and fissures left open by both the idea of power 
understood as positional sovereignty and the way in which power is factually enacted 
and implemented by means of biopolitical dispositifs.  
Yet, it could be argued that the element of power in the approaches analysed 
in Chapter 4 appears downplayed and fundamentally neglected, or at the best dissolved 
in the broader system of relations85. I have already tried to suggest that the idea of 
power is not absent in Spinozist theories, but rather subsumed to the broader categories 
of a system of naturalism. By focusing on life as a maximisation of one’s intensities, 
the attention is put on the relationality, without the need to specify what the sign of 
these relations is or to determine their source. Spinozist thought, thus, goes beyond the 
concern of biopolitics, that puts the accent on power as the key discursive element 
structuring the field of experience. It is now possible to resolve this apparent gap and 
use Connolly to demonstrate how the trajectory of an engagement with life through 
ethics elaborated so far in fact addresses the problem of power by simultaneously 
incorporating a richer and more plural account of life reached in the previous steps of 
the analysis.   
This point appears relevant for the problematic engaged by the thesis. The 
question that the starting debate on biopolitics set up was precisely how to respond 
and counter the exclusions and totalising qualifications of forms of life that biopolitical 
regimes impose by systems of normalisations, and, ultimately, how to rethink the 
engagement with modes of life in a way that does not replicate these types of 
exclusions. Connolly’s account of an ethics of engagement and the ensuing forms of 
micropolitics can help provide an answer to the shortcomings pointed out by the 
criticisms aforementioned. By power, I mean the various forms of domination that 
usher in processes of normalisation of life forms, as what is reduced to the object of a 
                                                 
85 The latter may seem to downplay the manipulating, hindering and often negative effects that forms of power 
exercise. This might seem to dismiss concrete forms of struggle against power dynamics and the exclusions that 
they produce (Coole, 2013; Cudworth and Hobden, 2010).  
 
 181 
power over life. These can be visible in various modes of domination by the sovereign 
authority as well as their continuation and enactment in biopolitical mechanisms 
operating and ordering life in the social sphere.  
First, my argument does not ignore the effect that power logics play in the 
shaping of identities and forms of life. Ways of being are never given a priori or as 
emerging from a historical vacuum, but are always located and situated in the 
structures of power that give them origin and create their conditions of possibility. 
Continuing with the premises laid down by Foucault, he makes the point of how ways 
of life inscribed and made possible within a certain truth-regime imply the infusion of 
norms, judgments and standards into the affective life of those subject to them.  
In this, the biological dimension (the one that is more directly made object of 
manipulation and control) is never entirely separable from the cultural elements 
underpinning ways of life, inasmuch as it is possible to speak about “bioculture” (also 
in Ingold and Palsson, 2013). Connolly states that every way of life is already 
biocultural and biopolitical (Connolly, 2005: 139), whereby the biological dimension 
of life does not correspond to the genetic only, but attends the influences that culture 
has also on the layers of corporeality. The latter point can be read in line with a 
unification of the discursive and the material/corporeal dimension of existence. The 
account of “biocultural” or “biosocial” beings approximates the idea of a milieu in 
which social and natural elements are profoundly intertwined and ultimately 
indistinguishable from one another. Simultaneously, it appears clear that, yet, such an 
account does not neglect the effects that the discursive structuring of biopolitical logics 
has on life and that vitalist theories seemed to leave aside from their questions and 
concerns.  
Moreover, I have intimated that the renegotiation of political relations starts 
before (not in temporal but in logical terms), and expands beyond, the mere definition 
of (legitimate, proper) forms of life by the logics of sovereign and biopolitical power, 
as the only forces structuring the field of life. The thesis has supported the possibility 
of embracing a more fluid idea of power and acknowledging the continuous 
interactions and dynamics of power of life, which needs to be assumed as always 
abundant and excessive to the (bio)political attempts to dominate and normalise it. Not 
reducing the diagnosis of power either on one or the other polarity of biopolitics and 
vitalism traced in the schematic in Part I is seen as a productive solution to remain not 
only more open and responsive to the types of life that can enter the political domain, 
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but also more appreciative of the specificity and contingencies of the struggles that 
pertain to modes of life and define their emergence.  
The type of ethics of singularity mediates and interacts in more complex ways 
with both the logics of sovereign and biopolitical power than what biopolitical 
readings would maintain. However, it also simultaneously corrects the shortcomings 
of the theories of vitalism analysed in Chapter 2, which ended up reproducing a 
qualification and categorisation of modes of living, even though apparently giving 
priority to the side of natural life. An ethics of singularity is more similar to a 
disposition pertaining to a “plurality of forces circulating through and under the 
positional sovereignty of the official arbitrating body” (Connolly, 2005: 145). It 
engages with modes of life in their situatedness and specificity, before and beyond 
qualifications imposed on it. I argue that this alternative approach does allow room for 
recognising the capacity of life to oppose and always escape systems of normalisation 
and affirm its own norms and ways of existence.  
 In this way, the relation between power and life is not reduced to a binary and 
unidirectional logic whereby power imposes a system of domination on life (as it 
happens in biopolitics), nor escape and neglects the engagement with the question of 
power altogether (a critique that could be opposed to vitalisms). Rather, it carves a 
space to enter new elements into the system and acknowledge room for ways of life to 
participate actively into the formation and possibility of power itself. This lays at the 
core of an attempt to rethink the way in which the current debate around the politics 
of life defines and qualifies modes of living, and approach it in a more plural and 
potentially open fashion. 
The latter aspect plays a crucial implication for the argument that I elaborate. 
The conceptualisation and definition of forces participating into political mechanism 
do not address the action of the role of power and the sovereign authority only. Rather, 
they describe a power that irrupts into established (discursive/cultural) regimes more 
broadly and disrupts existent systems of normalisation which very often produce and 
perpetrate exclusions in the forms of life that are allowed to exist. By disrupting the 
dominant order and inserting new energies and expressions into a given milieu, they 
resemble the challenges and transformations related to the practice of a Spinozian 
ethics as an action situated and taking place in the broader context of an ecosystem (a 
milieu) of ideas. In this case, ideas identify both the dominant logics and normalising 
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discourses that structure the biopolitical terrain, but also those emergent ideas and 
forces that have the power and energy to disrupt established order.  
Moreover, this insertion of the complexity of cultural elements into power and 
political logics can also take place in conflictual and ultimately agonistic terms. 
Precisely because the sign of the encounters is not defined, they can entail also 
moments of disruption or potential conflict. These are resolved by an attempt to 
overcome this opposition and maximise one’s power of action in each encounter or 
relation established. This is deemed fundamental to respond and address some of the 
limitations to which the idea of an emergent power of life could be attached, and 
accomplish a rethinking of the norms and ethics of life that takes into account the 
complex processes through which life and power interact in multiple directions and in 
a contingent and situated engagement. 
 
The impact on global politics 
After expanding further on the relational character of the ethics here suggested 
and discussing the problem of power, one final challenge or objection could be 
advanced with regard to the relevance of the approach here elaborated for formal and 
institutional politics. Having maintained that the practice of ethics is situated primarily 
at the level of micro-conducts, gestures and dispositions in everyday life (see also 
Beausoleil above, 2017), it could be argued that yet, this framework does not seem to 
bear particular significance for the exercise of macro-level politics.  
The present and last section aims at addressing this criticism, and demonstrate 
that, in fact, it is possible to scale up possibilities of action not only to the level of 
one’s immediate relations, but also to the macro-level of the formal institutional 
sphere. This entails understanding the possibilities of action and engagement with life 
in more multilayered and diverse terms. In this regard, the engagement with formal 
and governmental decisions occurring in the institutional sphere are not neglected, but 
rather reinscribed in a broader system of relations. I will again use Connolly’s work to 
address this final point. To put it in the author’s words: the pluarlisation of pluralism 
(in fact, the key concern underpinning his work) does not aim at depreciating a politics 
of governance through state apparatuses; “rather, it nudges the latter into critical 
relations with other dimensions of politics” (Connolly, 1995: xix). This latter 
argument, thus, helps advance the claim that the idea of politics operating at the levels 
of relation and everyday interactions and practices does not exclude or reject the 
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consideration of politics at the wider state- or institutional scale. By looking at the 
macro-institutional dimension, moreover, this stage of the analysis substantiates the 
argument explored in the previous chapter in regard to Spinozist theories and the 
material power expressed in an ecosystem of ideas. 
The ethico-political account of micro-politics offered by the previous 
discussion aims at making an impact on state and governmental politics. The synthesis 
and connection of these multiple levels where political action can be performed 
accomplishes a twofold aim. To quote Connolly: “first, a more genuine appreciation 
of the fugitive abundance of being; second, revealing and construing the territorial 
state as one among many sites of political action and identification in late-modern 
time” (Connolly, 1995: xxiii). The focus on the micro-dimension, therefore, does not 
neglect the effects played on macro-political structures. As mentioned in the opening 
section of the chapter, in the definition of ethics as a tool for practicing forms of 
resistance, the very meaning of politics is opened up and identified with the level of 
the everyday gestures and practices that pertain to subjects in power apparatuses 
(Beausoleil, 2017: 314). Ultimately, this multiplication of the sites of politics can be 
read as an attempt to accomplish a further pluralisation: along with a horizontal one 
that aims at a more genuine account of life and ways of being at the level of the self 
and one’s range of immediate relations, there seems to occur also a “vertical” 
pluralisation of the sites and locuses of political action, which problematises the role 
of the state as the final site for acts of political mobilisation and identification. 
Such an account has therefore two important implications for the argument. 
First, it further corroborates and supports the claim made in the previous section 
regarding the engagement with the question of power. Secondly, and agreeing with 
Connolly, it redefines political activity as a form of militant activism, which starts 
from the modification of everyday practices: forms of cultivation of attitudes that 
dislodge and unsettle attachments to sedimented ideas, practices and ways of life; but 
that can also be scaled up and carry a transformative potential at broader macro-scale 
or even global dynamics.  
The points just made can be read through Connolly’s theory across its multiple 
stages, and become particularly evident when the author engages with the global or 
macro-scale patterns of political intervention and action in his latest works (Connolly, 
2010; 2013, 2017). At this further stage, he starts looking at the global dimension of 
problems and dynamics, and at how these are related to an active (and transformative) 
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individual and collective political practice. The core of his argument is that the 
introduction of changes into one’s own behaviour can eventually scale up into political 
changes at the wider level.  
 A fruitful concept to visually portray the sense of global interconnectedness of 
multiple processes is the idea of a “global resonance machine” (Connolly, 2010:135). 
The image of a resonance machine well depicts the processes by which the situated 
action in one part of the world can reverberate and be scaled up to other parts, and 
being amplified across all global dynamics. Although such links may appear 
imperceptible, in fact, they already place actions into a multiple chain of related 
influences and effects. In the author’s words:  
The elements into such mobile machine impinge upon one another to some 
degree, infiltrate each other to an extent, and also exceed both relationships in 
generating loose energies that might be colonised in new ways (Connolly, 2010: 
135). 
If the idea of the machine can make sense of the generativity and emergent 
processes in a global scale, however, it is necessary also to be cautious against the 
uncertainty produced by the multiple forces that can be involved in it. In Connolly’s 
words:  
Once a machine gets its role, it is abstract because of its self-amplifying 
character, because its dynamism exceeds the control of humans entangled in it, 
and because it is susceptible to changes through the interplay between new 
infusions from outside and responses by extant elements. An abstract machine 
in which human estate figures prominently is irreducible to machines entirely 
outside the human estate. The former introduce complex relations of agency, 
alliance and so on somewhat less discernible in the latter. Nevertheless it might 
be useful to see that abstract machines are formed in the nonhuman estate, the 
human estate, and, particularly, human-nonhuman relational processes 
(Connolly, 2010: 136).  
 The last passage reveals the expansion of the uncertainty and, simultaneously, 
potentiality to new creation and activity that characterise interactions among entities 
in a complex world. As far as a politics of the self is concerned, in this enlarged 
cosmological account, ethics is no longer directed towards the human “other” only, 
but opened to all entities that play some degree of agentic force. In this multilayered 
system of forces, it appears therefore clear how the state and institutional practices 
remain only one among the factors that can shape and influence political outcomes. 
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 Moreover, the role-experimentation at the micro-scale can lead to equivalent 
experimentations at the large-scale of actors that are distributed along structures of 
hierarchies and power (being them collectivites, groups, associations, institutions…). 
Changes at the micro-level can enhance participation and involvement into more 
robust movements or initiatives of actions, that ultimately may result in the rupture or 
destabilisation of a given order – and therefore in possibilities for change. As the 
author expresses his invitation to enact a constant democratic militant practice:  
One way to get a preliminary handle on a difficult situation may be to launch 
experimental shifts in the roles we now play, both because such an accumulation 
of shifts can be good in itself and more because such constituency actions may, 
first, seed the way for more militant, collective actions outside electoral politics 
and, eventually, fold these issues into electoral politics (Connolly, 2013: 411).  
 The interconnectedness among different levels of political agency is put as 
condition for change. Even when speaking of transformative endeavours and 
destabilising political behaviours and processes, therefore, the role of existent political 
institutions is not neglected. Rather, such an account can incorporate the effect on 
institutional political practices. The dispositional ethics characterised above and here 
articulated in terms of an engagement with life as singularity, thus, proves to 
supplement and not replace or be entirely opposite to electoral and formal political 
practices. 
Finally, the reasons under Connolly’s commitment to a multi-layered form of 
global action are made clear in his very last works that notably associate “the fragility 
of things” with “neoliberal fantasies” (2013). His effort to formulate a theory of 
politics that embraces non-human life worlds and multiple registers of being seems to 
be ultimately derived by the extent to which these forces are produced as effects of 
neoliberal practices at the global scale. The development of new ways of coping with 
the unpredictability and constant threat of natural processes and phenomena appears 
to emerge as responsive (and even “resistant”, see Kahn, 2009) behaviour against risks 
created by a global neoliberal dominant logic. In a close passage: “The thesis is that 
today we must escalate creative action on several fronts as we also slow down and 
divert the intersections between neoliberal capitalism and a variety of nonhuman force-
fields” (Connolly, 2013:411). This is in line with the argument (Kahn, 2009) that 
Connolly’s theory provides the formulation of a disposition that helps transform and 
revolutionarise one’s everyday way of life and introduce new practices that disrupt 
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logics operating at the capillary levels of existence. The passage through Sharp’s 
system of ideas that are generated by affective states and dispositions and translated 
into new ways of thinking and practices that have a material impact on the 
configuration of the world helps theorise this further opening and formulate the 
possibility for this ethics to have an impact at the political level. 
 Connolly’s argument appears thus effective to address the question of how to 
engage with life beyond the normalising operation effected by structures of power and 
undertake an action that can have effects also at the institutional level. The concern 
addressed by the thesis is the application of ethics as a first dimension where to 
challenge established treatment of forms of life – and attend them in a more open sense.  
As mentioned, my analysis remains fundamentally different from that of 
Connolly, whose starting concern is the negotiation of relations of identity and 
difference in democratic practice. Nevertheless, the characterisations just mentioned 
underline the relevance of Connolly’s theory for supporting the formulation of a 
response to current perspectives on the politics of life and their engagement with 
modes of living. This relevance derives from the fact that the form of sensibility or 
ethos that he suggests helps carve out a space for an element of life that responds to 
biopolitical logics and norms and that remains excluded by the framework of 
biopolitics. Moreover, his account builds on and supports the explanation formulated 
by drawing from Spinozist thought and demonstrates how the affective experience can 
enhance transformation of the surrounding environment in the medium of an 
ecosystem of ideas and the possibilities of actions ensuing from it. 
In conclusion, as mentioned, the ethics of singularity here suggested seems to 
cut across those sharp divisions between person and non-person; cultural and natural; 
human and animal that were seen ushering from biopolitical normalising regimes and 
that neglect room for alternative and more plural ways of life within their systems. At 
the same time, it also does not start from the assumption of an a priori liveliness of 
life as an absolute term, which also reproduces classifications and divisions, as seen in 
vitalism. It has also been demonstrated that the ethics here outlined does not pertain to 
the individual sphere only, but can – and needs - to play an influence at the level of 
institutional complexes from the local, national to the global. In other words, it creates 
a chain where the effects at the micro- and affective level can move up to induce 
changes at the wider dimension and vice versa, in a relation of reciprocal 
independence. In the political context, it appears therefore even clearer why the 
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insistence of the micropolitics of the self that was seen starting with Foucault and now 
completed in Connolly via contemporary forms of Spinozism plays an important role 
in starting action that can challenge established ways of envisioning the politics of life. 
This is enabled by a turn to an account of life as “singularity”, that problematises the 
idea of the self in its own condition of relationality and situatedness, and ultimately 
opens it up to a more generous appreciation of alternative modes of being.  
The author’s approach to ethics therefore helps sustain the account of an ethics 
of singularity suggested by the thesis. Singularity seems here to build the bridge 
between an understanding of life as object of a power over (constructed by biopolitical 
regimes) and a force of power of (advocated by vitalist accounts). It invites a 
consideration of life in relation to politics as more plural and nuanced. The latter 
account attempts thus an alternative route to the mapping out of current positions of a 
politics of life outlined in the schematic provided in Part I of the thesis. In the analysis 
above, an ethics of singularity seems able to support the openness and continuous 
transformation that pertains to one’s own identity and enables to engage in constantly 
new relationships with others and open up new possibilities to act ethically and 
politically, beyond established relations of power of/over life. Through these dynamics 
of remaining open to the rethinking of norms of existence in a more receptive sense 
(by challenging the existent and externally imposed ones), Connolly’s theory has 
helped provide the closest and most relevant support in fulfilling the question of 
rethinking the norm and ethics of life, and challenging the often restrictive and 
exclusionary outcomes that the mapping of the politics of life provided in Part I 
seemed not to be fully able to address.  
A very final point could be addressed in regard to the overall framework that 
has been suggested here. This relates to reflections around the possibility of critique, 
that has been partially touched on as a second, parallel sub-layer of the analysis already 
in Chapters 3 and 4. It could be argued that, yet, the approach proposed, especially in 
the latest conclusions explored through Connolly, appears itself a way to comply – and 
thus reinforce – rather than fundamentally challenge existent structures of power and 
normalising ways of acting and thinking. Hence, the kinds of action and conduct that 
this approach leads to could themselves be seen as a result of an uncritical 
normalisation and compliance with the language of power. I have tried to demonstrate 
why, in my argument, this is not the case, and how the ethical attitude outlined in the 
study can productively interact with – and against – power logics and ultimately fosters 
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avenues for change. However, I believe this point can be addressed also at another 
level of analysis, by looking at the implications entailed by the use of a framework of 
ontopolitics. I argue that, in order to remain open and sensitive to the concrete and 
contingent struggles of life that can present themselves to “us” (as researchers and 
living beings), action and comprehension can start in the middle, from the perspective 
in which one is already situated. To put it in the words of Coleman and Rosenow: 
An embodied and ontopolitically committed self is always already in the middle 
of the double move of analysis and projectional theoretical construction, or 
theoretically-informed engagement and critique of those very practices […] 
‘Where/how to start’ becomes a superfluous question (Coleman and Rosenow 
2017: 268).  
I maintain that, if one wants to remain more open and receptive to the struggles 
and problems that start from the practical engagement with life, then a start “in the 
middle” is not only necessary, but also productive – lest falling prey to an inability to 
act at all. This is why, at the beginning of the chapter, it was argued that the type of 
action (supported by an ethics) advocated here cannot replace – but also does not 
exclude – critique. Moreover, this also explains why, in the last stage of the analysis, 
the response to the problem posed has ultimately been presented as a “practice”: we 
are already engaged with life and thus action takes place in the middle, neither before 
nor against, but along with any attempt to theory-construction – as well as with other 
forms of critique. 
 
Conclusion 
The chapter addressed the possible challenges that still remained open from the 
previous elaboration of an ethics of singularity suggested by the thesis. In particular, 
it tried to anticipate and, eventually, respond to, the criticisms that could be advanced 
against an account of ethics thus understood. These have been identified with the 
following. First, the apparent collapse into a highly individualistic and isolating 
enterprise that does not take into account the dimension of the collectivity. Secondly, 
the overlooking of the question of power, which was in fact central in the debate set 
out through biopolitical theories at the beginning of the thesis and that vitalist 
approaches seem to disregard. Third, and connected to the latter point, the effects that 
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the endorsement of such an ethics can have in regard to formal and macro-structures 
of political processes and phenomena. 
In order to formulate these potential limitations, I first engaged with the 
broader debate around an idea of “dispositional ethics”, as an approach to ethics 
gaining attention in the field of political studies. In this regard, I argued that an ethics 
of singularity itself can be included in this broader category. The enquiry performed 
seems therefore relevant for ongoing debates in the discipline. Then, I tried to address 
the questions emerging from this broader account by looking at the work of William 
Connolly. By following the way in which Connolly integrates his ethics of cultivation 
and critical engagement to inform a democratic and, in his latest works, a planetary, 
politics, I argued that it is possible to incorporate the ethics outlined above into 
political practices. In this analysis, it has been necessary also to specify what is meant 
here by politics, that is, looking at the set of relationships in which one enters in its 
closest proximity and in the capillaries of the everyday, through practices and gestures, 
by challenging established ways of thinking that hinder the expression of life. This 
also justifies the emphasis on politics as a practice highlighted in this section. It also 
specified the complementary and non-substitutive role that this mode of practicing 
politics maintains with standard forms of critique, thus linking back the discussion to 
the engagement with critique as seen in Foucault and then expanded in Spinozist 
thought.  
Then, the analysis of Connolly as an author that fundamentally links ethics to 
politics helped demonstrate how such an account of the politics of life here intimated 
remains relevant for discussing matters of power and to have a potential purchase in 
informing practices at a macro- and wider scale of formal politics. The aim was to 
suggest a mode of engagement with forms of life that provides an alternative answer 
to the normalising and often exclusionary measures of processes of qualification of 
life that are enforced and reproduced by biopolitical power, which was the question 
posed at the beginning of the thesis. I finally justified why the emphasis on an 
understanding of ethics and action as a practice at this point relates to the enquiry 
conducted from the approach of ontopolitics, which was the method of engagement 




The Relevance of “Life” 
 
The analysis of Connolly’s work in Chapter 5 allowed me to address some of 
the impasses that remained open in the solution offered by the previous stages of the 
analysis, namely, the apparent neglect of the question of power and the alleged 
detachment from macro-scale institutional politics. Although contestable, the latter 
move has been deemed relevant for two main purposes. First, it demonstrates that the 
account of ethics suggested by the thesis does not stand as an alternative, but can be 
complementary to existent structures and practices of politics. The perspective 
elaborated therefore, does not claim any superiority or supreme validity over 
competitive perspectives. Rather, in line with the enquiry conducted and with what 
mentioned in light of the approach of ontopolitics presented at the beginning, it poses 
itself as one possible option which is not exclusionary of other possibilities, but 
remains open and contestable to new formulations and adjustments. Secondly, the final 
step in Chapter 5 wanted to demonstrate that the perspective provided is not 
completely detached or separate from latest developments in political theory. The 
engagement with Beausoleil’s idea of dispositional ethics fulfilled precisely this aim: 
demonstrating that similar sensitivities and an orientation towards modes of 
envisioning ethics and possibilities of action below the level of formal structures of 
politics are present in contemporary scholarship in the field. Once again, this does not 
mean implying that the focus of political action has fundamentally shifted, but that 
multiple lines of development, influences and directionalities can be included when 
we try to define what politics consist of. The engagement with the politics of life that 
the analysis set out to discuss already made a contribution in enlarging the field and 
the concern of politics to the micro-level of the attention for forms of life.  
In light of these considerations, it is now possible to conclude by summarising 
the rationale and objective of the analysis and the contribution that it aimed to achieve.  
 
Project rationale and argument 
The research just performed addressed the question of the understandings of 
life in the main approaches that engage with the question of the politics of life in 
contemporary political and social theorising. The underpinning concern that led the 
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enquiry has been an aspiration to ask whether, and in what way, existent perspectives 
are able to make sense of the ways in which life is continuously problematised in the 
multiple forms of interactions and discourses that define what counts as life, what its 
value is and what the implications of this assessment for everyday living and for 
politics.  
The research identified two main approaches that are seen as fruitful to address 
the question: biopolitics and vitalism, which stand as two preeminent perspectives 
informing contemporary political theorising. I argued that the two approaches provide 
the opposite ends of the axis along which current perspectives of a politics of life can 
be structured. In Chapter 1, I started with the discussion of the literature on biopolitics 
and showed that it significantly exposes the problem of how modes of life become 
qualified as effect of regimes of power that construct the meaning and value ascribed 
to modes of living. I used the idea of a norm of life to capture all biopolitical 
apparatuses through which forms of life become classified. More specifically, the 
thesis has selected the literature that demonstrates how biopolitics functions through 
the attribution of value to types of life, by rehabilitating the ancient Greek 
classification of the organised life of bios as opposed to the natural and biological life 
of zoe. Rearticulating this definition, the authors selected in Chapter 1 reached a 
formulation of biopolitics as a process of classification of life forms, that operates by 
means of logics of inclusion and exclusions between forms of life considered 
legitimate, or proper, and thus assigned political significance, and those that instead 
remain excluded from the political realm. Many of the categories that define types of 
life, like human/animal, person/thing, healthy/ill are read as biopolitical apparatuses 
that establish the value attributed to life and inform the politics governing living 
beings. The authors selected to develop this first stage of analysis were the following: 
Hannah Arendt, with her analysis of the rise of the social sphere and her assessment 
of the situation of refugees; Giorgio Agamben and his biopolitical account of 
sovereignty and bare life; Nikolas Rose and Paul Rabinow, concerned with the 
normalisation and classification of modes of life as effect of medical practices, and 
Roberto Esposito, which instead takes issue with the juridico-political notion of 
personhood at the centre of the politics of modernity and of the processes of 
immunisation through which the latter operates. Overall, these perspectives have 
highlighted the reduced, constrained, often annihilated character of the idea of life 
subjected to biopolitical control. The latter functions through mechanism of inclusions 
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and exclusions that decide about the legitimate forms of life that can enter into the 
political domain. 
Opposite to this first perspective, Chapter 2 turned the attention to approaches 
of vitalism, which are deemed to sit at the opposite end of the axis mapping out 
perspectives on the politics of life. By advocating an account of life as generative, 
productive and lively, vitalism may appear to respond and offer an alternative to the 
qualifying and often repressive outcomes seen in place in biopolitics. I outlined a 
“vitalist turn” in the social sciences, its main claims around the idea of life and how 
these assumptions are articulated in some perspectives that can be gathered under this 
label. However, at this first stage, the analysis maintained that, even though 
formulating an apparently opposite account, perspectives of vitalism are not able to 
free themselves completely from distinctions operating in biopolitics, that means, they 
seem to reproduce analogous, but opposite, processes of qualification that give priority 
to certain types of life and downplay the value and the space of others. By so doing, 
they are ultimately unable to reframe the terms of the discourse around which the 
politics of life can be read and to provide an account that fundamentally challenges the 
premises of biopolitics. A first contribution of this project is thus that of providing a 
comprehensive perspective of the debate on the politics of life and suggesting a 
framework to read through this area, in response to the more blurred and sometimes 
unclear way in which the secondary literature examined in the introduction tends to 
deal with the subject. 
As the underlying method to the schematic suggested in Part I of the thesis, I 
maintained that the debate between the two positions can be best captured by 
Connolly’s idea of ontopolitics, which I here used as a content as well as a method for 
leading the enquiry. The discussion of these perspectives highlighted the link that 
exists between ontological assumptions of certain positions and the kind of politics 
that is derived by them. In other words, their strong ontological stances (that means, 
in the debate here outlined, either an idea of life as discursively constructed by the 
power exercised over it or an ontological and material affirmation of life as principle) 
impact on the type of questions, struggles and entities that can become object of 
consideration. The deconstruction and analysis of the ontological premises of the 
positions analysed has led to demonstrate how biopolitics and vitalism remain 
fundamentally incapable of either conceptualising or detecting phenomena and 
experiences concerning an engagement with life that escapes the classificatory terms 
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that they establish, and instead takes place at the contingent and situated level of 
relations. 
After providing this analysis and criticism in Part I, the second part of the thesis 
moved on to attempt an alternative trajectory to investigate a politics of life more open 
to modes of living and to the contingent responses to the engagement with life. Part II 
attempted a consideration of life beyond the exclusionary and qualifying outcomes 
analysed in the previous part. To this aim, I argued that returning to the original 
perspective of Michel Foucault can provide a useful point of departure for an 
alternative line of enquiry. Foucault, in fact, has a more complex and nuanced 
engagement with life in his oeuvre, which does not reduce life either to the object of a 
power exercised over it, nor to a pure force of life that expresses itself beyond any 
discursive and power constraints. This ambivalent and complex perspective appears 
particularly evident in the formulation of his concepts of resistance and critique, that 
he poses as co-extensive with power. Significantly, the locus of these sites of resistance 
to the discursive power of biopolitics is grounded on the material dimension of 
affective experience and the body, a dimension that thus partially escapes power logics 
which operate through the norm. Moreover, he fundamentally links the practice of 
critique and freedom to the dimension of ethics that has the body and the affective 
dimension at its centre. The element of resistance via ethics, in Foucault, enables the 
entering into the system of a form of action that opposes and counters the normalising 
logics of power. I suggested that this is expression of a force of life that proves 
irreducible to the sole subjection to power dynamics. Moreover, I moved from 
Foucault to George Canguilhem to further characterise this impulse of life as the 
expression of life struggle of survival and capacity to generate and perform its own 
norms. 
The latter aspect has been important to build a bridge with the naturalistic 
theory of norms and life derived from the contemporary Spinozian turn in politics and 
philosophy. In Chapter 4, I outlined Spinoza’s account of ethics as emerging 
particularly from the reading of Deleuze and other contemporary authors. More 
specifically, I highlighted how this literature conceives of possibilities of action and 
freedom starting from the affective dimension of experience. The discussion of 
Spinozian theories helps build on the relationality and responsiveness to relations that 
was introduced in Foucault, and that, with this further step, becomes extended to the 
material relations constituting one’s environment. Crucially, Spinoza’s monistic 
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ontology (well captured by Deleuze’s notion of univocity), which establishes a 
continuity between the affective experience of the body and thought, supports a 
materialist theory of ideas whereby a modification of the affective experience can 
generate new ideas able to modify one’s surrounding environment. This latter aspect 
enlarges and extends to a natural account the idea of norm central in Foucault. In Part 
II, the analysis elaborated an ethical account built on the idea of singularity as 
capturing the uniqueness and relationality of modes of engagement with life, which 
occurs not through pre-established categories and norms of life, but at the level of the 
contingent and situated encounter. The idea of singularity thus seems to remain more 
open and comprehensive in the engagement with forms of life than the outcomes 
reached by the debate in Part I. An ethics of singularity has been suggested as a 
framework that is able to accommodate an alternative mode of engagement with life 
beyond the discourse of qualifications examined in the first debates suggested. In order 
to demonstrate how an ethics of singularity can work in practice and as alternative 
framework of analysis, I briefly discussed the case of refugees as a possible context of 
application. In this regard, I first showed how both approaches of biopolitics and 
vitalism remain bound to rigid classifications and binary logics in offering an analysis 
and diagnosis of the issue. Moreover, again by adopting an ontopolitical interpretation, 
I argued that they are unable to recognise and conceptualise alternative modes of 
engagement with life, and thus remain limited in their critical and analytical purchase. 
I thus demonstrated how the idea of singularity can work in practice.  
In order to move a step further and to anticipate some possible criticism that 
could be moved against the argument here supported and its application to the example 
proposed, in the third and final part of the thesis, I interrogated the relevance of the 
ethics of singularity for the contemporary practice of politics. The analysis argued that 
the ethics outlined above can inspire a political practice that infuses a disposition of 
openness to forms of existence at the level of micro- and everyday relationships that 
build the texture of society. By looking at William Connolly’s idea of cultivation and 
responsiveness, I argued that the sensitivity to the emergence of new modes of living 
can generate new initiatives of ideas and, eventually, actions, which can be potentially 
scaled up to influence also the practice in institutional and formal sites of politics. This 
can support avenues for a politics that is more receptive to (and can better account for) 
the emergence of new modes of life and living beyond the exclusionary outcomes that 
the politics of life analysed in Part I produced. 
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Contribution and aims: towards an open politics of life 
 In light of the argument and the overview of contents just outlined, it is thus 
possible to conclude by reinstating and summarising the contribution of the project, 
the place of the research here conducted with regard to the existent literature, and the 
implications it has for contemporary practices.  
First, I maintain that the research here conducted contributes to the 
understanding of approaches of the politics of life in contemporary political 
philosophy and theory. While the perspectives of either biopolitics and vitalism have 
themselves a very long history and tradition, and my analysis has been more a critical 
engagement with the two than a genuine addition to either of those fields separately, 
the attempt to find a synthesis that brings them together in a unique reading seems 
underexplored. This appear evident by the analysis of the survey of the critical and 
secondary literature around the two perspectives discussed in the Introduction. Several 
authors and strands tend to read these approaches as separate and opposite, but none 
has so far attempted to highlight how, in their being opposite, the two perspectives 
also make an analogous and symmetric move in grounding an understanding of politics 
in their (strong) ontological assumptions around a certain idea of life. This starting 
point precludes them the possibility of criticising the alternative perspective in a way 
that fundamentally challenges the terms of the debate. This contradiction was 
highlighted in particular by a critical use of the notion of ontopolitics here applied as 
a method of analysis. Ontopolitics demonstrated how the polarisation and binary way 
in which these perspectives are defined and stand in opposition to one another, leaves 
no room for divergency by alternative interpretations, so much so that, as soon as the 
premises of one account are rejected, one is immediately drawn “like a magnet” 
towards the opposite polarity. This configuration of the dominant positions on the 
politics of life, however, closes down possibilities to reframing the terms of the 
discourse, and thus looking for or even leaving room for alternatives. A first 
contribution of the project is thus offering a comprehensive mapping of the 
problematic of life (and of how this is accounted for) in contemporary political 
theorising. This discussion has been undertaken in Part I of the analysis. Even beyond 
this, the analysis has demonstrated that the problem of life in contemporary theory 
goes beyond the way in which it is internally captured by either of the perspectives 
considered separately (which take like as object of a power over in the case of 
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biopolitics and as capable of its own power in vitalism). Rather, it demonstrated that 
the problem lies in the fact that existent perspectives remain incapable of conceiving 
of life in relation to politics beyond these boundaries. They remain too prescriptive as 
to what should count as life, and therefore they are unable to capture the manifestations 
of life that escape or do not adhere to their schemes of understanding. The structuring 
of the debate around the politics of life offered by the thesis has therefore the function 
of highlighting these gap and closure that remain recognisable in the existent 
scholarship around the subject. 
The response to these gaps led the way to the further step of the thesis, that is, 
the attempt to itself formulate an understanding of the relationship between politics 
and life that does not remain prey of the closure and reductionism ascribed to the 
previous perspectives. It could be argued that, by so doing, the argument of the thesis 
itself falls into the trap of ascribing a particular meaning or prescriptive or normative 
idea of life, which was the criticism advanced against the perspectives analysed in Part 
I. However, I maintain that the alternative suggested here (by analysing a trajectory of 
the ideas of life and ethics that run from Foucault to contemporary Spinozism) aims 
precisely at capturing the way in which the engagement and making sense of forms of 
life remain fundamentally open and not pre-determined, if considered in the contingent 
and situated character in which life is encountered and experienced. The argument of 
the thesis, therefore, does not fail to understand that the problem around the politics of 
life cannot be reduced to any final understanding or rule – lest falling prey of the same 
criticism that it applies to its critical targets. Rather, it suggests a way to theorise and 
capture this openness theoretically and conceptually. This has a strength against the 
current structure of the debate around the politics of life, since it enables the opening 
up of alternative perspectives. The one suggested by the thesis does not claim any 
superior validity over others, but primarily shows that new interventions in the debate 
are indeed possible. The politics of life, that is, the debate around the mode of 
engagement of life and politics, remains thus undefined and undefinable. However, 
this should not dissuade from any attempts to capture it by theory. Rather, it is an 
invitation to notice that any new interpretation emerging should remain open and 
contestable. This is the genuine way in which any mode of engagement with life 
(practical or conceptual) is deemed possible. 
The reflections just suggested lead me to explicate the second dimension of the 
contribution, that is, the implications that the thesis has for the practices of a politics 
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of life. In fact, it could be wondered why to ask the question around the politics of life 
in the first place. I maintain that this problematic has a concrete, practical dimension, 
that is, as stated in the Introduction, the fact that we are part of life and surrounded by 
life in its multiple modes and manifestations. This is not only reflected in 
contemporary applications in debates that vary from bioethics to bio-art, from 
immigration policies to discourses of human rights. We engage with modes of life in 
our gestures and everyday practices, and thus we are constantly renegotiating ways in 
which life is encountered and made sense of, before and beyond any final 
conceptualisation. In this light, the analysis is thus aimed at intimating the inadequacy 
of existent perspectives in capturing the much more situated and contingent way in 
which life is experienced and which, as shown in Chapter 4 with the example provided, 
requires theoretical analysis to develop sharper tools to accommodate the plural and 
complex understanding of life beyond any rigidity and fixity of assigned norms. 
Insofar as we remain into binary and rigid understandings, there is something about 
the making sense of life that will escape explanation. It is once again Connolly that 
seems to capture this in a most accurate way: “the initial need today (and probably in 
most times) is to detach identities to a greater degree from the fixed set of alternatives 
in which they tend to move, to excite the experience of discrepancy with established 
dualities of normality/anormality, rationality/irrationality, and good/evil, 
sovereignty/anarchy so that alternative experiences of danger and possibility might be 
cultivated” (Connolly, 1992: 139). If we replace the notion of identity with the idea of 
modes of living and their engagement, this demonstrates and advocates how any even 
theoretical closure ultimately prevents from attending the way in which life is 
concretely and practically encountered beyond dualities and fixed categories. The 
politics and ethics of life elaborated in Part II of the thesis, thus, has less the aim of 
providing itself a definitive alterative than inviting to appreciate how practical and 
actual modes of engagement with life are more open, various and negotiable. This is 
an important problematic for all times, but it applies specifically to today’s world, 
where issues like care for the environment and natural beings, migration flows, 
agricultural policies, debates around asylum remain at the top of public discourse and 
of policy agendas. 
Finally, there is a last dimension to which I would claim that the thesis aims to 
make a contribution. This applies once again to the level of existent philosphico-
political scholarship, but also ushers from what was just suggested in regard to the 
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field of practices. Throughout the analysis and starting from the approach of 
ontopolitics outlined in the Introduction, I intimated that the strong opposition between 
biopolitics and vitalism consists of the fact that they respectively conceive of a purely 
discursive or material understanding of life. These strong ontological assumptions 
inform their politics and the exclusions and restrictions that have been demonstrated. 
In exploring an alternative account in Part II of the thesis, I foregrounded the notion 
of singularity as basis for the understanding of ethics and politics I elaborated. 
Singularity indicated first of all the grasping of forms of life in their difference and the 
situated relational way in which they are encountered, without yet assuming a different 
degree or value among beings. At the end of the analysis, however, it appears clear 
how the notion of singularity accomplishes another, related aim. The term helps 
capture the simultaneously material and discursive dimensions that partake in the 
encounter of life and that, as it has been argued, are not completely separable or liable 
of isolation. This appeared clear with the opening of Foucault and then with the 
materialist theory of ideas inspired by contemporary Spinozism. If we regain the 
ontological level that an analysis of political interpretations in light of ontopolitics 
presupposes, singularity captures the bundle of the material and the discursive, the 
distinction of which still shapes debates in contemporary philosophy and political 
theorising. The emphasis on the dimension of materiality and vitality of life against 
the linguistic turn of the last decades, as seen, was a strong claim driving the 
contemporary vitalist turn explored in Chapter 2. Analogously, biopolitics has for a 
long time made clear the discursive construction of modes of living and being as effect 
of power. However, the attempt to find a synthesis between these approaches remains 
still weak and underexplored in contemporary theory. The use of the notion of 
singularity outlined here can be read in this direction and provides thus an attempt in 
this trajectory. This can be added thus as area of contribution of the project here 
pursued, along with the intervention in theoretical debates around the politics of life 
and the implications it can have for the practical engagements with life and modes of 
living. In fact, such an attempt works astride the two dimensions. My keeping into 
account the material and the discursive dimension or, as seen in the Introduction, 
matter and meaning, as Fassin (2010) has put it with regard to the specific object of 
life, makes a contribution to this divide. I argued that these two dimensions of life do 
not need to be disjoined, since the material and biological status of existence often 
affects the exclusions, inequalities and injustices of which life is object at the social 
 200 
and political level. The concept of singularity, that I used in the second part of the 
thesis in building an alternative account to the politics of life, aimed at taking into 
consideration these only apparently separate dimensions, which are highlighted in 
academic discussions but that also have implications for making sense of life in 
everyday encounters and problems. 
Finally, bridging the materiality and discursivity with which life can be made 
sense of has implications for the research conducted here. I suggest that my own 
attempt to develop a theorisation around the relationship between politics and life 
should not be seen itself as a move that incapsulates, crystalises and constrains modes 
of engagement with life. Rather, the discursive and material planes go hand in hand 
and developments in one direction, that is, the discursive sphere of concepts, theories 
and ideas, can inform and influence the field of practices, thus themselves paving way 
to new avenues of research. Given this mutuality and co-forming, it is thus possible to 
return to Foucault’s quote with which I began the enquiry: in the account here outlined, 
forming concepts is a way of living and not of killing life, it is a way to maintain and 
recognise life in its openness and mobility. The current research has attempted to raise 
reflections, ideas and understandings around alternative ways in which current 
perspectives of the politics of life can be conceived. If this might result in further 
avenues of research in order to maintain the mobility and openness with which this 
scholarly and practical discourse can be addressed, it would have reached the aim that 
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